SAFE ENERGY E-JOURNAL No.20 May-June 2001

Please note that the web site address has changed to http://www.kare-uk.org  

1. Editorial - MOX Battle Goes On.
2. Survey of SMP Consultation Submissions.
3. Phoenix News.
4. Proliferation
5. Health News
6. Waste Transports to Sellafield.
7. US MOX
8. Nuclear Waste News
9. Dounreay News

1. Editorial - MOX Battle Goes On.

The UK Government has extended the deadline for responses to its 4th public consultation exercise on the Sellafield MOX Plant by a week to 30th May, because of postal strikes in some areas. So if you haven't sent in a response yet, please send a quick e-mail to 

Claire Herdman
Radioactive Substances Division
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
4/F6 Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6DE
fax: 020 7944 6340
e-mail: mox_consultation@detr.gsi.gov.uk

You can see the consultation documents at:-
 
http://www.environment.detr.gov.uk/consult/mox/sellafield/index.htm

The Barrow Evening News and Star (26th May 2001) reported that DETR has been flooded with a massive 1,500 responses to the consultation. Officials have been astonished by the scale of the reaction to the latest public debate on whether the moth-balled plant should be given the go-ahead to start operating. The third consultation only received 400 responses. The massive postbag makes it unlikely that the long-awaited decision on MOX will be announced before July or August at the earliest. BNFL said it needs a decision by July or it risks losing contracts. 

A ministry spokeswoman said an explosion in the use of e-mail helped explain why the final round of public consultation had sparked so many more responses. But we shouldn't get too excited, the extra responses have probably come from BNFL Sellafield workers. Two years ago, 95 per cent of people said ''No to MOX'' after groups such as Greenpeace successfully mobilised supporters to write in. This time, BNFL workers and local businesses have copied the tactic to even up the pressure exerted by the Greens. The ministry spokeswoman said: "More than half the responses have arrived by e-mail, the vast majority from two campaigns, for and against. 
"There could be a lot more responses in the post because if past consultations are any guide, lots of people leave it to the last minute. How quickly we make an announcement will depend on the new government and the new ministers. We haven't got a date at the moment." 

A report by independent consultants, Arthur D. Little (ADL) on the economic case for MOX will not be handed to ministers until early in June.  

Meanwhile Friends of the Earth has filed a High Court action against the Government over BNFL's plan to start operations at the MOX plant. 
 
Friends of the Earth believes that the Deputy Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Health have acted unlawfully, by deliberately restricting the scope of the final public consultation exercise. FOE lodged papers at the High Court on 24th May, applying for a Judicial Review over Government decisions to:-

(1) skew the economic 'benefits' of the scheme by disregarding the £482 million of taxpayers money spent so far, mostly on constructing the plant;
(2) withhold from the public the ADL report until after it is too late to comment. 

Mark Johnston, Nuclear Campaigner at Friends of the Earth said:

"We are asking the courts to ensure that Ministers act lawfully and responsibly in their approach to the long-term management of plutonium. The fact that Government is the sole owner of the company does not permit it to disregard the law in order to allow BNFL to start making MOX.The growing stockpile of separated plutonium is a worldwide
embarrassment for the nuclear industry. It only exists because of the continuing yet unnecessary reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The 'MOX option' for plutonium is both expensive and misguided". 

Peter Roderick, Legal Adviser at Friends of the Earth said:

"Radiological protection law is intended to protect the environment and public health. New facilities can only be permitted if the economic benefits outweigh detriments. This balancing judgement must include all relevant costs, including the cost of constructing the plant. It is quite wrong for Ministers to ignore construction costs and skew the analysis. It is also unfair and unjust to deny interested parties access to the critical information on which Ministers will take their decision."

A spokesman for the DETR told PA News: ``We don't agree with the basis of this litigation. We believe it to be premature and misguided and we will oppose it.''

The legal challenge is supported by Greenpeace.

The Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) commissioned Arthur D Little Consultants (ADL) to undertake an independent evaluation of the economic case for SMP in April. Their work has run in parallel with the eight-week public consultation exercise. Ministers have said they will not be subjecting the ADL report to public scrutiny before they take their decision on SMP. This is despite already
having set a precedent by releasing earlier economic reports (by PA Consulting) in 1998 and 1999. FOE maintains that DETR is acting unlawfully by preventing interested parties from commenting on the ADL analysis prior to Ministers taking a decision.

According to the Cabinet Guidelines, the consultation period should be 12 weeks not 8, and 12 weeks is a minimum period. There have to be powerful reasons to derogate such as genuine urgency. Beyond saying "we've consulted before" there is no reason given why it is 'necessary', 'unavoidable' or 'really urgent' to limit the consultation period.  

The March 2001 consultation paper says the consultants to the DETR will report to the Government two weeks after the public consultation process has closed. There appears to be no reason why consultees should not get to comment on the ADL report, other than a perceived need to speed up the process. There is no question of confidentiality. ADL will publish their report excluding commercially sensitive information, so the public will be able to see it, but beyond the opportunity to comment. In previous consultations, consultants' reports were released at the start of the public consultation period. ADL's report is clearly very important to the decision making process, consequently consultees ought to be given an opportunity to comment on it.

ADL has been given an unduly narrow scope in its remit. Economics is centrally important and hotly controversial. However, the Government has directed ADL to make the same assumptions as the economic case, which ADL is being asked to appraise. ADL has no scope to say whether or not it agrees with the assumptions being made. The case being made by many objectors is that the wrong assumptions are being made.

ADL is being asked to determine "whether MOX manufacture is justified by its economic, social or other benefits in relation to the health detriment it may cause". No mention is made of the wider detriments discussed in the Environment Agency's 1998 Memorandum.

ADL has also been directed to ignore the issue of sunk costs. In its document "The economic and commercial justification for THORP(1993)", BNFL provided profit projections for THORP that included the need to cover capital costs for both THORP and associated plant, and also evidence of contracts and associated payments to cover these capital costs. No such profit projections have been provided to consultees to date for the
SMP and DETR is wrong to exclude them from ADL's remit. 

The urgent need for a quick decision on SMP, seems to be something made up by BNFL's 'spin unit'. BNFL Chief Executive, Norman Askew warned the Financial Times that BNFL's Swiss customers would have to buy Mox from a foreign competitor unless approval to start production at the plant was granted in the next three months ("BNFL pressures government over Sellafield review", by Matthew Jones, Financial Times March 28 2001)

A Swiss Sunday newspaper reported that BNFL is using orders from its Swiss customers to pressurise the UK authorities to authorise SMP. It accuses BNFL of giving the wrong impression that Swiss utilities need to get their MOX fuel very quickly. HSK (the Swiss Nuclear regulator) is reported to be unaware of any need for urgency ("Sellafield wirbt mit Schweizer Kunden", by Hubert Mooser, SonnstagZeitung 29th April 01). 

The tiny Swiss contracts should not be used as an excuse for rushing a decision, which, if taken now, would be a gamble that the market situation for MOX might improve in Japan.

Job losses are also routinely exaggerated if the plant is not opened, and take no account of alternative jobs, for example in immobilising existing separated plutonium. BNFL's original application claimed only 200 jobs at peak and 100 routine jobs in operating the SMP. Recent Press Coverage talks of 600 job losses if the plant remains closed.

Another product of the BNFL 'spin unit' was the description of agreements with Swedish and German utilities as "contracts", and the claim that this now means that SMP can "break even". (BNFL Press Release of 8th May 2001). To add together agreements with a Swedish reactor that does not have a license to use MOX fuel to a "Heads of Agreement" with German utility, E.ON - based in a country where the government is pushing in international fora for plutonium immobilization - is clearly an attempt to bounce the UK Government into a decision to authorize SMP as soon as possible.

The Swedish company OKG AB announced at the beginning of May that it had reached agreement to convert 900 kg of plutonium owned by the company into MOX fuel at the Selalfield MOX Plant, for subsequent import into Sweden and use at the Oskarshamn power reactors.

This announcement was both premature and overoptimistic. OKG does not have the necessary government permission to import or use MOX fuel in its reactors.  Since the use of MOX fuel in power reactors is contrary to Swedish government policy, it is far from clear whether such permission will ever be granted. The announcement was nothing more than wishful thinking and an attempt to unfairly influence the SMP public consultation process. 

The then Environment minister, Anna Lindh, in reply to a parliamentary question in1997/98 [1098] regarding MOX fuel said:-

"... the government's position [is] that MOX fuel in principle shall not be used in Swedish reactors."

Sweden continues to look for alternatives to MOX according to the country's environment minister, who will not predict when a decision will be made. Environment Minister Kjell Larsson said 

" We have a serious problem. We have plutonium and we have to do something with it, but it's not so easy."

Immediately following the MOX data falsification scandal, Larsson said he did not want Sweden dealing with BNFL and he has repeated that position as recently as April this year. 

