December 17, 2007: Comments written by Greenpeace and supported by NIRS and other groups on NRC proposed rule that requires some--but not all--new reactor designs to withstand aircraft crashes.

October 10, 2007: Project On Government Oversight statement on causes of exhausted security workers at Peach Bottom

Asleep at the Switch. Security Guards Caught Sleeping at Peach Bottom.
A three-month investigation by WCBS-TV in New York City uncovered a stunning breakdown of security at some nuclear reactors, including videotape of security guards sleeping on the job at the Peach Bottom site in Pennsylvania. The videotape first aired on WCBS on September 25, 2007.

Peach Bottom’s owner, Exelon Corp., says it will fire Wackenhut, which ran the site’s security operation. WCBS says it also found instances of security guards sleeping at Indian Point in New York.

July 2, 2007: NIRS comments to NRC on its woefully inadequate Environmental Assessment and entirely unacceptable Finding of No Significant Impact regarding terrorist attack risks at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant High-Level Radioactive Waste Dry Cask Storage Installation.

May 15, 2007: Esquire magazine reports Palisades nuclear power plant security chief falsified his background, experience and security credentials. May 14, 2007

January 29, 2007: NIRS, Committee To Bridge the Gap and Public Citizen press release in response to 5-0 vote by Commission to leave reactors vulnerable to 9/11 style attack.

September 2006: The C-10 Education and Research Foundation and Citizens Awareness Network’s joint presentation “Nuclear Spent Fuel & Homeland Security: The Case for Hardened Storage” of high-level radioactive waste onsite at nuclear power plants (a 10 minute presentation).

September 7, 2006: Nuclear Security Coalition calls upon each member of Congress to support hardened onsite storage of used nuclear fuel.

September 7, 2006: Members of Congress join Nuclear Security Coalition in call for Hardened On Site Storage of used nuclear fuel. Nuclear Security Coalition Press Release.

June 2, 2006: In a major victory, a federal court rules that the NRC must consider security/terrorism issues in all nuclear licensing proceedings. For years, the NRC has tried to claim that the threat of terrorism on a nuclear facility is so remote that such issues need not be considered. Court decision is here.

GAO documents that NRC water downed its staff recommendations on nuclear power plant security after conferring with industry on cost considerations. April 4, 2006

Greenpeace UK video: Friday the 13th. January 2006. Watch it!

NIRS comments on NRC proposed rulemaking to amend requirements to protect nuclear power plants from terrorism. February 22, 2006

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Proposed Rule Making on Nuclear Power Station Security. Public Comments are due January 23, 2006. NIRS Alert. January 13, 2006.

On November 08, 2005 the NRC issued its Final Director’s Decision dismissing the request for emergency enforcement action of August 10, 2004 regarding the vulnerability of the General Electric Mark I and II Boiling Water Reactor irradiated fuel storage ponds that are elevated to the top of the reactor building at 32 units in the United States. Read Nuclear Security Coalition letter of response to the petiotion here.

June 29, 2005 NRC Proposed Director’s Decision to the Nuclear Security Coalition August 10, 2004 emergency enforcement petition regarding the structural vulnerability of GE Boiling Water Reactor Mark I and II elevated nuclear waste storage ponds.

April 20, 2005: Study Confirms Public Concern Over Nuclear Fuel Pools. Coalition Demands NRC Move Waste from Vulnerable Reactor Pools. Press release.

Supplemental filing of April 19, 2005 to NRC regarding the August 10, 2004 petition on the vulnerability of GE boiling water reactors as confirmed by findings in the National Academy of Sciences April 2005 public version of its classified report to Congress “The Safety and Security of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage”

Press release on the joint statement of the Nuclear Security Coalition on the National Academy of Sciences report “Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel,” April 06, 2005, identifying the vulnerability of high-level nuclear waste storage ponds at U.S. reactors.

The National Academy of Sciences Report on “Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel,” April 06, 2005:
       Title page/Content
       Executive Summary
       Chapter 1: Introduction and Background
       Chapter 2: Terrorist Attack on Spent Fuel Storage
       Chapter 3: Spent Fuel Pool Storage
       Chapter 4: Dry Cask Storage and Comperative Risks
       Chapter 5: Implementation Issues
       References
       Appendixes

NIRS comments 03/28/2005 to NRC critical of the agency’s proposed rule to broaden its arbitrary and capricious reclassification of documents to be withheld from public disclosure.

March 14, 2005, NRC response to Congress on the agency’s suppression of the National Academy of Science’s redacted summary of its report to Congress on reactor fuel pool vulnerability to terrorism as headlined in a front page story of the Washington Post, March 28, 2005, “Storage of Nuclear Spent Fuel Criticized.” (940Kb)

List of all airports within 10 miles of U.S. nuclear power stations.

NIRS FACT SHEET, February 2005: Nuclear waste storage casks at reactor sites demonstrated to be vulnerable to terrorist attack.

Committee to Bridge the Gap filed a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-73-12) to NRC, as posted to this page,  in request of requiring nuclear power stations to significantly upgrade their Design Basis Threat (DBT) to include raising physical obstructions around reactors and their critical structures to shield the sites from aircraft attack.  The petition also seeks to raise nuclear site security response capabilities to repel at minimum 19 attackers or the equivalent force used on September 11, 2001 against U.S. targets. Over 700 comments, largely in support of the petition for rulemaking were received by NRC and will be posted to http://ruleforum.llnl.gov/cgi-bin/rulemake?source=ctbg_prm&st=petitions-a including comments by NIRS and the combined comments of seven State Attorneys General for Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, and Wisconsin.  Additionally, the Attorney General from Delaware filed support comments.

