May 3, 2004
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
|
In
the Matter of System
Energy Resources, Inc. (SERI) (Early
Site Permit for |
|
Docket
No. 52-009 |
CONTENTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE-CLAIBORNE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI BRANCH,
NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE, PUBLIC CITIZEN, AND MISSISSIPPI
CHAPTER OF THE SIERRA CLUB REGARDING EARLY SITE PERMIT APPLICATION
FOR SITE OF
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant
to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309 and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s (“ASLB’s”)
Initial Prehearing Order of March 8, 2004, Petitioners, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Claiborne County, Mississippi
Branch (“NAACP”); Nuclear Information and Resource Service (“NIRS”); Public
Citizen; and Mississippi Chapter of the Sierra Club (Sierra Club) (hereinafter
“Intervenors”) Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (“BREDL”), Nuclear
Information and Resource Service (“NIRS”) and Public Citizen, hereby submit
their contentions regarding System Energy Resources Inc.’s (“SERI’s”) application
for an Early Site Permit (“ESP”) that would allow it to build and operate one
or more new nuclear power plants on the site of the Grand Gulf Unit 1 nuclear
power plant. As demonstrated below,
these contentions should be admitted because they satisfy the NRC’s
admissibility requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309.
II. CONTENTIONS
Below Petitioners present
their contentions, which are numbered in accordance with the ASLB’s
instructions in its March 8, 2004, Initial Prehearing Order. Contentions related to the Site Safety
Analysis begin with 2. Contentions
relating to environmental issues begin with 3.
Contentions relating to emergency planning begin with 4. There are no contentions under the
“administrative” or “miscellaneous” categories proposed by the ASLB in its order.
1. Administrative
Contentions
Petitioners
are not submitting any administrative contentions at this time.
2. Contentions
Regarding Site Safety Analysis
Contention 2.1: Failure to provide adequate safety assessment
of reactor interaction
Contention: The ESP application for Grand Gulf Unit 1 fails to comply with 10 C.F.R. § 52.17 because its safety assessment does not contain an adequate analysis and evaluation of the major structures, systems, and components of the facility that bear significantly on the acceptability of the site under the radiological consequences evaluation factors identified in 10 C.F.R. § 50.23(a)(1). In particular, the safety assessment does not adequately take into account the potential effects on radiological accident consequences of co-locating new reactors with advanced designs next to an older reactor. The safety assessment should contain a comprehensive evaluation and analysis of the ways in which interaction of the old and new plants under accident conditions may exacerbate the consequences of a radiological accident.
This contention is
supported by the Declaration of David A. Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer, In
Support of Petitioners’ Contentions (May 3, 2004), copy attached as Exhibit
2.1-1.
Basis: Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 52.17, an ESP application must contain:
a description and safety assessment of the site on which the facility is to be located. The assessment must contain an analysis and evaluation of the major structures, systems, and components of the facility that bear significantly on the acceptability of the site under the radiological consequence evaluation factors identified in § 50.34(a)(1) of this chapter.
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a)(1)(ii), an ESP application must consider such “radiological consequence evaluation factors” as whether and to what extent “generally accepted engineering standards” are used to design the new plant, whether and to what extent the new reactor design incorporates “unique, unusual, or enhanced safety features having a significant bearing on the probability or consequences” of an accident release of radiation, and plant design features that are “intended to mitigate the radiological consequences of accidents.”[1]
The safety assessment for Grand Gulf Unit 1 is deficient because it does not adequately consider the relationship between the design of the proposed new reactors and the design of the existing reactor on the site. The new reactor designs already certified by NRC and those currently under review by NRC are allegedly “safer” and less likely to have an accident involving significant core damage. For instance, the potential reactor designs listed in the application include the AP-1000 pressurized water reactor, the gas-turbine modular helium reactor (“GT-MHR”), and the pebble-bed modular reactor (“PBMR”). ESP Application, Section 1.3.1.3. The vendors of these reactors contend that the designs contain features which lessen the likelihood of an accident, and which also lessen the severity of an accident, should one occur. Consequently, the design basis accidents (“DBAs”) and source terms resulting from DBAs for the proposed reactors are significantly less severe than for the existing operating reactor. Correspondingly, the new reactors are designed with fewer features to protect station workers from radiation released during accident conditions, including loss-of-coolant accidents. An accident at the existing reactor could, therefore, have significant adverse effects on the operation of the new reactor.