"... I am not especially happy about manufacturing MOX at Sellafield,"

Larsson has not said what alternatives are being considered.
As Nigel Hawkins, a utility analyst at Williams de Broe told Reuters on 3rd May 2001, BNFL will have to show progress on possible deals with Japanese customers, since that country is a key market (Reuters 3rd May 2001). 
Japan represents just over 60% of BNFL's Reference Case. If BNFL received contracts for all Swiss and German plutonium, but no Japanese contracts, it would just fail to reach the 40-50% of the Reference Case it needs to justify opening the plant. Securing firm Japanese contracts is, therefore, crucial. 

BNFL's Executive Director, Norman Askew stated last September that: 

"Without Japanese orders we cannot justify opening the MOX plant. We have no time to finesse this: we have until about next January or February to convince the Japanese, otherwise we shall have to abandon the project" (BNFL losses at all-time high by Paul Brown, Guardian, September 15, 2000). 

Sources close to Arthur D Little (ADL) are reported to have told Nuclear Fuel Magazine that Japanese business prospects would likely be a prime factor in ADL's recommendation, which will be used by the U.K. government in its determination whether SMP will be authorized to fully operate. "It can be expected that (ADL) is going to draw a conclusion about whether MOX in Japan will prove to be a real business". A Japanese utility consultant was also quoted saying, "BNFL is going to need [the Japanese] business to make its case". (Europeans First in Line for SMP; No Fuel for Japan until about 2004, by Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel-April 30, 2001).

In its Memorandum to the Trade and Industry Select Committee (TISC) in May last year, the Department of Trade and Industry said

"These [falsification] incidents have led to a breakdown in confidence amongst BNFL's customers and its key stakeholders. Japan represents BNFL's most important market for reprocessing services and for the supply of MOX. Following the data falsification events, the Japanese utilities have suspended negotiations on future contracts pending progress by BNFL on its recovery plan". (TISC 9th report "Proposed PPP for BNFL" (18 May 2000). Memorandum by the DTI).

This begs the question why BNFL are again seeking an authorisation for SMP, given that, according to the utilities, negotiations on future Japanese contracts are still not taking place (see Safe Energy 19).

In its response to TISC, the Government observed that:

"SMP is currently undergoing uranium commissioning. A decision is pending on authorising plutonium commissioning and full operation of the plant. Japan is a key customer country in relation to BNFL's projected sales of MOX. Clearly, it is right to delay a decision on full authorisation of SMP until the Secretaries of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and for Health are in a better position to judge whether or not the MOX data falsification issue has affected substantially the projected level of BNFL's MOX business and the economic case for the plant" (Government observations on the ninth report from the Trade and Industry Committee (Session 1999-2000) on the Proposed Public Private Partnership for BNFL", 24 July 2000). 

Jonathan Watts reporting in the Guardian from the village of Kariwa in Japan on 28th May said:-

"The future of British Nuclear Fuels' controversial plant at Sellafield for recycling nuclear fuel was cast into doubt yesterday by residents of a Japanese village next to the world's largest nuclear power plant. Residents of Kariwa, 180 miles north of Tokyo, rejected plans to use Mox, or mixed oxide, fuel at the nearby Kashiwazaki-Kariwa power plant. The result is a heavy blow to BNFL. It had been relying on orders from Japan for Mox, a mixture of uranium and plutonium recycled from spent nuclear fuel, to ensure the £400m Sellafield plant became viable. Although the 54% to 43% vote is non-binding, the local mayor and the head of the Tokyo Electric Power company have said they will not proceed with the Mox programme unless they have the cooperation of local people".
Greenpeace Japan called on the Japanese government to suspend and review the entire Mox programme. Kariwa ought to be a stronghold for Mox. One in four of the 1,400 households depends on the nuclear industry for an income. The government has paid 22bn yen in grants to the village in return for hosting the facility, and its acceptance of orthodox nuclear power is reflected in the names of the Atomic restaurant and the Uranium hostess bar. 
"It's one thing living with a nuclear plant, but another altogether to have Mox. There is no way I can trust that it is safe after what BNFL did," said Kuniko Shinoda, a resident who voted against. 
The Independent (28th May) called the vote "Historic" and agreed that BNFL's plans had suffered a setback. 
Shaun Burnie, of Greenpeace, said: "The idea that the [BNFL] Mox plant can operate without Japanese contracts is a nonsense. That's it for Tokyo Electric. The issue will now be bogged down for years."
The Irish Independent said the vote "will put huge pressure on the Japanese government and the country's utility companies to rethink plans to introduce ...MOX, in nuclear reactors around the country over the next 10 years".
The Economy, Trade and Industry Minister, Takeo Hiranuma called the vote highly regrettable, as the plan is one of the fundamental pillars of Japan's energy policy He said he would do his best to gain people's understanding, as it is the most important key to the success of the plan. (NHK Newsline 28th May 2001). 
Green Action in Kyoto called the Referendum result an "astounding victory [which] signals the end of Japan's MOX fuel utilization program and the death-knell for BNFL's Sellafield MOX Plant" 

"The result of this referendum will have a major effect on Japan's MOX utilization program since Japanese electric utilities, including Tokyo Electric, have clearly stated that they would not go forward with the program without local approval.  The vote will undoubtedly have major repercussions on MOX implementation plans in Fukushima and Fukui prefectures where the programs are already frozen.  In February, Eisaku Sato, governor of Fukushima Prefecture, announced a one year suspension on plans to load MOX fuel into the Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactor, and called for a prefectural-wide debate on Japan's energy program including the nuclear fuel cycle and the pluthermal program.  

The percentage of voters against MOX utilization was 53.6% (total 1925 votes), those voting "suspend" were 3.7% (131 votes) and those voting in favor of MOX utilization was 42.7% (1533 votes).  

The percentage of votes against MOX utilization and those voting "suspend" came to a total of 57.3%.  Since the voting rate was 88.14% (3605 people in a village of total 4092 voters), this means that more than half the total electorate of the village are against MOX utilization or have voted "suspend". 

Today's overwhelming anti-pluthermal result confirms that Japan's nuclear fuel cycle is in shambles.  The result is sure to influence the outcome of the energy debate in Fukushima Prefecture, where the governor has stated that he "wants to consider alternatives to the nuclear fuel cycle" of reusing plutonium in the form of MOX fuel.

"The Kariwa result signals the death-knell for BNFL's Sellafield MOX Plant.  This is because Japanese contracts for MOX fuel are absolutely necessary in order for BNFL to obtain its Reference Case to make SMP economically viable.  The Kariwa results mean that Japan's MOX program is next to dead.  This compounded by the fact that trust in BNFL remain totally destroyed in Japan due to the 1999 BNFL MOX fuel quality control data falsification scandal, no region in Japan will touch BNFL fuel.  It is now unthinkable that Japan will ever use MOX fuel fabricated by BNFL" stated Aileen Mioko Smith, director of Green Action".
The UK Government can only come to one conclusion - it should turn down BNFL's application for authorisation to open SMP.
2. SURVEY OF SMP CONSULTATION SUBMISSIONS.

Greenpeace

The experience of one of the most recent plants constructed by BNFL, the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) does not bode well for the future of SMP. This plant was given authorization to open based on a projected profit of £500m over its first ten years of operation. This projected profit was based on a planned throughput of 7,000 tonnes. Today, after many unplanned breakdowns, technical problems, and more than 7 years of operation, throughput has been a mere 3182 tonnes. Most recently the plant was forced to close in February and was only re-opened in late April. For the year ending 31st March 2001, THORP was only able to reprocess 362 tonnes out of a target of 800 tonnes.("BNFL plants resume reprocessing work" by Pearl Marshall, NuclearFuel, May 14, 2001)

According to documents leaked to The Independent newspaper ("Foreign firms threaten crisis for Sellafield" by Severin Carrell & Geoffrey Lean, Independent on Sunday 13th May 2001. And "BNFL moves to head off revolt by foreign firms" by Michael Harrison, Independent 14th May 2001), BNFL's customers are deeply dissatisfied over massive cost overruns and failures in key facilities at Sellafield, and are considering legal action if the situation continues. These documents totally contradict BNFL's assertion that it has rebuilt customer confidence, and that it will obtain sufficient contracts to justify the opening of SMP. A statement made by customers in September 2000 rejects the notion that BNFL is a changed company. As recently as March 2001 the overseas utilities accuse BNFL of returning to:-

 "...its previous ways of being unresponsive and unwilling to help." 
The September statement says:-

"Some of your customers believe that the situation is now becoming critical and are calling into question whether BNFL has breached the implied terms of the contracts due to the lack of performance in the areas of reprocessing and vitrification ...if BNFL's under-performance continues in these areas, there could be a complete loss of confidence in all aspects of BNFL's services".

In the documents the overseas baseload customers complain of a 10 per cent increase in THORP operating costs, mainly due to the need for an 11th year to complete baseload contracts. Given the throughput rate at THORP, baseload customers might be shocked to realise that they should be budgeting for a 12th, 13th and 14th year as well. 