NIRS comments on PRM-73-12, January 24, 2005
Combined Comments of Office of Attorneys General, January 24, 2005

NRC Petitioned To Urgently Upgrade Nuclear Security Requirements: Meet Realistic Threat Levels and Shield Units From Air Attack! Your Comments Needed by January 24, 2005. NIRS Alert. November 16, 2004.

This U.S. Government Accountability Office congressional testimony (September 2004) is critical of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s oversight of revised Design Basis Threat validation of reactor security compliance.

August 10, 2004. NIRS in concert with a national coalition petitioned NRC for emergency enforcement action on BWR structural  vulnerabilities to terrorism. 32 of the nation’s 104 licensed nuclear power stations are fatally designed and constructed so that irradiated fuel storage ponds are located literally on the roof of the reactor building in structures that NRC has identified in a pre-9/11 study as vulnerable to aircraft penetration. The same study identified that the resulting nuclear waste fire involving hundreds of tons of irradiated nuclear fuel would cause tens of thousands of fatalities out to 500 miles. An international coalition (US and Canada) has filed an emergency enforcement petition to NRC to address the structural vulnerabilities of these reactors or force their closure. Click here for Petition and Annex to the Petition. List of Affected Reactors.

On July 23, 2004, Committee To Bridge the Gap (CBG) filed a Petition for Rulemaking to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission focused on revising the Design Basis Threat for nuclear power stations to contemplate and defend against realistic threat levels and to require that nuclear power station operators protect the facilities from attack by aircraft.

State of New Jersey letter (July 2004) to NRC Region 1 outlining concerns for public safety from perceived vulnerabilities of the Oyster Creek nuclear power station to attack by aircraft and secrecy of federal and industry reports that might otherwise assuage such concerns.

Great Lakes United Resolution on Nuclear Installation Safety and Security, June 2003.

U.S. Government Accountability Office report to Congress (September 2003) identifying weakness in NRC simulation “Force-On-Force” security exercises at nuclear power station.

“Lessons learned” from 1979 Gorleben, Germany decisions on high-level nuclear waste storage given the threats of terrorism and sabotage to U.S. high-density irradiated nuclear fuel storage pools, memo by Dr. Gordon Thompson of Institute for Resource and Security Studies, April 19, 2003.

Nuclear Monitor article (January 2003) focuses on US Nuclear Regulatory Commission denies NIRS et al security contentions at re-licensed nuclear power stations citing terrorism as “speculative.”

Executive Summary of “Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Neglected Issue of Homeland Security”, Institute for Resource and Security Studies (January 2003) focuses on the vulnerability of irradiated fuel stored at the nation’s nuclear power stations  to terrorism and what we can do about it.

Full report of “Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Neglected Issue of Homeland Security”, Institute for Resource and Security Studies (January 2003) focuses on the vulnerability of irradiated fuel stored at the nation’s nuclear power stations  to terrorism and what we can do about it.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order () issued December 17, 2002 denying State of Utah the right to raise security contentions in a nuclear licensing proceeding on Private Fuel Storage.  Order cites terrorism as too “speculative” to be considered under any public hearing as required under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Order was separately applied to three other NRC licensing proceedings including security contentions raised by NIRS in the Duke Power license extension application for the Catawba and McGuire nuclear power stations.

Nuclear Reactor Security in the Wake of September 11
130 Groups call for Increased Nuclear Reactor Security, Shift to Sustainable Energy Future; Press Release, November 1, 2001

Text of Statement--Mandate for Securing America

NEIS paper on reactor security, October 22, 2001

NRC shuts website, other document access;

NIRS letter to NRC Chairman Meserve on NRC website shutdown, October 16, 2001

Press Release: DOE Suspends Largest Radioactive Waste Shipment Due to Security Concerns, October 25, 2001

NRC Security Expert's "Differing Professional Opinion" noting that 47% of U.S. reactors suffer from serious security deficiences, February 3, 1999 (, 2797k)

Project on Government Oversight press release on security lapses at DOE nuclear weapons facilities, October 9, 2001

 Harvey Wasserman on nuclear security and terrorism.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission study (October 2000) “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants” focuses on the possibilities for a nuclear fuel fire in an irradiated fuel storage pond following decommissioning of a nuclear power station.  The report raises relevant post-September 11th security concerns specifically under Section 3.5.2 Aircraft Crashes. For just this reason the report was pulled from public access following the 9/11 attacks only to be returned with the caveat that NRC would not publicize its existence. The study calculates that an irradiated fuel fire could result in tens of thousands of cancer fatalities out to 500 miles of the nuclear facility.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission study (October 2000) “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants” Appendix 4 focuses radioactive inventory releases and human health consequences of a zirconium fire in a “spent” fuel storage pond.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission study (October 2000) “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants” Appendix focuses on the consequence of an accidental aircraft crash on the nuclear waste storage pond.  Deliberate attack is not calculated. However this section as does Section 3.5.2 notes that the 32 General Electric Mark 1 and 2 Boiling Water Reactors “do not appear to have any significant structures that would reduce the likelihood of penetration” of the spent fuel pool by an aircraft.  The study characterizes a “large aircraft” as weighing 12,000 pounds or 6 tons. The take off weight of a large jumbo commercial aircraft that hit the World Trade Center was on the order of 150 tons.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission study (October 2000) “Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants” cover letter (August 2000) identifying calculated “short term” human health consequence (in cancer deaths and societal dose) of an irradiated fuel fire at a decommissioned nuclear power station. Consequences for a fuel fire at a typical operating nuclear power station in the US today are comparable. Report references “long term consequences” of an irradiated fuel storage pond fire as “unaffected.” These cancer fatalities are contemplated and calculated in the report in the Zirconium Fuel Fire section potentially in excess of 26,000 deaths out to 500 miles.