There are many
sites in the
The interaction of control room designs for older and newer reactors provides an example of this problem. The control room design for the new reactors may be sufficient to adequately protect workers from postulated accidents at that reactor and from postulated accidents at nearby reactors of the same or similar design. But the control room design for the new reactors may not adequately protect workers from postulated accidents at nearby reactors of different design (e.g., the current fleet of operating reactors).
As required by General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to Part 50, a control room:
shall be provided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions, including loss-of-coolant accidents. Adequate radiation protection shall be provided to permit access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem whole body, or its equivalent to any part of the body, for the duration of the accident. Equipment at appropriate locations outside the control room shall be provided (1) with a design capability for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor, including necessary instrumentation and controls to maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot shutdown, and (2) with a potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown of the reactor through the use of suitable procedures.
The reactors operating today, such as Grand Gulf Unit 1, are designed with ventilation systems that maintain the control rooms at higher pressure than outside so that in event of an accident, clean air leaks out of the control room rather than radioactive air leaking in. Some outside air must be drawn in to create the positive pressure inside the control rooms- this outside air passes through charcoal and HEPA filters to remove radioactivity before it reached the operators in the control rooms. Because these existing reactors cannot preclude the occurrence of an accident resulting in significant release of radiation, GDC 19 requires their control rooms be designed to protect workers from exposure to that radiation.
Because
new reactor designs are allegedly safer, the protection for control room
operators is less. Assuming the new
reactor designs are safer, building one next to an existing reactor means that
it will be exposed to radiation released during an accident at Grand Gulf Unit
1. Thus, it is unreasonable to protect
the operators in the control room of the new reactor(s) at the
Environmental qualification of electrical equipment provides another example of the potentially adverse interaction between old and new plant designs. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.49 and General Design Criterion 4 of Appendix A to Part 50, nuclear power plant electrical equipment must be qualified to withstand the severity of accident conditions that are predicted for that plant design. Because accidents at nuclear plants of relatively new design are not expected to be as severe as accidents than for older plants, electrical equipment in the new plants at the Grand Gulf site may not be qualified to withstand levels of heat or radiation that may be generated by an accident at the existing plant. This should be of concern to the applicant because of the relatively close proximity of the new and existing plants.[2]
Contention 2.2: Failure to
Evaluate Site Suitability for Below-Grade Placement of Reactor Containment
Contention:
The Site Safety Analysis Report for
the Grand Gulf ESP application is inadequate because it does not evaluate the
suitability of the site to locate the reactor containment below
grade-level. Below-grade construction is
advisable and appropriate, if not necessary, in order to maintain an adequate
level of security in the post-9/11 threat environment.
Basis:
a.
Legal requirements. Pursuant
to 10 C.F.R. § 52.17, an ESP application must contain “a description and safety
assessment of the site on which the facility is to be located.” Section 52.17 also requires that site
characteristics “must comply with part 100 of this chapter.” Part 100 requirements include the stipulation
that: “[s]ite characteristics must be
such that adequate security plans and measures can be developed.” 10 C.F.R. § 100.21(f). The site conditions that must be evaluated
include “soil and rock stability, liquefaction potential, natural and
artificial slope stability, cooling water supply, and remote safety-related
structure siting.”
b. Rationale for requiring below-grade
construction of containments. The applicant should be
required to evaluate the Grand Gulf site for below-grade construction of the
containment because, as currently designed and constructed, nuclear power
plants are unacceptably attractive and vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks
and sabotage. The attractiveness of
nuclear plants as terrorist targets is well-recognized. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, for
example, President Bush stated that nuclear power plants are priority targets
for terrorists. http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/. The fact that nuclear plants are still high
on Al Qaeda’s target list was recently confirmed by Robert Hutchings, chairman
of the National Intelligence Council (which reports to the CIA Director).
Reuters, “U.S. Intelligence Official: Qaeda Posed Plane Threat,” New York Times
(February 17, 2004), copy attached as Exhibit 2.2-1.