It is clear from these documents that BNFL's key clients remain deeply dissatisfied. They have accused BNFL of deliberately blocking progress in negotiations, reneging on earlier agreements, and penalizing them with costs that go up continually. BNFL is already in negotiations with its biggest customer, British Energy (BE), which has described reprocessing as an "economic nonsense". BE's nuclear fuel costs are continuing to shoot up, largely a result of the index-linked reprocessing contracts it is tied into at British Nuclear Fuels' Sellafield plant. A quarter of BE's total operating costs are accounted for by the contracts with Sellafield. It pays BNFL £300m a year and makes annual provisions in its accounts of £140m against future reprocessing costs but Michael Kirwan, BE's finance director reckons that sum could be reduced by £80m a year if it was able to switch to storage rather than reprocessing of its spent fuel. Reprocessing is partly blamed for BE's recent collapse in profits ("British Energy Sets Sights on Expansion into North America", by Michael Harrison, The Independent, 17th May 2001). 

Unless it can resolve the disagreements with its base-load customers, THORP will have a very limited future. With hindsight, it is crystal clear that it was a mistake to license THORP in 1993. The disagreements threaten to further undermine the limited prospects for SMP. But there is still time to take a step back and avoid the mistakes made with THORP by not authorising SMP. You can read the leaked documents, and see the full Greenpeace submission on their new website www.BritishNuclearFuels.com .

INSTITUTE FOR RESOURCE AND SECURITY STUDIES Cambridge, Massachusetts

The Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS) says it is not appropriate for comments about the proposed operation of the SMP to be limited to economic issues.  Other issues, especially those related to international security, must be considered.  In particular, IRSS emphasizes that operation of the SMP cannot be justified if it creates significant adverse impacts on international security.  Specifically, IRSS recommends the development of new processes for impact assessment and justification.  These processes should be applied to the SMP prior to any decision by the UK government to authorize operation of the SMP.  

Regrettably, the UK government has not developed the analytic and administrative processes that are needed to: (i) thoroughly assess the impacts of a nuclear project such as the SMP; and (ii) properly account for those impacts in decision making.  If deficiencies in UK decision-making processes are not corrected, the government will make badly-informed, inappropriate decisions.  One consequence of bad decisions could be the waste of public money.  Other consequences could be much more significant.  For example, if operation of the SMP contributes to the proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities, the resulting reduction in international security will be experienced worldwide and for generations to come.  

One illustration of present deficiencies in UK decision-making processes is the absence of any systematic examination, by BNFL or the UK government, of options for the future management of plutonium.  Two independent analysts have recently published a study of such options (Fred Barker and Mike Sadnicki, The Disposition of Civil Plutonium in the UK, April 2001).  Their study sets a standard for the type of analysis that BNFL and the UK government should be required to perform as a precondition for any decision about operation of the SMP.  

If the process of justification of a nuclear project is to have any credibility, the full range of impacts and benefits of the project should be identified, assessed and explicitly acknowledged in the justification decision.  BNFL itself has implicitly accepted the need to consider a project's full range of impacts and benefits, by stating that its interpretation of the principle of justification relies, in part, upon paragraph 115 of publication #60 by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP60).  Paragraph 115 of ICRP60 acknowledges the need to consider a range of impacts and benefits, and includes the statement: "The justification of a practice thus goes far beyond the scope of radiological protection."  

As a starting point for the development of impact assessment methodologies, the UK could adopt the practices used by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to assess the impacts of nuclear projects.  From this starting point, the UK could develop methodologies that would set a standard for worldwide application.  DOE's practices are the product of three decades of experience with impact assessment, but they leave considerable room for improvement.  

DOE has prepared many environmental impact statements (EISs) for nuclear projects.  These EISs always consider alternative options and their impacts.  The concept of an environmental impact has expanded over the years, and in EISs prepared by DOE the concept now encompasses socio-economic impacts, environmental justice impacts, and cumulative impacts.  In recent years, DOE has also prepared some non-proliferation impact assessments to complement EISs.  

Three important preconditions must be satisfied before the UK government can make a credible determination that operation of the SMP would be justified.  First, the full range of impacts of the SMP's operation, in the mode proposed by BNFL, must be assessed.  Second, alternative options must be identified, and their impacts assessed.  Third, any assessment of benefits must be a true and accurate assessment of the net benefits; for example, the assessment must account for sunk costs.  

When these preconditions have been satisfied, the UK government could potentially make a credible determination that operation of the SMP, or some alternative option, would be justified.  A credible determination would also require the government to explicitly acknowledge the full range of impacts and benefits of the project, and to explain how the justification decision has accounted for these factors.  

CND

CND's principal objection to the commissioning and operation of SMP has always been, and remains, centred on the proliferation risks inherent in plutonium separation and its re-use in MOX fuel. 

There is no doubt that the major barrier, today, to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is access to fissile material. Plutonium separation through reprocessing and its subsequent incorporation into MOX fuel (from which it can be relatively easily re-separated prior to irradiation of the fuel in a reactor) threatens to put fissile material within the reach of those, be they states or sub-national groups, who might desire it. MOX fuel is thus part of a fuel cycle that poses a threat to international security. Its widespread use would inexorably lead to the growth of a 'plutonium economy' with implications for civil liberties and political culture.

Unfortunately, CND can see no evidence that these wider policy issues have been taken into account, as suggested by the Environment Agency. Yet again the current consultation is narrowly focussed on the question of economic benefit whilst the detriments associated with nuclear proliferation, international security, transport and safety issues are ignored.

CND urges the Government to consider, as a matter of priority, the merits of using SMP as part of an immobilisation strategy for Britain's growing stockpile of separated civil plutonium. To operate SMP in such a way would enhance international security. To use it to manufacture MOX fuel threatens international security.

GREEN ACTION 

BNFL states, "Japan continues to represent a significant and robust market for BNFL's MOX fabrication services."  BNFL attempts to support this claim by quoting the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission's "Long Term Program on the Research, Development and Utilization of Atomic Energy" (hereafter "LTP").  

While the LTP does in fact state that plutonium recovered from reprocessing "will be used in existing light water reactors in a process of MOX utilization", it does not necessarily follow that it will be implemented, since electric utilities do not necessarily abide by the LTP.  The LTP has a dismal track record when it comes to implementation of plutonium utilization policies.

Japan's first LTP was issued in 1956 and has been revised eight times since.  The ninth LTP, which BNFL quotes in its documents, was finalized by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in November 2000. The track record of previous LTPs is dismal when it comes to plutonium utilization plans.  (Since plutonium utilization targets are regularly not met, the LTPs credibility with respect to the plutonium program is regularly being called into question by various sectors of society.) 

For example, the eighth LTP finalized by AEC in June 1994 specifies that until Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) technologies can be developed, plutonium should be appropriately used as MOX fuel in commercial Light Water Reactors (LWRs) and in Advanced Thermal Reactors (ATRs).  However, neither of these plutonium utilization plans proceeded as outlined in the LTP, and no critique has been conducted by the AEC as to why this happened. 

The 1994 LTP declared that MOX fuel should be loaded in about ten commercial LWRs by around the year 2000.  However shortly after the plan was finalized, it became apparent that this target would not be met.  On 31 January 1997, AEC adopted a recommendation urging all electric utilities to fuel at least one reactor with MOX fuel by the year 2010.  Then on the 21 February 1997, FEPCO announced the utilities' plans to have four reactors loaded with MOX fuel by 2000 (two in 1999, and two in 2000).  However, to date no commercial LWR in Japan has ever used MOX fuel except on an experimental basis. 

The 1994 LTP also clearly states that the Electric Power Development Co. Ltd will begin construction of a demonstration ATR reactor with the goal of having it in operation by the early 2000's. On 11 July 1995, only thirteen months after the 1994 LTP was finalized, the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPCO) submitted a letter to the Atomic Energy Commission, Science and Technology Agency, and Ministry of International Trade and Industry informing the government that the cost of constructing a demonstration ATR is too high when compared with that of LWRs.  All mention of the ATR program disappeared with no explanation from the ninth LTP issued by the AEC in November 2000.  

In previous LTPs, plutonium utilization was to center around fast breeder reactor (FBR) technology.  However, efforts to develop commercial FBR's proved to be much more difficult than originally estimated, and plans to develop a commercial fast breeder reactor have been put back further and further in time in every single LTP.  Again, no explanation as to why target dates were reset has ever been given in the following LTPs. After the Monju prototype fast breeder reactor accident in 1995, the importance of the FBR program became greatly reduced.  With the ATR program scrapped and the FBR program at a standstill, the pluthermal program became the main forerunner for reducing Japan's plutonium surplus. 

The latest LTP was released in draft in August 2000 for public comment.  After a 50day period 1190 comments were received.  In addition three public forums were held (in Tokyo, Aomori Prefecture and Fukui Prefecture) to directly hear the views of citizens.  

