**********************Yurika's E-mail Pu Update****************** Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow Project Physicians for Social Responsibility FISSILE MATERIAL DISPOSITION & CIVIL USE OF PLUTONIUM Issue No. 5(Final) December 16, 1996 ------------------------------------------------------------ CONTENTS Editorial: DUAL-TRACK OPTION WILL ONLY INCREASE SECURITY THREAT ACTION ALERTs NEWS BRIEF:THORP to Increase Its Releases *************************************************************** EDITORIAL:DUAL-TRACK OPTION WILL ONLY INCREASE SECURITY THREAT The US Department of Energy released the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on the Disposition of Weapons Usable Fissile Materials on December 9, 1996, in which the DOE recommended the "dual-track" option as the preferred alternative for disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The "dual-track" option includes reactor use and immobilization. According to the Final PEIS, 70% of the "excess" plutonium could be fabricated into MOX fuel, and the rest vitrified into glass or ceramics. The Record of Decision by the Secretary of Energy will be made before January 20, 1997 when she leaves the office. This decision seems to be based only so that US could keep Russia on the same table, and not from a nonproliferation perspective. The DOE said, "We are committed to irreversible nuclear reductions and we will ensure that surplus plutonium is never again used for nuclear weapons."(1) While US says that the "dual-track" option will help assure Russia that the US is really "destroying" plutonium, US is in fact not destroying plutonium but encouraging more use of plutonium in nuclear reactors worldwide. The November 22 New York Times story, "U.S. Set to Let Reactors Use Bomb Plutonium," ignited a renewed debate on whether the "dual-track" approach would be compatible with US nonproliferation policy. Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary along with John Gibbons, the Assistant to the President for Science & Technology, and John Holum, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, responded in a letter to the New York Times that the dual-track approach is consistent with US policy of "opposing the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel for civilian or military purposes"(2) and "not encouraging or supporting the expanded use of plutonium for civil purposes."(3) The DOE's argument that the "dual-track" option is compatible with the US nuclear policy was consistent throughout the entire evaluation process of plutonium disposition alternatives, and was emphasized in the Draft Nonproliferation Assessment. The Department justifies its support for MOX by ensuring that burning plutonium as MOX fuel will be limited to disposition, and will be a once-through process. When the disposition of all the "excess" weapons plutonium is complete, the fabrication plant will be shut down permanently. "The licenses and approvals that will be sought for the facilities necessary for plutonium disposition will be limited specifically to that mission, and will not authorize any broader civilian plutonium use."(4) The US has also given green light to the use of plutonium as fuel in light water reactors in the Draft Nonproliferation Assessment. "US policy is that separated plutonium poses greater proliferation risks than unseparated plutonium.... and all plutonium currently separated should become unseparated..i.e. be transformed into forms meeting the Spent Fuel Standard...Use of excess weapons plutonium as fuel in LWRs would be consistent with this policy."(5) Unfortunately, the US government does not seem to be aware of the significance of its message to the wider international public. By endorsing the dual-track option, US has approved the use of plutonium in civil reactors. The Asahi Newspaper in Japan reported on December 8 that this policy decision "shelves the US government's long-standing policy of suppressing the utilization of plutonium worldwide." Kyodo Wire News reported on the same day that this is a change of US plutonium policy which had restrained Japanese policy of utilizing plutonium. US approval of MOX utilization has actually prompted the Japanese government to say that they would support Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's plan to build a MOX fabrication plant. (6) This will help Russia to build-up its plutonium-based nuclear power industry. Not only in Russia, but currently in France, UK, Germany and Japan, huge amounts of separated civilian plutonium are being stockpiled as a result of commercial nuclear waste reprocessing contracts. The quantity will grow as reprocessing continues. The U.S. plutonium disposition decision will encourage these countries to use this plutonium to make MOX fuel and burn it in LWRs worldwide. This will encourage more reprocessing contracts to be made. The US decision to use MOX would revitalize and re- energize the entire infrastructure that supports and sustains the global plutonium economy. In order to justify MOX option, the DOE, in its Nonproliferation Assessment tried to divert attention necessary for safeguarding. Accurate materials accounting is essential for verification. However, "it is impossible to provide assurance solely by measuring the material that every kilogram of plutonium is accounted for."(7) The trouble of having plutonium stuck in the fabrication process that occurred at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility in Japan was an "unexpected problem."(8) And as a result, the DOE is saying, accurate material accounting is impossible and diversion of nuclear material must be prevented by materials accounting combined with containment and surveillance measures.