NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
|
In
the Matter of System
Energy Resources, Inc. (SERI) (Early
Site Permit for |
|
Docket
No. 52-009 |
WASTE CONFIDENCE CONTENTIONS
OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE-CLAIBORNE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BRANCH, NUCLEAR
INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE, PUBLIC CITIZEN, AND MISSISSIPPI CHAPTER OF
THE SIERRA CLUB REGARDING EARLY SITE PERMIT APPLICATION
FOR SITE OF
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioners,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Claiborne
County, Mississippi Branch (“NAACP”); Nuclear Information and Resource Service
(“NIRS”); Public Citizen; and Mississippi Chapter of the Sierra Club (Sierra
Club) (hereinafter “Intervenors”) Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League
(“BREDL”), Nuclear Information and Resource Service (“NIRS”) and Public
Citizen, hereby request leave to file two environmental contentions out of
time, approximately one hour after expiration of the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board’s 5 p.m. deadline for electronic filing of contentions in this
proceeding. The contentions are
virtually identical to contentions that NIRS and Public Citizen have submitted
in the North Anna and Clinton ESP proceedings.
The omission of the contention from Petitioners’ original set of
contentions was an oversight.
A hard
copy of the contentions and their exhibits will be served tonight by Federal
Express.
II. CONTENTION
Contention
3.2.1: Failure to Evaluate Whether and
in What Time Frame Spent Fuel Generated by Proposed Reactors Can Be Safely
Disposed Of
Contention: The ER for the Grand Gulf ESP is deficient
because it fails to discuss the environmental implications of the lack of
options for permanent disposal of the irradiated (i.e, “spent”) fuel that will be generated by the proposed reactors
if they are built and operated. Nor has
the NRC made an assessment on which SERI can rely regarding the degree of
assurance now available that radioactive waste generated by the proposed
reactors “can be safely disposed of [and] when such disposal or off-site
storage will be available.” Final Waste
Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,658 (
Basis: The ER for the
proposed new reactors does not contain any discussion of the environmental
implications of the lack of options for permanent disposal of the irradiated
fuel to be generated by two new reactors on the Grand Gulf Anna site. Therefore, it is fatally deficient. State
of
While SERI may
have intended to rely on the NRC’s Waste Confidence decision, issued in 1984
and most recently amended in 1999, that decision is inapplicable because it
concerns plants that are currently operating, not new plants. The second finding of the Waste Confidence
Decision, as amended in 1999, is that the Commission has:
reasonable assurance that at least
one mined geologic repository will be available within the first quarter of the
twenty-first century, and that sufficient repository capacity will be available
within 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the
term of a revised or renewed license) of any reactor to dispose of the
commercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel originating in such
reactor and generated up until that time.
(This finding revised the finding in the original decision that a mined
geologic repository would be available by the years 2007 to 2009).
Waste Confidence Decision
Review: Status, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,005,
68,006 (
Moreover, the
revised second finding in the 1999 Waste Confidence review statement
conspicuously fails to assert confidence in the likelihood that more than one
repository will be licensed. In fact,
the Commission has backtracked on its original 1984 “Nuclear Waste Confidence
Decision,” in which the Commission expressed confidence that “one or more”
repositories would open between 2007 and 2009.
Waste Confidence Decision, 49 Fed. Reg. at 34,673. The 1999 Status Report states merely that “at
least one” repository will open by 2025.
64 Fed. Reg. at 68,006.
It is also clear
that the inventory of spent fuel and other high-level radioactive waste being generated
by the current generation of nuclear
reactors is far greater than what can be accommodated in the single repository
in which the Commission places its confidence,
NRC’s now-routine
approval of 20 year license extensions to old commercial nuclear reactors will
only increase the quantity of high-level radioactive waste that exceeds the
capacity limits at the proposed
Accordingly, the
spent fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes generated at the proposed
new reactors could not be “disposed of” at
Moreover, Congress
has not given the NRC any basis for assuming that a second repository will be
opened. Section 161(b) of the NWPA
provides that: “[t]he Secretary [of
Energy] shall report to the President and to Congress on or after
The Commission’s
failure to express confidence that a second repository will be opened any time
soon also implicates the third and fourth findings of the Waste Confidence
Decision, i.e, that spent fuel and
other high-level radioactive waste can be safely stored at reactor sites for up
to 30 years. 64 Fed. Reg. at
68,006. If the Commission has no
confidence that a repository will open at some reasonable time in the future,
it must be assumed that spent fuel may sit at the reactor site for an
indefinite period of time. The
environmental impacts of such indefinite storage must be evaluated before an Early
Site Permit can be granted.
Contention 3.2.1: Even if the
Waste Confidence Decision Applies to This Proceeding, It Should be
Reconsidered.