In spite of the fact that a vast majority of the comments submitted to the Long-Term Program Council were opposed to the various specific policies outlined in the draft, (the chairperson Sho Nasu, admitting during the official deliberations that comments received opposing Monju outnumbered those advocating restart 9 to 1), the Long-Term Program Council, its members highly skewed to those with direct interests in Japan's nuclear program, virtually ignored these comments and proceeded to finalize the LTP in less than two meetings.  This failure to reflect public opinion did not go unnoticed by the media and public, and has backfired on the AEC and the national government.  Newspaper headlines the morning after the Long Term Program Council concluded drafting the final plan read, "views of national citizens hardly reflected."

The LTP is not a program that can force the utilities to implement programs, and this would also include the pluthermal program.  Although the LTP states that the basic policy of the government is to call for the effective use of such materials as plutonium and uranium, it limits itself to stating:  "It is hoped therefore that nuclear operators will continue their activities under this basic policy." As can be seen with the ATR cancellation, the AEC can "hope", but there is no assurance whatsoever that implementation will actually take place.

Obtaining public consent is absolutely essential before the pluthermal program can be implemented.  The current LTP confirms this by stating in its introductory section, "a prerequisite for any nuclear policy is winning the understanding and confidence of the Japanese people."  

In Fukushima Prefecture - the location of the first reactor intended to be loaded with MOX, after the Takahama reactors dropped out of the running due to the BNFL scandal, the Governor has announced plans to establish a task force to review national energy policy (See Safe Energy 19).  With regards to the pluthermal program Sato stated, "we will take at least one year to examine the plan and there is no way I am going to give my approval during that time."

In addition to seeking the opinion of prefectural citizens via the internet, the prefecture will hold an open public forum on 31 May in order to help decide the topics that will be considered by the energy review task force.  Governor Sato has also announced that after the task force concludes its review, the prefecture will submit its findings to the national government and make a proposal concerning what should be done.  The review committee is scheduled to conclude its findings by the end of the fiscal year (30 March 2002), and a proposal will be submitted to the national government around this time.  If the review panel concludes that the nuclear fuel-cycle policy is not as beneficial as a once-through fuel cycle, it is highly unlikely that the pluthermal program will get off the ground at any time in the near future.

In Niigata Prefecture, Tokyo Electric's plans for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 3 reactor to be the second reactor to load MOX, have been thrown into disarray by the Kirawa referendum result.

It is clear from earlier referendum attempts that even in towns where many citizens rely on the nuclear industry for their livelihood, a large percentage of people are willing to sign their names for the public record calling for a referendum against the pluthermal program.  The referendum movement in Kariwa is not an isolated movement and only achievable because of the small population in the village.  Even in the neighboring city of Kashiwazaki, with an electorate of over 69,900 people, 26,690 voters, or 38% of the voting public signed a petition to hold a referendum.  

In its "Second MOX Market Review", BNFL tries to play down the significance of the delay in Fukushima.  BNFL states, "senior central government personnel and TEPCO officials have consistently stressed that the plan is to load MOX fuel at Fukushima at the next possible outage.  However, even if the MOX is not loaded in spring 2001, a delay of several months or even around a year does not alter the conclusion that SMP is economically justified."  It is now quite obvious to all concerned in Japan that it is not the central government nor electric utility officials who have the power to decide if the MOX program will go forward or not in Fukushima.  It is also worthy to note that these government and TEPCO officials are stressing to BNFL that they plan to load MOX fuel at Fukushima at the next "possible" outage.  They are not saying at the "next outage", or "the outage after this next outage".  They make no commitments as to loading date.  For BNFL to assume that MOX fuel will be loaded in Fukushima by the spring of 2002 is simply wishful thinking and not substantiated by fact. The political reality is that the conclusion of the Fukushima Prefecture Energy Policy Review will have a definite impact on the future of the pluthermal program.  BNFL has no means at its disposal of predicting what the outcome of this Review might be.

Plans to load MOX fuel at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant will now be at a complete standstill. The Kariwa referendum will certainly influence the Fukushima Prefecture Energy Policy Review committee's debate and final outcome.  If the utilities are unable to obtain public consent for the pluthermal program, the program will never be able to commence.  

Distrust in BNFL, runs so deep in Japan due to the 1999 MOX fuel quality control data falsification scandal, that it will be impossible, even with time, to obtain the acceptance of Japanese citizens for BNFL MOX fuel.  On 24 April a letter was written to Dr. Jack Cunningham, member of the British Parliament at the time of his visit to Japan to address the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum and promote BNFL SMP contract possibilities with Japanese electric utilities.  Green Action signed this letter along with members of the Japanese Diet, local legislators, consumer, professional, religious, and anti-nuclear organizations from Fukui, Niigata, Fukushima, Aomori, the Tokyo and central Japan regions.  This letter addresses how BNFL is currently viewed in Japan, and how there are numerous unresolved issues still stemming from the 1999 falsification scandal.  

Mike Sadnicki

In a paper commissioned by FoE and Greenpeace, Economist, Mike Sadnicki reviews new information presented for the 4th Consultation. 

In the absence of an opportunity to comment on ADL's appraisal, it is impossible to draw attention to any observations as to the way in which BNFL's economic case has been assessed by ADL and the method and conclusions adopted by ADL. This is a matter for grave regret and stands severely to limit the ability to draw relevant points to the decision-maker's attention, for consideration at the time of the ultimate decision.
 
An SMP economic analysis carried out by this author and colleagues in July 1999 concluded: "the provisional view of Ministers that the balance of the argument is in favour of economic justification appears to be incorrect; and that the confidence which Ministers have in the evidence so far assembled should be very limited".  A re-examination of the SMP economic case, carried out by this author and colleagues in May 2000 after the data falsification incident(s), concluded that: "SMP operation is still very unlikely to generate sufficient income to cover future costs, and that Ministers should have very limited confidence in any evidence setting out an economic case for operation."

The overall conclusion now, in May 2001, is that MOX "market" opportunities seem to have deteriorated sharply since the last analysis submitted in June 2000. Estimated future net cash inflows from SMP operation have declined. There is strong evidence that costs have increased significantly, and in addition prices may also have fallen. BNFL's bargaining power with all potential customers - especially in Japan - has deteriorated. The very limited confidence that Ministers ought to have had in 2000 should now diminish even further.
BNFL's current position seems to be predicated on a false importance being attached to certain European agreements which would in themselves be loss-making. These European agreements appear insignificant, when compared with the increased uncertainty and hesitancy - arising from political, economic and technical drivers - in the potential Japanese MOX market. 

In addition, plutonium immobilisation has now emerged as a serious cost-effective competitor to MOX, as a way of disposing of foreign plutonium which has already been separated at Sellafield. This in itself seriously undermines much of the underlying thinking behind BNFL's economic case. 

3. PHOENIX NEWS

BNFL has made no secret of its desire to build one or two plutonium-fuelled reactors in the near future. BNFL has prepared a corporate plan that has been submitted to the government, and is expected to be made public shortly after the General Election. The company is understood to have earmarked potential sites and is urging the government to accept proposals for new reactors.  BNFL has declared it "has the designs for the reactors" it needs and the sites on which to build them.

British Energy has said it will approach the Government shortly after the General Election about reactivating plans for new nuclear power stations. Hunterston C has been mentioned as a possibility in several newspaper stories.  Robin Jeffrey, British Energy chairman, said at a conference last year: "To have a plant up and running for 2010 we need to start now. The clock is ticking."

The Observer on 20th May reported that the Government is planning to launch a sweeping review of the sources and security of Britain's energy supply if it wins the election. Ministers are increasingly anxious about future electricity shortages, reliance on foreign sources of fuel - particularly gas from Russia, North Africa and the Middle East - and difficulties in cutting carbon dioxide emissions in line with Kyoto agreements as ageing nuclear plants are shut down. Both major UK nuclear operators have been lobbying the Government intensively over the need for a new generation of power stations here, and plans for new plants could be one result. Ministers are also aware of energy industry concerns that the New Electricity Trading Arrangements may discourage companies from building power plants, which could reduce long-term capacity and lead to Californian-style blackouts.

There has been an apparent shift in the Labour Party's stance on nuclear power, according to the Sunday Times (20th May). The party's manifesto dropped its 1997 pledge to block the building of new plants. Then, it stated, there was "no economic case for building any new nuclear power stations". This election's manifesto, however, makes no reference to such a bar, but says: "Coal and nuclear energy currently play important roles in ensuring diversity in our sources of electricity generation."

The industry will still face a considerable hurdle in persuading the next government and potential investors of the economics of constructing new nuclear reactors. But if they can persuade the Government to subsidise reactors in some way, either for using up plutonium, once it has been declared a waste, supplying the MOD with tritium, or making savings in CO2 for example, the day when new reactors are built in the UK may not be far away. 

US operator plans to build new nuclear plant By Julie Earle in New York and Nancy Dunne in Washington May 23 2001 Financial Times.

Exelon, the largest nuclear operator in the US, said it hoped to announce construction of a new nuclear plant within the next 12 months. If it were to go through, it would be the first new nuclear plant ordered in the US for more than 20 years. Industry executives believe strong support from the Bush administration has paved the way for the revival of a sector
once considered moribund. 