(9) The Assessment further goes on to say, "While the diversion of a few kilograms or tens of kilograms of plutonium by a non-nuclear weapon state could pose a dire security threat, for the United States or Russia, such an amount would be only a tiny fraction of the nuclear stockpiles they already possess."(10) And as a premise, "Both the U.S. and Russia will still retain substantial stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials even after disposition of the fissile materials currently considered excess is complete."(11) The whole procedure of the evaluation of options and making a Record of Decision seem to be like a ceremony to show that the DOE is making efforts to move forward, to do something about the Russian plutonium which is a great security threat. There is no logic which would supercede the rational that it is better to have Russians' plutonium threat reduced as soon as possible by burning in reactors, since this is the only way they say they would do. This is only a short-term solution. In the longer-term perspective, this option would further increase the threat by reconstructing the worldwide plutonium economy. The DOE plan would "eliminate" 52 tons of excess weapons plutonium in 30-40 years. But during the same period, some 1000-1400 additional tons of plutonium is predicted to be produced from civilian reactor spent fuel and burned as MOX.(12) While this civilian plutonium may be used for energy purposes, it may easily be adapted for weapons when political situations change. It is certain that this growing stockpiles of civilian plutonium will be a great security threat in the very near future. ----------------------------------------------------------- (1)DOE Press Release, December 9, 1996 (2)New York Times, Letter to the Editor, November 29, 1996 (3)Letter to the New York Times, dated November 26, 1996 (4)Draft Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons- Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (DOE, October 1, 1996)(Hereafter, Draft Nonproliferation Assessment) p.90 (5)Draft Nonproliferation Assessment, p. 91 (6)Asahi Shimbun, November 12, 1996 (7)Draft Nonproliferation Assessment, p.70 (8)Ibid. p.81 (9)Ibid. p.81 (10)Ibid. p.70 (11)Ibid. p. xvii (12)"Use of MOX in the Disposition of Weapons-Grade plutonium," by H. Bariot for the International Seminar on MOX Fuel (June, 96, UK) ************************************************************ >>>ACTION ALERT The use of MOX in light water reactors is actually an on-going research & development at the reactor sites in Europe. To have more plutonium in the reactor cores will increase the possibility of having troubles and accidents. When accidents do occur, there will be more risk of explosions and more plutonium included in the fallout. The waste after a safe operation will include more fission products and will be hotter, which would require more time and space to cool off before actual disposal. The plan for reactor option includes utilizing European MOX fabrication facilities in the initial stage to speed up the disposition mission. This would mean mass transports of weapons plutonium across the Atlantic and MOX fuel back to the US again across the Atlantic. These transports will take in the form of a military operation, as the transport of nuclear weapons, with the highest level of security. The facilities to handle these weapons plutonium, such as the fabrication facilities and reactors to burn them will be guarded as stringent as nuclear weapons facilities. The use of MOX means more risk of accidents, environmental and health hazards, more stringent military security control over civil facilities, and more time, space and cost for waste management. As the New York Times wrote on November 22, "The decisive battle, though, will probably take place years from now, in localities with electric companies that agree to accept mixed oxide fuels." And also in the Los Angeles Times on December 10, "The plan to burn or encase plutonium in glass is certain to lead to extended lawsuits, fights over environmental impact statements and disputes over nuclear licensing, as well as the enactment of new laws by Congress." WHAT YOU CAN DO: *WRITE TO SECRETARY OF ENERGY or to the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES before the Record of Decision is made in January. Talking Points: -No to MOX, because of proliferation, cost, and health and environmental concerns -Immobilization is better Honorable Hazel O'Leary Secretary of Energy U.S. Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585, U.S.A. Fax:1-202-586-4403 President Clinton The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. Washington, DC 20500, U.S.A. Fax: 1-202-456-2461 or: president@whitehouse.gov *SPEAK WITH YOUR STATE LEGISLATORS, and/or your congressional representative *WRITE TO YOUR LOCAL UTILITY If your live in an area that is serviced by one of the utilities listed below, write to them. ---------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF UTILITIES interested in BURNING MOX FUEL/PRODUCE TRITIUM Arizona Public Services Company*(a)Palo Verde Unit 1, 2, 3 Centerior Energy* Perry Duke Power Company and Common- McGuire Unit 1, 2 wealth Edison Company Catawbe Unit 1, 2 Braidwood Unit 1, 2 Byron Unit 1, 2 LaSalle County Unit 1, 2 Entergy Operations, Inc. Grand Gulf Nuclear Station River Bend Station Florida Power and Light Company*(b)St. Lucie Unit 2 Georgia Power Company Alvin W. Vogtle Unit 1, 2 IES Utilities, Inc. Duane Arnold Energy Center Illinois Power Company* Clinton Power Station Niagara Mohawk Power Company* Nine Mile Point Unit 1, 2 North Carolina Municipal Power Agency Number 1, and Piedmont Municipal Power Agency* Catawba Unit 2 PECO Energy Company Limerick Unit 1, 2 Peach Bottom Unit 2, 3 Southern Nuclear Operating Co. Joseph M. Farley Unit 1, 2 Tennessee Valley