The
vulnerability of containment structures and associated irradiated fuel storage
ponds to terrorist attack, particularly to aircraft penetration, has also been
recognized in NRC documents and press articles.
For example, a 1987
NRC-sponsored study found that a 12,500 pound aircraft had a 32% chance of
crashing through a 6-feet thick reinforced concrete wall, and an 84% chance of
penetrating through a 2-feet thick reinforced concrete wall. NUREG-/CR-5042, Evaluation of External
Hazards to Nuclear Power Plants in the
A 1982 study by Argonne National Laboratory
also concluded that
Based on the review of past [NRC] licensing experience, it appears that
fire and explosion hazards have been treated with much less care than the
direct aircraft impact and the resulting structural response.
Therefore, the claim that these fire/explosion effects do not represent a
threat to nuclear power plant facilities has not been clearly
demonstrated.
The various
advanced reactor generation designs that are being considered by SERI in its
application were developed before the terrorist attacks of September 11, and
before the NRC undertook a comprehensive evaluation of its regulations to
evaluate their adequacy to protect against the terrorist threat. Thus,
they are not specifically designed to protect against assault by attackers with
the level of determination and capability demonstrated by the September 11
terrorist attackers. In fact, the new
generation of advanced reactors does not have as robust a containment as the
current generation. For example, as a
general matter, the containment thickness of the current generation of nuclear
power plants is about 2-3 feet.[4] The containments of the allegedly new
“inherently safe” reactor containment building designs are equivalent or even thinner. For example, the Westinghouse AP 600 Advanced
Pressurized Water Reactor has a 3-foot thick containment wall of reinforced concrete.[5]
c.
Viability of below-grade construction
Below-grade
construction of nuclear reactor containments is a viable design security
measure that would protect the reactor containment from assault by aircraft or
other high-power weapons. In fact,
consideration of below-grade construction was recommended as a prudent design
feature over 50 years ago by Dr. Edward Teller, one of the founders of the
[t]he various committees dealing
with reactor safety have come to the conclusion that none of the powerful
reactors built or suggested up to the present time are absolutely safe. Though the possibility of an accident seems
small, a release of the active products in a city or densely populated area
would lead to disastrous results. It has been therefore the practice of these
committees to recommend the observance of exclusion distances, that is, to
exclude the public from areas around reactors, the size of the area varying in
appropriate manner with the amount of radioactive poison that the reactor might
release. Rigid enforcement of such
exclusion distances might hamper future development of reactors to an unreasonable
extent. In particular, the danger that a reactor might malfunction and release
its radioactive poison differs for different kinds of reactors. It is my
opinion that reactors of sufficiently safe types might be developed in the near
future. Apart from the basic construction
of the reactor, underground location or particularly thought-fully constructed
safety devices might be considered.
Letter from Dr. Edward Teller to
the Honorable Sterling Cole, Chairman of the Joint Committee on
There
is no indication in the ESP application that the applicant considered the
suitability of the site for below-grade construction of the reactor
containment. While the application
evaluates the suitability of the site for construction of a foundation for the
facility, suitability for underground construction would require a much more
sophisticated and in-depth analysis of geological and hydrogeological
conditions. Therefore, Petitioners
contend that the applicant has not provided sufficient information within its
site safety analysis to permit a finding that the propose site is suitable for
new nuclear reactors.
3. Environmental
Contentions
Contention 3.1: Inadequate
Consideration of Disproportionate Adverse Impacts on Minority and Low-Income
Community
Contention: SERI’s Environmental Report (“ER”), prepared in support of its Early Site Permit application, does not comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) because it does not adequately consider the adverse and disparate environmental impacts of the proposed nuclear facilities on the predominately African American and low-income community of Claiborne County.