The Chicago-based Exelon, which owns 17 reactors in the US, told the
Financial Times it was in talks with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission over a Pebble Bed Modular reactor, which it claims will be "faster, safer and cheaper" than the current generation of plants. The new technology compacts carbon-coated uranium granules into billiard ball-like spheres, which are used as reactor fuel.  The company is working in South Africa with BNFL, and Eskom, a South African utility.

Representatives from the NRC and the energy department have made "numerous visits" to South Africa to view the work, according to Tom Clements, executive director of the Nuclear Control Institute. 

BNFL has said that construction of a Pebble Bed reactor would begin in South Africa within a year and that several could be under construction in the US within five years. 

The Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry group holding its annual meeting, on Wednesday said it expected the sector's share of electricity production to rise from 19.8 per cent in 2000 to 23.1 per cent in 2020. However, opposition to a nuclear energy renaissance has begun to coalesce. Environmentalists and other public interest groups are to hold a press briefing on Thursday to attack the administration's proposal to renew the Price Anderson Act, which shields nuclear companies from unlimited liability. 

Californians Favor Nuclear Plants by COLLEEN VALLES Associated Press Writer

SAN FRANCISCO (AP) -- A surprising 59 percent of Californians now support building more nuclear plants, according to a poll released Wednesday. The pollsters said the findings suggest how deeply the power crisis has affected people in the state, which has been hit by rolling blackouts and soaring electric bills over the past few months.

The last time the organization polled Californians about nuclear energy was 1984 -- five years after the accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania -- and it found 61 percent opposed to nuclear power. ''In my interpretation, the current energy crisis has some bearing on the public's changed attitudes on nuclear power,'' said Mark DiCamillo, spokesman for the Field Institute, a nonpartisan polling organization. ''The public is searching for clean ways to add to the capacity. I think the poll is saying that nuclear should be included in that consideration.''

The Field poll comes as the Bush administration pushes for a renewed look at nuclear power. Vice President Dick Cheney, who heads the president's energy task force, has promoted nuclear power as essential to America's energy needs and said that at least some of the 65 power plants that need to be built annually to meet future electricity demand ought to be nuclear.

No utilities have ordered any new nuclear power plants in the United States since 1978.

The poll 1,015 California adults was taken May 11-20. It showed that 59 percent of Californians favor nuclear power and 36 percent are opposed. The margin of error was plus or minus 3.2 percentage points.

Carl Zichella, the Sierra Club's regional staff director for California, Nevada and Hawaii, said Californians have not thought about nuclear energy for about 20 years and do not have as much information as they did around Three Mile Island.

''I think this number really reflects a lack of knowledge on the part of the public about the problems that drove nuclear power underground,'' he said. ''The more people know about nuclear power, the less they're going to like it.''

US attraction to nuclear power BBC On-Line Tuesday, 15 May, 2001
By Stephen Evans in Washington 
In 1979, a controlled nuclear reaction here became an uncontrolled one, threatening meltdown and the contamination of a continent. Nuclear power is undergoing a dramatic rehabilitation in the United States as the new Bush administration reviews the country's future energy demands. In the middle of the luxuriant forests and farmlands of Pennsylvania, there is an unlikely tourist attraction - a working nuclear power station.
A heroic effort contained the damage within the concrete, but the closeness of the call changed attitudes. From then, no new nuclear power station was built in the United States. Now, though, nuclear is coming back. Most American citizens take cheap energy for granted and the new Bush administration is trying to keep those demands satisfied. Three Mile Island is jointly owned by British Energy and by US company Exelon. Three Mile Island, once a by-word for nuclear disaster, is now a designated official historic monument and a magnet for tourists
Exelon's Ralph De Santa said the old assumption that existing nuclear power stations would close when their licenses expired has now gone. "You will see existing nuclear companies put in for license renewal, to extend the life of the existing plants," he said. "So that's very important, because just a couple of years ago the common thought was that these plants would be shut down. "Ultimately, they are looking at building new plants. So that's the future." 
Cheaper costs 
Apart from the politics, the economics have changed. Howard Greenspect, of the independent Resources for the Future think-tank in Washington, said costs had come down, certainly for running existing stations. "They are operating more efficiently; their utilisation rates are higher," said Mr Greenspect. "The plants are being gathered, instead of being operated individually. They're now being agglomerated and put in the hands of more experienced operators. "It's now more economically attractive to extend the lifetime of those facilities and seek an additional 20-year period." 
All the same, new plants remain expensive to build. However, as burning coal and oil gets more politically and economically costly, nuclear power plants will become more attractive. And there is the problem of waste, which has to be buried for centuries. Damon Moglan, Greenpeace's nuclear expert in the US, said pinning hopes on nuclear power meant the Bush administration was dodging the real issue. 
"These guys are looking backwards by 30, 40, 50 years, instead of looking forwards," said Mr Moglan. "And it's quite clear that the real solution is going to be the development of alternative renewable, clean technology, wedded to energy efficiency and conservation. "Those are solutions." 
New confidence 
The forests around Three Mile Island bristle with monitoring equipment, continually testing the air: a testament to the fact that, when nuclear goes wrong, it goes very wrong. All the same, the man charged with policing this expanding industry, Dr Richard Meserve, the head of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said lessons had now been learnt. 
"We have been preparing for the possibility of new construction by staffing, by trying to anticipate the problems that may arise, that may be presented to us, particularly if new technologies are something that licensees seek," said Dr Meserve. "Every indication we have is that there's great enthusiasm in the generating companies for maintaining their existing nuclear plants and possibly expanding them." 
The Bush administration reckons that 1,300 new power stations, conventional and nuclear, will be needed to keep pace with American demand over the next 20 years. The great political attraction of nuclear is that it seems to offer cheap power to a people suffering power cuts. Whatever the long-term issues, that argument will be immediately attractive in Washington. 
NEW YORK TIMES, 16 May 2001 More Nuclear Power Means More Risk
Opinion Editorial by PAUL L. LEVENTHAL president of the Nuclear Control Institute.]
 

WASHINGTON - Despite all the talk about nuclear power as the environmentally clean response to electricity shortages and global warming, many Americans are understandably wary. The Bush
administration's energy task force announces its report today, and President Bush would do well to note the public's concerns about the combination of human fallibility and mechanical failure that can set off catastrophic accidents at nuclear plants and about the link between nuclear waste and nuclear weapons.

 The nuclear industry's safety and security claims are often misleading. Its spokesmen still insist that the Three Mile Island accident demonstrated that the core of a light water reactor is far
more resistant to a meltdown than had been previously thought. They don't acknowledge that the core at the Three Mile Island plant was within hours of an uncontrolled melt - with Chernobyl-like
consequences - when a new shift supervisor came on duty in a panicked control room and finally figured out that thousands of gallons of cooling water had poured undetected from a valve that
was stuck open. Advanced designs for presumably safer light water reactors and simpler pebble-bed reactors still have not made it off the drawing boards.

Though the nuclear industry claims it is being crippled by over-regulation, its powerful friends on Capitol Hill have threatened budget cuts to make the Nuclear Regulatory Commission compliant. The N.R.C. has begun a process of granting life extension to America's aging supply of 104 power reactors, for example, despite a rash of forced shutdowns due to equipment failures caused by aging. There have been at least eight such shutdowns over the past 16 months, according to an analysis of N.R.C. data by the Union of Concerned Scientists.

 And the agency has decided not to take enforcement action against weak security at nuclear plants: guards at half the nation's nuclear power plants have failed to repel mock attackers in
N.R.C.-supervised exercises that test the protection of reactor safety systems against sabotage. Instead, it is in the process of weakening the rules of the "game" used in the mock attacks.

 A push for nuclear power, which Mr. Bush supports, isn't the way to meet America's urgent energy needs. New plants could not be brought on line quickly enough to offset present electricity
shortages, which many experts believe are caused primarily by lack of capacity for transmission, not production. Nor could using nuclear plants make a big dent in global warming. Two-thirds of the emissions of carbon dioxide, a major greenhouse gas, are from transportation or other sources not related to power generation. And worldwide, it would take 3,000 nuclear plants - a tenfold increase - to replace all coal plants; yet that increase would reduce carbon emissions by only 20 percent, while enormously expanding risks that materials from nuclear power plants would be applied to making weapons. And since reserves of uranium ore are limited, millions of kilograms of plutonium, equivalent to hundreds of thousands of bombs, would have to be separated from wastes each year to help fuel so many reactors in the future. 

 There are better alternatives. Energy efficiency measures, like using the best available existing technology for air conditioning, lighting and electric motors, could offset the need to build any
new nuclear plants. Renewable energy sources and other alternative energy systems, including hydrogen recovered from fossil fuels after removing carbon, could provide new, clean ways to generate power.

 A rapid expansion of nuclear power would compound the existing dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation. International inspections of nuclear facilities provide uncertain protection; Iran, for
example, has pledged to put the reactors it will build under inspection but is still suspected of using civilian nuclear power as a cover for a nascent nuclear weapons program.