Authority* Bellafonte Unit 1, 2 Virginia Power*(b) North Anna Unit 1, 2 Surry Unit 1, 2 Wisconsin Public Service Company* Kewaunee Washington Public Power Supply System WNP-2 ------------------------------------------------------ * Utilities also expressing interest in tritium production (a) According to Greenpeace, Arizona Public responded to the DOE's inquiry only to "obtain additional information on these programs," and "has not volunteered to produce tritium for DOE." (b) According to Greenpeace, Florida Power and Virginia Power have decided later not to take part in the program. ========================================================== >>>CANADIANS ALERT The use of the Canadian reactors CANDU has always been an option in the reactor category. In this case, the MOX fuel has to be sent across the border to Canada. The CANDU option is on the premise that Russian plutonium would be burned as well, and in this case, the Russian weapons plutonium has to be sent to Canada across the European continent and the Atlantic. The U.S. would require an agreement between Canada and the U.S. "to implement stringent security standards approaching the Stored Weapons Standard for this material coming from the United States, and possibly to include some U.S. role in the security arrangements for this material after it crosses the border." (13) Russia, on the other hand, may require some sort of compensation for the electricity that would be generated from their weapons- plutonium. (14) The two "benefits" for the U.S. stated in the Draft Nonproliferation Assessment to select CANDU option are that 1)the spent MOX fuel will stay in Canada for final disposal, and that 2) it may be easier to get licensing because of "LESS PUBLIC RESISTANCE TO NEW MISSIONS FOR EXISTING REACTORS THAN IN THE UNITED STATES." (15)(Emphasis added by the author) ------------------------------------------------------- (13)Draft Nonproliferation Assessment, p.95 (14)Ibid. p.97 (15)Ibid. p.99 ************************************************************** NEWS BRIEF >>THORP Applied To Increase Its Aerial Discharges BNFL has filed on December 6 an application to the British Environment Agency for an increase of aerial discharge limits, specifically tritium for the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP). When the EA finishes looking into the application, a draft authorization will be announced, and a public consultation will take place for at least 8 weeks, during which the public is to submit comments and opinions on the discharges. THORP has been undergoing active commissioning since its startup in 1994, but needs this authorization in order to go into full operation. BNFL intends to reprocess 900 tons of spent fuel annually, but until today they have reprocessed only 208 tons in fiscal year 1995 and 408 tons (expected) for 1996(ending March 1997).(17) According to Cumbrians Opposed to Radioactive Environment, application for more liquid discharges into the Irish Sea is expected soon.(18) Four people of Ireland are seeking injunction to bar continued operation of THORP on grounds that the operation is against European Commission directive.(19) ------------------------------------------------------------ (17)Nucleonics Week, October 31, 1996 (18)Vebal communication with CORE, December 10, 1996 (19)Nucleonics Week, October 31, 1996 ********************************************************** Addendum The following part of Issue No.4 (November 26) has been revised as follows thanks to comments from Dr. J. Takagi and Dr. Frans Berkhout. #Reduced Efficacy of Control Rods Control rods work by absorbing neutrons in the reactor core, thereby maintaining stable power conditions. Criticality depends on the small fraction of neutrons produced in the fission of uranium or plutonium which are generated with a delay of about ten seconds.(19) This time difference makes it possible to control the power level by mechanically inserting additional control rods into the core. However, the fraction of delayed-neutrons in Pu-239 is about one- third that of uranium-235, which means that the reactor is more sensitive to variations in power.(20) In addition, plutonium has a slightly higher propensity to capture thermal neutrons than uranium. Therefore, in burning plutonium, the efficacy of control rods is somewhat reduced, and safety margins are lower. The additional demands on control systems are largest for those plutonium fuels in which plutonium-239 content is highest, as in MOX fuel using weapon-grade plutonium.(21) For these reasons, the MOX fuel assemblies should not be placed adjacent to control rods. ============= 3. Impacts on Waste Management: The term fission product is used to imply the product of the fission process, but actinides like neptunium and americium are not produced by the fission process. They are produced through neutron reaction of uranium and plutonium. These are called actinides and not fission products. (From Dr. Takagi) -------------------------------------------------------------- (19)"Disposition of Separated Plutonium," Frans Berkhout, Frank von Hippel, et.al. (Science and Global Security, 1993 Vol.3, p.177) (20)"Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Reactor-Related Options" (National Academy of Sciences, 1995, p.41) (21)Ibid. ***************************************************************** The Pu-Updates are available on Center for Defense Information's Home Page on the Web at under Fissile Materials in the Issues section. It is also available at the Home Page of Nuclear Information and Resource Service at under MOX/Tritium Campaign. **************************************************************** For more information or comments, please e-mail Yurika Ayukawa at . ****************************************************************