At the outset,
while the ER acknowledges the existence of minority and low-income populations
within a 50-mile radius around the Grand Gulf site, see ER § 2.5.4, the ER understates the levels of minority
representation and poverty in Claiborne County, which hosts the Grand Gulf site
and which takes up much of the area in the portion of Grand Gulf’s
10-mile-radius emergency planning zone that lies on the east side of the
Mississippi River. As a result, the ER
falsely minimizes the disparity of the adverse impacts on the minority and
low-income community of
The ER also fails
to address the environmental impacts of the proposed reactor(s) in light of the
“factors peculiar to” the minority and low-income community
The ER also fails
to consider the effect of adding two reactors to the
The ER is also
deficient because it makes no attempt to evaluate the disparity in distribution
of the economic benefits yielded by the proposed reactors. For instance, under current tax law, most of
the tax revenue generated by the new reactors will go to the State of
Finally, the ER fails to weigh the costs of the proposed reactor(s) to the minority and low-income community against the benefits to the community, or to examine alternatives that would lessen the impact of the facility and/or distribute the costs and benefits more equitably. These alternatives could include consideration of other sites whose surrounding populations are in a better financial position to absorb the costs of mounting an effective response to a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant, or arrangements to more equitably distribute the wealth that is generated by the facility.
This
contention is supported by the Declaration of Robert Bullard, Ph.D., In Support
of Petitioners’ Environmental Justice Contention, copy attached as Exhibit
3.1-1. Dr. Bullard has been found by the
NRC to be a qualified expert on environmental justice issues. See
Basis:
a.
Requirements of NEPA. NEPA
requires the NRC to fully assess the impacts of the proposed action, including
the disparate impacts on a low-income and minority community. CLI-98-6, 47 NRC at 106. The question of whether a proposed NRC action
adversely affects minority and low-income communities in a disparate way “lies
close to the heart of NEPA.”
In CLI-98-3, the Commission declared that a “disparate
impact analysis” is its “principal tool” for advancing environmental justice
under NEPA.”
b.
History and demographics of
Well
into the 20th century,
Segregation
continued racial inequality in
The presence of
the
c.
ER distorts minority and low-income representation. The ER generally concedes that the region
surrounding
First, the ER fails to directly acknowledge that a minority community surrounds the Grand Gulf site, and occupies virtually the entire portion of the ten-mile emergency planning zone that lies on the east side of the Mississippi River. According to the ER:
Portions of
ER § 2.5.4. Figure 2.5-6 shows that on the State of
Second, in order to identify low-income communities, the ER uses an inappropriate geographic area for comparison. NRC Office Instruction LIC-203, Procedural Guidance for preparing Environmental Assessments and Considering Environmental Issues (2001), defines a “low-income population” as one in which:
1) the low-income population in the census block group or the environmental impact area exceeds 50 percent, or 2) the percentage of households below the poverty level in an environmental impact area is significantly greater (typically 20 percentage points) than the low-income population percentage in the geographic area chosen for the comparative analysis.”
By choosing
In determining whether a minority or low-income population exists, define the geographic area to use for the comparative analysis. The area used for the comparative analysis is larger and encompasses the entire area of potential impact from the proposed action or all of the environmental impact areas (it is called the geographic area). See Figures 2 and 3 for examples.
When a regulatory action is being considered that involves alternative site considerations, such as an early site or construction permit, then, in addition to determining the individual geographic area for each site as defined above, determine an overall geographic area that encompasses all of the alternative site geographic areas. See Figure 3 for an example.
d.
Disproportionate accident risk.
In Section 5.8.3, the ER provides an extremely brief discussion of “Environmental Justice Impacts.” Under the heading “Potential Human Health Impacts,” SERI asserts that accidents at the new Grand Gulf reactors would pose “no significant adverse health impacts to the public,” because radiological consequences of postulated accidents would “meet the site acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.34 and 10 CFR 100 for the exclusion area boundary and low population zone boundary.” ER § 5.8.3.2.2.
SERI’s evaluation
of accident impacts on the minority and low-income community that lies adjacent
to the Grand Gulf site is inadequate because it only considers design basis
accidents, and because it is misleading.
SERI states that “[t]he evaluation of postulated accidents is provided
in Section 7.1” of the ER.
While severe accidents are less
likely to occur than design basis accidents, the NRC learned from the Three
Mile Island accident and the
SERI concedes that the consequences of severe
accidents may be extreme, and that therefore it is important to consider the
impacts of severe accidents on the environment and their “offsite costs.”
the site population (which reflects the number of people potentially at risk to severe accident exposure) and wind direction (which reflects the likelihood of exposure.
e.
Disproportionate risk due to lack of adequate emergency planning and
security resources.