George Perkovich, in his book "India's Nuclear Bomb," reports that a bomb tested by India in 1998 was made from the grade of plutonium produced in its 10 uninspected power reactors.

 Is it reasonable to assume that millions of kilograms of plutonium, separated from reactor wastes, can be kept secure, down to amounts of less than eight kilograms, which is all that is
needed for an atomic bomb that terrorists and radical states could make? This is the ultimate question requiring an answer before nuclear power is looked to as the solution to climate and energy worries.
British linked to US nuclear plans By Ben Fenton Electronic Telegraph 18th May 2001.
IF George W Bush is successful in encouraging the building of nuclear power stations in America, the chances are that they will be built, albeit indirectly, by the British Government. 
The Department of Trade and Industry wholly owns British Nuclear Fuels, which in turn bought the American company Westinghouse about two years ago. Westinghouse is the dominant player in the design and building of nuclear power plants in America. 
Hugh Collum, chairman of BNFL, said: "If the full potential of the proposed changes is realised in the US, BNFL will be well positioned to provide nuclear technology through Westinghouse." The nuclear industry was cock-a-hoop yesterday at the boost to its flagging fortunes given by the White House energy panel. 
America, under President Bush, is now seeking to take the lead in reviving nuclear power generation. Behind the move is a desire to provide an alternative to the relatively dirty fossil-fuel generators. No new nuclear facilities have been built in America since the early 1980s. 
Mr Bush cited the example of France, which produces 80 per cent of its energy from nuclear stations. But his panel has also recommended investigating fast-breeder reactors, which Britain, France and Japan have all abandoned after accidents. 
There is also talk in the panel's recommendations of reviving the reprocessing of nuclear material in America, abandoned by the Carter administration. Once fuel is reprocessed, however, it is technically available to terrorist or rogue states if they can steal it.
4. Proliferation

Plutonium for sale: Smuggling of radioactive materials is rife, new research reveals Exclusive from New Scientist magazine Rob Edwards, Stockholm

The nuclear arms race has left the world with a terrifying legacy: 3 million kilograms of bomb-grade plutonium and uranium. A terrorist would need no more than a few kilograms to make a devastating bomb, so you'd think this material would be kept under guard in secure military installations. You'd think so, but you'd be wrong. 

Radioactive materials are going missing, border controls are almost non-existent, monitoring equipment doesn't work and smuggling is rife. 

This was the frightening picture painted at a conference of nuclear experts in Stockholm earlier this month organised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Interpol and the World Customs Organization. It seems only a matter of time before a terrorist group acquires the ultimate bargaining chip. 

Mass disruption 

Terrorists don't even have to get hold of enough to make a nuclear bomb, says Friedrich Steinhäusler, a physicist from the University of Salzburg in Austria and a former member of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. They could steal radioactive isotopes from unprotected research and medical facilities with "relative ease" and combine them with conventional explosives to contaminate large areas, or simply spread them through the ventilation system of an airport, office complex or shopping mall. "Such a potential future scenario emphasises the low-tech terror of 'mass disruption' rather than 'mass destruction'," Steinhäusler says.

Today's leading terrorist groups, however, may have the means and the determination to achieve mass destruction. These groups include Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo cult. 

Poor safeguards 

According to Steinhäusler, up to 100 countries may hold radioactive materials that they can't safeguard properly. Steinhäusler, working with colleagues at Stanford University in California, has just completed a study of nuclear security in 11 typical countries: the US, China, Germany, Austria, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Israel, Brazil, Kazakhstan and Bangladesh. It reveals gaping holes in their ability to detect nuclear smuggling, worrying flaws in their audits of radioactive materials and serious shortages of trained staff, equipment and resources.

None of the 11 countries has any radiation monitoring equipment covering its unfenced borders, where there are few roads, railways or settlements. One of the countries had no radiation monitoring equipment at any of its borders.

No registers 

Although the study does not point the finger at any particular country, it discloses that around a quarter of them do not keep registers of radioactive sources that may have been lost from laboratories or hospitals. Half of the countries knew of unlicensed radioactive material, and in nearly a third nuclear material has been stolen from licensed sites in the past 10 years.

The material that is intercepted may be just a fraction of what is actually being smuggled. Ian Ray, a forensic nuclear scientist from the Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany, estimates that only 5 to 10 per cent of the illegal traffic in radioactive materials is detected. 

Nuclear authorities are starting to call for action. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate wants the IAEA to set up a unit to combat smuggling. And experts are meeting in Vienna this week to discuss plans to strengthen the IAEA's Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

A full length version of this story is featured in the 26 May issue of New Scientist magazine 

UN says 130 terrorist groups capable of nuclear attack. Sunday Herald by Rob Edwards 13th May 2001.
 
The United Nations has reported a doubling of the number of attempts to smuggle radioactive materials and identified 130 terrorist groups capable of developing a homemade atomic bomb.
 
These include notorious organisations such as Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, along with a host of lesser known ethnic, right-wing political and religious groups, according to a secret UN report.
 
In a confidential report, marked "Strictly not for publication or distribution" and presented to the IAEA which has been obtained by the Sunday Herald, the paper's author, Alex Schmid, the head of the UN's Terrorism Prevention Branch, is confident that terrorists have the motive, the skills and the materials to develop a nuclear capability and that there is enough plutonium and enriched uranium left over from the cold war to make hundreds of thousands of bombs.
 
New figures from the IAEA, the UN body charged with promoting and regulating nuclear power, reveal that the number of confirmed attempts to smuggle radioactive materials worldwide has doubled over the last five years. Since 1953, 550 incidents have been recorded on the agency's database on illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, of which more than 370 have been confirmed by the countries in which they took place.
 
Although most of the incidents involved materials like radioactive scrap metal or radiation sources that could not be made into bombs, one in 10 included weapons-grade plutonium or uranium.
 
In the report presented to the IAEA, Schmid warns that much of the nuclear material in the former Soviet republics is poorly protected and the risk of some being stolen is growing. "Time might not be on our side. The amount of plutonium in the world is increasing", Schmid warned. "Vigorous efforts need to be made to keep the nuclear genie in the bottle and out of the hands of terrorists."
 
His 40 page report reveals that there are 130 terrorist organisations listed by the US Department of State as posing a potential nuclear, chemical or biological threat. They include 55 ethnic groups, 50 religious groups, 20 left-wing groups and five right-wing groups from around the world. Bin Laden has said that acquiring a bomb to defend Muslims is a "religious duty". In 1998 an aide was arrested in Munich by German police and charged with trying to obtain enriched uranium.
 
In the same year Israeli intelligence reported that Bin Laden paid £2m to a middle man in Kazakhstan who promised to deliver a bomb in a suitecase within two years. Aum Shinrikyo, which released deadly sarin gas into Tokyo's underground in 1995, has similar ambitions. The report disclosed that the cult has spent $400,000 on a sheep farm in Australia which included eight uranium mines. The group has also invested millions of dollars on laser enrichment technology and collected information about nuclear transports.
 
Experts say it takes no more than 5kgs of plutonium and around 15kgs of enriched uranium to make bombs like the ones which devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
 
"Most of the weapons-usable nuclear materials in the kilogram range are stored in nearly 400 buildings which are not all guarded in the way they should be guarded. This quantity of dangerous but potentially precious materials offers temptation for adventurers and desperados" said Schmid's report.
 
Several cases of insider theft have been documented at Russian facilities, where many workers and guards are poorly paid. There are no accurate inventories of nuclear materials, alarm systems can be disabled, wax seals designed to prevent tampering are easily faked and fences are full of holes and overgrown with vegetation.
 
There have been six confirmed incidents involving bom-capable plutonium and uranium in the last two years, including the seizure of almost a kilogram of enriched uranium fast reactor fuel pellets in the former Soviet republic of Georgia in April 2000.
 
Others include the discovery of six grams of plutonium in a cargo of scrap at the Liepaja sea port in Latvia at the beginning of January this year, and of three grams of plutonium in a forest near the village of Asvestochori in Greece later the same month.


5. Health News

A study of children born to fathers who helped with the Chernobyl clean-up (liquidators) has found they suffered seven times the normal mutation rate. The "unexpectedly high" mutation rate, discovered by using DNA fingerprinting techniques, will be of serious concern to the nuclear industry, which has repeatedly rejected claims that exposure to radiation among its workers can affect children yet to be conceived. The theory was put forward by a team at Southampton University as the reason for the leukaemia cluster at Sellafield, but later rejected. (See "Chernobyl raised mutations 600%" by Paul Brown, Guardian May 9, 2001)

The new findings show that the radiation from Chernobyl affected the sperm of fathers, leading to mutation in the DNA of the children. None of them showed physical deformities, because the DNA changes were slight, but the long-term effects are not known. The changes may cause increased risk of cancers or genetic instability in future generations. [Proceedings of the Royal Society Part B Volume 268 Number 1471 Issue 22nd May 2001 "Very high mutation rate in offspring of Chernobyl accident liquidators (p. 1001)" Weinberg et al.]