Contention: Even if the
Waste Confidence Decision applies to this proceeding, it should be
reconsidered, in light of significant and pertinent unexpected events that
raise substantial doubt about its continuing validity, i.e., the increased threat of terrorist attacks against
Basis:
In its 1999 “Nuclear Waste Confidence Decision” revision, NRC stated
“the Commission would consider undertaking a comprehensive reevaluation of the
Waste Confidence findings…if significant and pertinent unexpected events occur
raising substantial doubt about the continuing validity of the Waste Confidence
findings.” 64 Fed. Reg. at 68,007. Clearly, the catastrophic terrorist attacks
upon the
3.
The Commission finds reasonable assurance that high-level radioactive
waste and spent fuel will be managed in a safe manner until sufficient
repository capacity is available to assure the safe disposal of all high-level
waste and spent fuel (This finding is
identical to the finding in the original Waste Confidence Decision in
1984).
4.
The Commission finds reasonable assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel
can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least
30 years beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term of
a revised or renewed license) of that reactor at its spent fuel storage basin,
or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations. (This finding is basically identical to that
in the original Waste Confidence Decision with the addition of the
consideration of license renewal and spent fuel storage 30 years beyond the
licensed life for operation of a reactor).
64 Fed. Reg. at 68,006. The terrorist threat to irradiated nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste – whether it is being stored on-site at
commercial reactors in storage pools or dry casks; stored in away-from-reactor Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installations; or transported by truck, train, or barge between
nuclear plants and off-site interim storage facilities – demands an evaluation
of whether (a) it is appropriate to store spent fuel and other highly
radioactive waste for 30 years or more pending availability of a permanent
repository, and (b) whether nuclear power should be phased out as quickly as
possible as a matter of environmental protection, national security, public
safety, and common defense.
The homeland security risks posed by
indefinite temporary storage of spent fuel have been recognized by Energy
Secretary Spencer Abraham:
Statement of Spencer Abraham,
Secretary of Energy, Before the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, U.S.
Senate (May 16, 2002), copy attached as Exhibit 3.2.1-2 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that neither fuel storage
pools nor dry storage facilities are designed to withstand the type of
determined and sophisticated attack that was carried out on September 11,
2001.
To
protect against and mitigate the impacts of terrorist attacks, the NRC has
developed a system to maintain a constant state of alert, undertaken a
comprehensive review of the adequacy of its safety and security regulations,
and upgraded its security requirements for all operating nuclear facilities in
the
Petitioners
are aware that the Commission has ruled that environmental impacts of terrorist
attacks are not cognizable under NEPA. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo
Canyon Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-01, 57 NRC 1
(2003); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent
Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340 (2002). Petitioners request that the Commission
reconsider this policy, in light of (a) the obvious attractiveness and
vulnerability of spent fuel to terrorist attack, (b), the Secretary of Energy’s
recognition of the relationship between homeland security and assured capacity
for timely spent fuel disposal; and (c) the Commission’s explicit statement in
the Waste Confidence status review that it would undertake a comprehensive
reevaluation of the Waste Confidence findings if “significant and pertinent
unexpected events” occur raising substantial doubt about the continuing
validity of the Waste Confidence findings.
Clearly, that condition is met here.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing
reasons, the ASLB should admit Petitioners’ contentions.
Respectfully submitted,
Diane Curran
Harmon, Curran,
Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1726 M Street N.W.,
202/328-3500
fax: 202/328-6918
e-mail: dcurran@harmoncurran.com
May
3, 2004
[1] Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (“NWPA”),
63,000 metric tons is the legal limit for commercial waste storage that can be
“disposed of” at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, at least until a second repository is
operational elsewhere in the U.S. As the NWPA states at Section 114(d):
The [NRC] decision approving the
first such application [for a license to open and operate a repository] shall
prohibit the emplacement in the first repository of a quantity of spent fuel
containing in excess of 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal or a quantity of
solidified high-level radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of such
a quantity of spent fuel until such time as a second repository is in
operation…”
42 U.S.C. § 10134(d).
By long-established DOE policy, the first 70,000 metric tons of
irradiated nuclear fuel and solidified high-level radioactive waste “disposed
of” at Yucca Mountain, Nevada would include 90% commercial nuclear reactor
waste, and 10% DOE waste from the nuclear weapons production complex and
nuclear energy research activities. 90%
of 70,000 metric tons means that only 63,000 metric tons of commercial
irradiated nuclear fuel could be “disposed of” at
[2] Experience also shows that the NRC has been
overly optimistic about the opening of the first repository. It took from 1982 (the year the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act was passed) until 2002 – 20 full years -- just for the DOE to
recommend