The
ER also fails to consider the disproportionate safety and security risk to
Thus, SERI plans to depend on local fire control, law enforcement, and health care facilities to assist in responding to any emergency that may occur at the new reactor(s), and thereby attempt to prevent or mitigate the impacts of any radiological accidents that may occur at the new reactor(s).
The ER fails to
consider, however, that one of the factors that is “peculiar” to the minority
and low-income community of
For instance,
The Claiborne
County Sheriff’s Department is similarly under-equipped and under-staffed. The Sheriff’s Department plays a critical
role in security and emergency response for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, and
is designated as the first responder for any accident or other emergency that
occurs at the plant. Declaration of
Joseph C. Davis, President of the NAACP,
These deficiencies in the local law enforcement capabilities are particularly significant in light of the current post-9/11 threat environment. As recognized by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the recent increase in the security threat to nuclear power plants has led to a corresponding and rapid rise in initial response requirements from local law enforcement agencies, namely the Claiborne County Sheriff’s Department. Lance Terry, NEI, “Nuclear Power Plant Security,” viewgraph presentation to NRC Regulatory Information Conference (March 2003), excerpt attached as Exhibit 3.1-7.
To some extent, the lack of adequate resources
for the
f. Disproportionate
adverse economic impacts.
The
ER fails to address the effect of construction of two new reactors on property
values in the surrounding area. As
recognized in CLI-98-3, it is appropriate to evaluate the impacts of new
nuclear facilities on property values in a minority and low-income
community. 47 NRC at 108-09. As discussed above, the presence of the
The
ER also fails to evaluate the economic impacts on
g.
Disproportionately low benefits of proposed reactors.
According
to the ER, the new reactors would have “[s]everal positive socioeconomic
impacts,” including “employment opportunities, both directly and indirectly
related to facility operation for workers within the region of the GGNS site,
and increased tax revenues.” ER §
5.8.3.2.3. This discussion is deficient
because it does not address the fact that most of the tax revenue from the new
reactors will go out of the county. It
also fails to address the fact that the new plant(s) will create few new jobs
for the local community. According to
the Taylor Letter, approximately 20% of
The Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Plant, which began operation in July 1985, was
promoted as the answer to this dire
economic situation, promising jobs and tax revenue. This promise turned out to
be ephemeral. After
f. Failure to adequately weigh alternatives. Once the ER has provided a sufficiently detailed description of the environmental impacts of the proposed new reactor(s) on the surrounding minority and low-income community, SERI must evaluate reasonable alternatives that would avoid or mitigate those impacts. 10 C.F.R. § 51.45(b)(3). While SERI has provided an evaluation of alternative sites and energy supply sources in Chapter 9, it has not taken environmental justice issues into account in weighing these alternatives. SERI must conduct a new evaluation of alternatives in consideration of their environmental impacts on low-income and minority communities, including the no-action alternative, alternative sites, alternatives for reducing the off-site impacts of severe accidents, and alternatives for distributing the benefits of the new plant(s) more equitably.[16]
Contention 3.2: Inadequate Discussion
of Severe Accident Impacts
Contention: The ER’s discussion of severe accident is inadequate, because it relies on the findings and conclusions of NUREG-1437, Vol. 1, the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants (1996) (“NUREG-1437), without providing specific design information that would justify the applicability of the NUREG.
Basis: As required by NEPA
and NRC Staff guidance, Section 7.2 of the ER for the
In correspondence with the Nuclear Energy Institute (“NEI”), the NRC Staff has set limits on the use of NUREG-1437 to support or substitute for the severe accident analysis required of an ESP application. In early 2003, NEI wrote to the NRC, suggesting parameters for permitting reliance on NUREG-1437. Letter from Dr. Ronald L. Simard, NEI, to James E. Lyons, re: Resolution of Generic Topic ESP-10 (Use of License Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (NUREG-1437) for Early Site Permits) (February 6, 2003) (hereinafter “Simard Letter”), copy attached as Exhibit 3.2-1. In responding to the Simard Letter, the NRC made it clear that ESP applicants could not make unqualified reliance on NUREG-1437, cautioning that:
the process suggested in Items 2, 3, and 4 [of the Simard Letter], and the concluding remarks of your letter implies that the ESP applicant can adopt the conclusions of the GEIS in its application without detailed knowledge of the design and operational characteristics of a facility that may be built on the proposed site. The GEIS documents the staff’s evaluation of the environmental impacts of LWR reactors of known design, locations, and operating experiences. The analysis results documented in the GEIS may not be representative of the environmental impacts of a facility that could be built on the site proposed in an ESP application. Therefore, although the environmental impacts of the construction and operation of a nuclear facility located on the proposed site may be similar to those identified in the GEIS, it is incumbent on the ESP applicant to justify its conclusion regarding these impacts.