Dr Chris Busby has discovered evidence of a new cluster of childhood cancers linked to radioactive contamination from BNFL's ageing Oldbury nuclear reactor on the Severn Estuary. Although the data covers only a tiny area in and around Chepstow, Busby found three cases of myeloid leukaemia in children under four. The odds against such a cluster occurring by chance are 1,000 to one. Similar work by Busby has suggested that men living near the Oldbury reactor are at greater risk of prostate cancer and women have a greater risk of breast cancer. He recently investigated breast cancer cases occurring in a three-mile area downstream from the old Severn Bridge, and found that 262 women had died, 50% more than would be expected. He has also found higher rates of breast cancer apparently linked to Hinkley Point power station in Somerset and Bradwell power station in Essex. Efforts to expand on his latest research around Chepstow have been blocked by the refusal of cancer registries to release any more data to him. Using cancer figures for a five-year period for 147 wards, Busby reckons that living near the Severn Estuary can make you up to 80 per cent more likely than the national average to get some forms of cancer. He believes that radioactive material contaminating tidal sediments around the nuclear power stations on the estuary, are dried out and blown in land when mud flats are exposed during low tides. 

British Nuclear Fuels dismissed, as usual, Busby's findings describing him as "a professional scaremonger [who] comes up with these things every week." But several experts expressed support for Busby's work. There is growing unease among scientists that models used to predict radiation exposure are mainly derived from Hiroshima research and that not enough work has been done on the effects long-term low-levels of exposure. Vyvyan Howard, a senior anatomy lecturer at Liverpool university and an expert on the effects of toxins on human tissue, said: "Although you cannot demonstrate any causal linkage from this study, we know the data are accurate and they do show a significantly increased incidence of cancer which needs further investigation". And Professor Ray Cartwright, director of the Leukaemia Research Fund's centre for clinical epidemiology, said: "His epidemiology is OK. It is important there is a robust debate about this". (See "Nuclear plant study reveals cancer cluster" by Lois Rogers, Sunday Times 29th April 2001 & "Young lives blighted in a nuclear wasteland" by Anthony Browne The OBSERVER,  April 29, 2001)

6. Waste Transports to Sellafield

Greenpeace MEDIA BRIEFING German nuclear transports to Sellafield 23rd April 2001

Transports of nuclear waste fuel from Germany to the UK have been suspended since 1998, due to problems with nuclear contamination on the surface of the flasks. 

Three (Excellox 6-type) casks of nuclear waste are due to leave the Neckarwestheim nuclear power station on 24th April. Two (Castor S1) casks will also leave the Biblis B nuclear power station around the same time. 

They are expected to travel by rail across France to Dunkirk, where they will be loaded onto the BNFL ship the "Shearwater". It is possible that the Shearwater will also carry nuclear waste fuel from the Netherlands to Sellafield.

This will only be the beginning. Almost 700 tonnes of German nuclear waste - about 200 flasks (1)- are due to be delivered to Sellafield over the next four years - before July 2005. 635 tonnes of German nuclear waste fuel are already at Sellafield (2). Reprocessing this 1,300 tonnes of German nuclear waste fuel at Sellafield will result in over 2,000 flasks of nuclear waste to be returned to Germany or dumped in the UK(3). This nuclear waste will remain dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years. 

Reprocessing German nuclear waste fuel will also produce around 13 tonnes of plutonium. Around 4kg to 7kg of plutonium is needed to make a nuclear weapon. One speck can cause cancer if inhaled.

The reprocessing plants at Sellafield are the largest sources of radioactive emissions into the environment in the whole of Europe. Sellafield's nuclear waste pipe discharges around 8 million litres of nuclear waste into the Irish Sea every day. This has made the Irish Sea the most radioactively contaminated in the world, and drawn protests from Ireland and Nordic countries whose shores are contaminated as the waste spreads northwards to the Arctic.

Germany, Japan and Switzerland are Sellafield's biggest overseas customers. The UK nuclear company British Energy also has contracts with Sellafield but is currently trying to renegotiate them to stop reprocessing. Last year British Energy's Finance Director stated "As far as we are concerned, reprocessing is an economic nonsense and should stop straight away"(4).

Green environment minister Jurgen Trittin has allowed the re-start of nuclear transports to Sellafield as part of a deal with the German nuclear industry. The transports will be banned from 2005, but this date still allows all Germany's reprocessing contracts with Sellafield to be completed.

In Copenhagen in 2000, Germany supported a decision by the OSPAR Commission on Marine Pollution to review reprocessing "as a matter of priority" with a view to implementing alternatives such as dry storage of nuclear waste fuel (5). Dry storage of existing nuclear waste fuel would avoid the nuclear transports, discharges and massive increases in nuclear waste volumes associated with reprocessing. It would also avoid the production of plutonium in a weapons-useable form.
 

Notes for editors:

(1) "Utilities must move 400 cask loads of spent fuel to meet German deadline" by Mark Hibbs. Nuclear Fuel April 16th 2001 pp 5&6 [200 to Sellafield & 200 to La Hague]

(2) Second MOX Market Review for DETR. BNFL March 2001.

(3) According to BNFL, reprocessing about 3200 tonnes of nuclear waste fuel would produce 5000 flasks of nuclear waste for return (3% high-level waste, 24% low level waste, 73% intermediate-level waste). (BNFL, August 1994). So 1,300 tonnes would produce 2031 flasks. Current UK Government policy is to keep dump German "low-level" nuclear waste in Britain and return the "high" and "intermediate" level wastes to Germany.
 
(4) The Independent, 11 May 2000.

(5) The OSPAR Convention covers marine pollution in the North-East Atlantic region. 15 governments and the European Union are members. The decision against reprocessing was adopted by majority vote, with only the UK and France abstaining.

German spent nuclear fuel returns to Britain. Ananova 29th April

A shipment of German spent nuclear fuel has arrived in Britain to be reprocessed for the first time in three years. The cargo, from two reactors in southern Germany, has been transported to the Sellafield nuclear plant, after a suspension in trade since 1998 because
of safety issues. Five flasks were transferred from Neckarwestheim and Biblis via rail to the French port of Dunkirk.

It was then transported on to the purpose built European Shearwater ship to the BNFL dedicated port at Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria. The German shipment follows on from the recent safe and successful re-start of transports from the Dodewaard reactor in The Netherlands.

Swiss end ban on sending nuclear waste to Britain April 30, 2001 Reuters

BERNE - Switzerland has lifted its ban on sending spent nuclear fuel rods to Britain for reprocessing after winning assurances that a British plant had tightened safety standards, the Swiss regulatory agency said on Friday. The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK) had blocked Swiss nuclear waste shipments to the Sellafield reprocessing plant, northwest England, in March 2000 amid concerns about its safety record highlighted in a report from British regulators.
HSK officials met representatives of Britain's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) and Sellafield operator British Nuclear Fuels Plc last week to discuss changes NII had ordered and make spot checks on how they were being implemented.

"The NII director described the Sellafield plant as safe. The new director of Sellafield confirmed that pressure to contain costs had been too high in years past and that security measures had been affected by cost cutting and job cuts," HSK said, but added this was now being remedied.

Revelations of falsified data at Sellafield triggered an international scandal in late 1999 and prompted some countries, including Germany and Japan, to ban imports from BNFL of tainted nuclear fuel. Germany resumed nuclear waste shipments to Sellafield this month.

Ed's note The first spent nuclear waste fuel transport to Sellafield will leave the Muehleberg Nuclear Power Station in Switzeland on 29th May. 

7. US MOX

Nuclear Information & Resource Service (NIRS) Briefing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is engaged in a licensing process for a new nuclear fuel factory at the Savannah River Site in SC that would make experimental nuclear fuel from plutonium recovered from nuclear weapons (and residues from the bomb-making process) for use in commercial nuclear power reactors. Since the plutonium would be mixed with uranium, it is a "mixed oxide" or "MOX" fuel. This proposal is mirrored by a similar program in Russia. Justified as "disposition" programs for surplus weapons-grade plutonium, these programs have far reaching consequences. MOX production & use in the US would reverse decades of policy against plutonium use, as well as "blend" civilian and military nuclear programs. MOX fuel could be in reactors near you, if current legislative proposals (S 472, S 388 and HR 1679) promoting the reprocessing of nuclear waste become law.
 
BACKGROUND: The Department of Energy plan to address surplus plutonium from the nuclear weapons program, resulting from bi-lateral US/Russian arms reductions, is to make it into commercial nuclear reactor fuel.

A second "track" in the US plutonium disposition program--preferred by most NGO's-ceramic immobilization of plutonium with existing high-level wastes, is jeopardized by proposed Bush administration funding cuts. Immobilizing plutonium treats it as a waste, provides a safeguard of a
highly radioactive jacket and would keep it within federally controlled boundaries.

