INSTITUTE FOR RESOURCE AND SECURITY STUDIES
27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA
Phone: 617-491-5177 Fax: 617-491-6904 Email: irss@igc.org
MEMO
TO: Interested Parties
FROM: Gordon Thompson
DATE: 19 April 2003
RE: Present Relevance of the Gorleben Hearing
In 1979, the government of the German state of Lower Saxony held a hearing to inform itself before licensing a proposed nuclear-fuel center at Gorleben. This hearing offers lessons that are relevant to accurately assessing: (a) the present potential for a maliciously-induced release of radioactive material from a US civilian nuclear facility; and (b) options for addressing this threat.
The proposed Gorleben center involved: (a) storage of spent fuel in high-density pools; (b) a reprocessing plant; (c) plutonium storage and MOX-fuel fabrication; (d) radioactive-waste vitrification; and (e) an underground repository. To gain an independent perspective on the issues relevant to licensing of this center, the Lower Saxony government commissioned a review by a group of 20 scientists from several countries. I chaired the subgroup on hazard analysis. Participating scientists were paid and supported by a secretariat. The group submitted its report in March 1979.
At a public hearing of 28 March to 2 April 1979, the review group and the proponent’s scientists debated their respective positions. No lawyers were involved. The hearing was attended throughout by the state governor and several of his cabinet. On 16 May 1979 the governor announced that the Gorleben center would not be licensed as proposed. One of the unacceptable design features was the use of high-density spent-fuel pools. War risk was a major factor influencing this decision. Following this decision, Germany adopted a design for independent spent-fuel-storage installations (ISFSIs) in which spent fuel is stored dry in thick-walled casks housed in a building designed to resist antitank missiles. An ISFSI of this type now exists at Gorleben.
In the present US context, independent scientists, the NRC and the nuclear industry have expressed differing views about the potential for an act of malice or insanity to release radioactive material from a nuclear facility. Members of Congress and other decisionmakers are unsure about the true nature of this threat. The Gorleben hearing offers a model that could be adapted to provide needed information. Key features of the model are: (a) independent scientists are provided with the time, payment and support that they need to develop carefully-considered findings; (b) lawyers and public-relations personnel are excluded; and (c) independent scientists debate government and industry scientists in front of decisionmakers. Much of the debate can be held publicly, as demonstrated by a forthcoming paper in the journal Science and Global Security. Sensitive issues can be debated in private sessions, using the same general model.