The NRC does believe that there may be useful insights in the GEIS that an ESP applicant can consider for its purposes in developing its environmental report, but, as stated above, the burden for justifying relevance and demonstrating completeness rests entirely with the applicant. In addition, the NRC retains the prerogative to utilize well-established NEPA techniques, such as tiering, cooperation and adoption, where the NRC believes that it is appropriate.
Letter from James E. Lyons, NRC, to Dr. Ronald L. Simard, NEI, re: Resolution of Early Site Permit Topic 10 (ESP-10), Use of License Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (NUREG-1437) for Early Site Permits (April 1, 2003) (hereinafter “Lyons Letter I”), copy attached as Exhibit 3.2-2. In a subsequent letter, Mr. Lyons Letter further clarified that:
[t]he NRC will perform its review
on severe accident environmental impacts in accordance with ESRP Section
7.2. If specific plant design
information is available (e.g., a detailed design with a Level 3 PRA), then
this information would be used in the evaluation. However, even in the absence of a detailed
plant design (e.g., the specific reactor type or technology is undecided), a
severe accident impacts analysis is technically feasible at the ESP stage using
a PPE approach and the existing guidance in ESRP [Early Site Review Plan] Section
7.2. Such a approach could involve
characterizing the spectrum of credible releases from candidate future plant designs,
in terms of representative source terms and their respective frequencies, and
using these release characteristics in conjunction with site-specific
population and meteorology to determine site-specific risk impacts for the
surrogate design. Release
characteristics could be developed through a survey of severe accident analyses
for previously certified ALWRs and/or operating reactors. Risk impacts could be assessed using the same
metrics as in previous plant-specific and generic EISs, such as NUREG-0974, “
Letter from James E. Lyons, NRC, to
Dr. Ronald L. Simard, NEI, re: Response
to Letter on Early Site Permit Topic 12 (EP-12, NEPA Consideration of Severe
Accident Issues at 2 (June 25, 2003) (hereinafter “Lyons II Letter”), attached
as Exhibit 3.2-3.
Contrary
to the guidance of the Lyons I Letter and the Lyons II Letter, the ER for the
The ER simply makes no attempt to analyze the potential for severe accidents with respect to any of the advanced designs proposed by SERI. There is no indication in the ER that the design information used for NUREG-1437 would be applicable to the advanced designs proposed by SERI, or that the behavior of those advanced reactors under severe accident conditions would be the same or similar. Accordingly, SERI’s severe accident analysis is fatally deficient.
4. Emergency
Planning Contentions
Contention 4.1: Emergency Planning Deficiencies
Contention: SERI’s ESP application is inadequate because it fails fully to identify “physical characteristics unique to the proposed site, such as egress limitations from the area surrounding the site that could pose a significant impediment to the development of emergency plans.” 10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(1). In particular, Part 4 of the ESP application, entitled “Emergency Planning Information,” fails to identify the significant impediment to the development of emergency plans posed by the gross inadequacies in offsite emergency response facilities, including the Claiborne County Sheriff’s Department, the Claiborne County Fire Department, and the Claiborne County Hospital.
Basis: NRC regulations at 10 C.F.R. § 52.17(b)(1) require that an ESP application:
must identify physical characteristics unique to the proposed site, such as egress limitations from the area surrounding the site, that could pose a significant impediment to the development of emergency plans.
Correspondingly, before approving an ESP application, the NRC must make a determination that “there is no significant impediment to the development of emergency plans.” 10 C.F.R. § 52.19. In addition, in order to issue an ESP, the presiding officer must make a determination that:
a reactor, or reactors, having characteristics that fall within the parameters for the site can be constructed and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
10 C.F.R. § 52.21.
In Section 3.1.1.5
of Part 4 of the ESP, SERI asserts that
While local officials may be
willing to develop emergency plans for the new reactors, it is clear that they
lack sufficient resources to develop effective emergency plans. As discussed above in Contention 3.1, the
Claiborne County Sheriff’s Department, fire department, and hospital, have
grossly insufficient resources and personnel to respond to a radiological
emergency at
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing
reasons, the ASLB should admit Petitioners’ contentions.