MOX fails spectacularly as a non-proliferation strategy. Putting weapons-grade MOX into commerce vastly decreases security. This is compounded by the Russian nuclear agency's intent to export weapons-grade MOX fuel to their nuclear "client nations," which of course, includes some typically referred to as "rogue nations" by US leaders. In any case, global trafficking in weapon's grade plutonium is a bad idea, whether done by US or Russia.

In 1999, DOE put out an EIS and a Record of Decision designating the Savannah River Site as the location for the new US plutonium fuel factory as well as all the plutonium processing steps-- and there will be many to make reactor fuel from nuclear weapons pits. DOE also defined
a series of contracts for the design, construction and operation of the new factory as well as "irradiation services," which, like immobilization, would make the weapons plutonium fuel so highly radioactive that it would be "theft proof." Until this is accomplished, MOX fuel is uniquely vulnerable to theft since it is not highly radioactive and unlike uranium fuel, the plutonium can be separated chemically and is still weapons grade.

Claims that use of weapons MOX fuel will "get rid of the plutonium" are false. The net reduction in plutonium would actually be quite small since new plutonium is formed in the reactor at the same time.

DOE awarded the MOX contract to a consortium called DCS, composed of Duke Engineering Services, COGEMA, Stone and Webster and a host of subcontractors including Framatome, Nuclear Fuel Services and Duke and Virginia Power. (Virginia Power recently said it is withdrawing from the program, but in fact the contract has not been amended to remove them)
The final taxpayer-funded contracts for irradiation (use) of the weapons-grade plutonium fuel would include not only the additional costs of plutonium fuel, but a nice "reward" for taking care of national security.

MOX fuel in Europe is not made from weapons-grade plutonium. There is no wide experience or data to support NRC's licensing action. We do know that both kinds of plutonium fuel--weapons grade and reactor grade-make reactors harder to control and age them more rapidly and therefore decrease the margin of safety against reactor accidents. In the event of a major core breach accident, plutonium fuel is more deadly than uranium. A Chernobyl style accident at a reactor using 100% MOX fuel could cause as many as double the number of deaths from cancer. Ed Lyman of NCI did this work, and he found that when less plutonium fuel is used, there is still an increase in cancer deaths, proportionate to the percentage of plutonium fuel. One would expect increases in all other radiation impacts as well.

The four reactors operated by Duke Power that have been selected for this program have the weakest physical containment structures in the US fleet. Dr. Lyman calls them "tissue paper containment" and one of NRC's own reports acknowledges that in the event of station black-out there is a 100% chance of core damage and containment failure at the Catawba reactors, and nearly that high a chance at the 2 McGuire reactors. We are calling on NRC to reject these flimsy ice condenser reactors from any further consideration in this program.

NIRS supports the "No Action Alternative" in this EIS, which would mean that NRC denies a license for the construction of the MOX fuel factory. This would throw it back to DOE as to what to do, since NRC has no jurisdiction over plutonium disposition. The immobilization track has
been de-funded, but not officially canceled. Since DOE's Record of Decision states that the reason for a "dual track" is in case one track fails, it could be argued that the NRC no-action is a 100% immobilization route. It is also possible, however, that DOE would consider export of the surplus plutonium to Canada under the "Parallax Program," so it would be well to specify what alternatives you think they should analyze as part of their "No Action," and then tell them NO
to MOX fuel!

The environmental records and operating histories of Duke, COGEMA, Stone and Webster must be made publicly available, and openly cited in NRC's analysis. To date, DCS has submitted the operating and environmental record of Savannah River Site, which is not relevant.

Making reactor fuel would require many more steps for purification than immobilization would. One of these steps, called "plutonium polishing," would generate millions of gallons of high-activity alpha-emitting liquid waste. DCS has no plan for what to do with this waste other than put it in one of SRS's tanks, many of which are already leaking. NRC must include the disposition of all process wastes in their analysis.

The contract for the MOX fuel factory only specifies "de-activation" at the end of 20 years. Other NRC licenses require provisions for decommissioning. If NRC licenses this facility, they should have regulatory responsibility for it through decommissioning.

If an analysis of MOX use is undertaken in this EIS, it must include diminished reactor control due to the smaller number of delayed neutrons rendering control rods less effective, and plutonium fission's characteristic coefficient of heat where the hotter the reactor gets, the easier it is to split plutonium, where uranium is the opposite. There must also be assessment of acceleration in reactor component aging due to more hard, fast neutrons. Higher levels of heat and fission
products should be assessed in terms of routine releases to air and water, thermal impacts, worker exposure and all waste streams. All these analysis should be straight reporting of real consequences, not modified by "risk" factors. Risk analysis should be reported clearly and
separately.

The source term (amount and type of radioactivity including persistence) used in the analysis of a plutonium core accident must be accurate, and the doses reported from projected accidents not modified by risk factors. The DOE has validated the NCI finding by Dr. Ed Lyman that there is an increased potential for cancer deaths from a core breach accident with plutonium fuel in use.  A possible doubling in fatal cancers associated with use of 100% MOX fuel, and the projected 25% or more increase in cancer deaths associated with the DCS plan for a 40% core is unacceptable and should be the basis for NRC to select the no-action alternative and reject MOX license.

For more information about NIRS:  http://www.nirs.org

Other organizations active on the plutonium fuel issue:
Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League http://bredl.org
Institute for Energy and Environmental Research   http://www.ieer.org
Nuclear Control Institute   http://www.nci.org/nci-wpu.htm
WAND Women's Action for New Directions http://www.wand.org/issuesact/nixmox-index.html

8. Nuclear Waste News

Green light for Finnish nuclear storage site ENDS Daily - 21/05/01

Finland took an important step toward securing long-term, underground storage of high-level nuclear waste on Friday, when its parliament approved a plan to build a test facility on the country's west coast.  If all goes according to schedule, it could be expanded into a larger, permanent disposal site.

The vast majority of MPs backed the plan as being "in line with the overall good of society," including Green MPs who are junior members of the coalition government. An industry
ministry official told ENDS Daily that the vote was "a green light for the site in principle and the concept".  He added that the next stage in the project's approval would probably take place in 2010, when an application for construction should be submitted by private nuclear waste firm Posiva.

Like many European countries, Finland has been searching for a long-term nuclear waste storage solution.  It adopted a strategy and schedule in 1983, which foresees a permanent storage facility to begin operating in about 2020.

Whether another European country will eventually beat Finland in the race to open a long-term nuclear waste storage facility is uncertain, but with Friday's vote the country has beaten all others in approving a site for development.

9. Dounreay News

An independent scientific study has been commissioned by the owner of Sandside beach near Dounreay, Geoffrey Minter. The report, by Dr Philip Day of Manchester University, Department of Chemistry, concludes that more than 99% of the dangerous fragments of radioactive waste contaminating the beach have been overlooked by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA).

Radioactive fragments (or particles) of irradiated nuclear fuel are currently being found from time to time on the beach at Sandside Bay. These originate from Dounreay, but precisely where is not known. The first Sandside particle was found in 1984, but despite routine monitoring no more were found until May 1997 when two were discovered. No particles were found in 1998, 5 were found in 1999 and 6 in 2000. Particles are currently being found at a rate of about one every two months. Two more particles have been found, so far this year, the last one in February.

Hundreds more particles have been discovered on the enclosed foreshore of Dounreay and on the seabed offshore, leading to a ban on fishing within 2km of the Dounreay discharge pipe since 1997. But neither the UKAEA or Sepa is sure exactly where the particles are leaking from, and they have been unable to stop them coming ashore. 

Day describes the current monitoring programme as "seriously flawed" and "grossly inadequate" Both UKAEA and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency are blamed for breaching the government's instruction to protect the public and the environment from the pollution. Monitoring takes place only once a month, only a third of the foreshore is covered, and to depths of only 10cm in sand - much less deep than children dig to make sandcastles.

Some of these particles "could be highly injurious if swallowed, or if held in contact with the skin for a prolonged period (say from being lodged in a shoe, under a fingernail or in an ear)". Day says there is no doubt that COMARE and NRPB "regard the removal of such particles ... as an urgent priority". 
In a second report for Minter, Day examines the report from the Dounreay Particles Advisory Group (DPAG) published in March 2001. He concludes that the monitoring programme agreed by SEPA and the UKAEA was based on practicality, not the fulfilment of an instruction from ministers to ensure that all particles be promptly detected and removed. DPAG do not address whether the criteria used for beach monitoring are appropriate, and it has failed to examine objectively the public health requirements for the monitoring. He says the logical approach would be to establish the public safety criteria first, and then determine the monitoring specification to meet these criteria. Day says he cannot understand why a more critical and proactive approach is taken to monitoring the offshore particles compared to the particles on the beach.

The UKAEA has rejected independent mediation with Geoffrey Minter. Unless the monitoring improves, Minter promises to launch a claim for compensation for damage to his property under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 as well as claims for personal injury and costs. He also accuses SEPA of being "secretive" and having "double standards".


THAT'S ALL FOLKS