Respectfully submitted,
Diane Curran
Harmon, Curran,
Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1726 M Street N.W.,
202/328-3500
fax: 202/328-6918
e-mail: dcurran@harmoncurran.com
May
3, 2004
[1] Section 50.34(a)(1) has two subsections, (i)
and (ii). Subsection (ii) presumably is
the relevant provision, because it applies to post-1997 applications for
construction permits, design certification, or combined licenses. The relevant portion of Subsection (ii)
requires submission of the following information:
(i)
A description and safety assessment of the site and a safety assessment
of the facility. It is expected that
reactors will reflect through their design, construction and operation an
extremely low probability for accidents that could result in the release of
significant quantities of radioactive fission products. The following power reactor design
characteristics and proposed operation will be taken into consideration by the
Commission:
(A) Intended use of the reactor including the
proposed maximum power level and the nature and inventory of contained
radioactive materials;
(B) The extent to which generally accepted
engineering standards and applied to the design of the reactor;
(C) The extent to which the reactor incorporates
unique, unusual or enhanced safety features having a significant bearing on the
probability or consequences of accidental release of radioactive materials;
(D) The safety features that are to be engineered
into the facility and those barriers that must be breached as a result of an
accident before a release of radioactive material to the environment can
occur. Special attention must be directed
to plant design features intended to mitigate the radiological consequences of
accidents. In performing this
assessment, an applicant shall assume a fission product release [footnote
omitted] from the core into the containment, assuming that the facility is
operated at the ultimate power level contemplated. The applicant shall perform an evaluation and
analysis of the postulated fission product release, using the expected
demonstrable containment leak rate and any fission product cleanup systems intended
to mitigate the consequences of the accidents, together with applicable site
characteristics, including site meteorology, to evaluate the offsite
radiological consequences. Site
characteristics must comply with part 100 of this chapter. . . .
[2] Section 3.6 of the ESP application for
[3] Notably, a “large” aircraft was defined as
weighing 12,500 pounds, even though the report observed that a Boeing B727-200
has a maximum takeoff weight of 209,500 pounds (or roughly the equivalent of 17
“large” aircraft).
[4] For example, the containment dome for the
existing
[5] Declaration of Paul V. Gunter (May 3, 2004),
attached as Exhibit 2.2-5.
[6] Petitioners note that they were unable to
obtain a copy of the original letter.
The copy that is attached is was retyped and posted on the website of
the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
[7]
Emilye Crosby, “A Little Taste of
Freedom: the African American Freedom
Struggle in
[10]
[11]
[12]
Even in correctly applying the guidance of LIC-203, Petitioners believe that
SERI should have also taken into account the fact that nuclear power plants,
nuclear waste dumps, and other toxic facilities tend to be located in
geographic regions where the level of poverty and minority representation is
relatively high. Thus, for instance,
three of the six sites identified above are located in states with a relatively
high poverty level in comparison with the rest of the
[13] See also ESP Application, Part 2 -- Site Safety Analysis Report, § 3.1.6.4, which states that:
Given the location of a new facility in relationship to GGNS Unit 1 which has, as part of its security plan, made provisions with local law enforcement agencies, there is high assurance that similar provisions can be made with regard to any new facility, in that the jurisdictions and local law enforcement agencies are the same as for GGNS Unit 1.
[14] SERI gives out inconsistent information on
the amount of tax revenue that is given to
[15] A Little Taste of Freedom at 211.
[16] As discussed in Contention 3.2 below, however,
Petitioners do not believe that SERI has provided enough information to make a
thorough analysis of the environmental impacts of severe accidents at the
proposed new
[17] In fact, Section 7.2.2 of the Grand Gulf ER
appears to be a cookie-cutter discussion, as it duplicates, almost word-for-word,
the discussion of severe accidents in Section 7.2.1 of the ER for the North
Anna ESP application.