UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
ATOMIC
SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL
Before
Administrative Judges:
Ann
Marshall Young, Chair
Anthony J. Baratta
Thomas S. Elleman
|
In the Matter of
DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION
(Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1
and 2)
|
|
Docket No’s. 50-413-OLA,
50-414-OLA
ASLBP No. 03-815-03-OLA
October 21, 2003
|
CONTENTIONS OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE
Duke Power has applied to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to amend the licenses of Catawba 1 & 2 and
for exemption from specific regulations in order to test four MOX fuel
assemblies, made from weapons-grade plutonium, in one of the two nuclear power
ice condenser reactors on Lake Wylie in South Carolina. Nuclear Information and
Resource Service (NIRS) and the members we represent oppose this plan for
multiple reasons.
Our choice of offering a narrow
scope of contentions at this time should in no way be seen to imply that other
issues are unimportant. This document reflects overall resource issues,
including the recognition that the resources of all parties will be better
served with respect to some of our concerns at a future juncture, should Duke
Power apply for batch use of MOX fuel.
We continue to note that this
proceeding is not timely; no Congressionally mandated
MOX fuel test irradiation is being reviewed in Russia. Since the two programs are
required to progress “in parallel” it is not clear under what authority this
license amendment to test weapons-grade MOX under the plutonium disposition
program will be granted.
1. Duke’s proposed plan is lacking key benchmarks
Although NIRS will argue below that the No Action
Alternative is the only credible action for NRC to take, we nonetheless offer
the following points in an effort to increase the credibility of the proposed
plan.
Weapons-grade plutonium has not been used widely as a
reactor fuel. Further, the factory on which the proposed MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility (MFFF) is based, is not now, and has not ever been licensed to handle
weapons-grade plutonium. Uncertainties remain about the differences between
reactor grade and weapons-grade fuel behavior and reactor control. In order to
show in the future that the present tests are representative, or bounding of
future large-scale use of weapons plutonium fuel, benchmarks are needed. Duke’s
proposal is deficient at two key junctures: documentation of the plutonium
oxide process history and content, and also
independent certification of the test fuel.
1.1
Plutonium Oxide
Since weapons
plutonium in the US plutonium disposition program will come from
multiple processes and will have to be treated to remove impurities and other
materials in order to make the MOX fuel, it is important to document or
benchmark the specific quantity of plutonium oxide that is used for the test
fuel, including how it was previously treated. Since the majority of the US
material to be converted to MOX fuel under this program comes from bomb parts
known as “pits” that are an alloy of plutonium and other elements and materials,
notably gallium, it is important to know whether the plutonium oxide that would
be used to make the test fuel was ever in the pit form.
Additionally,
independent validation of the post “polishing” product would serve the function
of creating a record of this part of the test program. It is also important to
preserve the information about the history of this particular plutonium and the
types of treatment used in processing it in order to discern in the future
whether it is representative of any prospective future fuel production.
Of key concern is the removal of gallium from
plutonium from nuclear bomb parts since this element may attack the zirconium
alloy metal of the fuel cladding.
The “NRC Staff White Paper on Mixed Oxide Fuel Use in Commercial Light Water
Reactors”
states:
Plutonium from nuclear weapons contains some
gallium. While the normal fabrication process will reduce the amount to
part-per-million level, its effects on fuel and cladding behavior have not yet
been fully assessed. DOE is performing experimental studies at this time, and
the effects of this impurity will have to be considered in any licensing
assessment.
While gallium in fuel and gallium removal have been the subject of considerable study in recent years, all studies that make a favorable finding assume that in fact, gallium has been reduced to a low number of parts per million, for example:
“The Zircaloy cladding does react with the gallium
to form intermetallic compounds at (greater than or equal to) 300 (degrees)C; however, this reaction is limited by the mass of the
gallium and is therefore not expected to be significant with the low level
(parts per million) of gallium in the MOX fuel.”
It is important to document the level of gallium (or lack thereof), and other contaminants remaining in the plutonium oxide in order to be able to use the data from this test fuel when considering any future loading of MOX fuel in the Duke reactors.
1.2 Certification of Test Fuel
The Duke license amendment application for the testing of 4 weapons-grade MOX fuel assemblies in the Catawba ice condenser reactor touches briefly on the issue of quality assurance. The text is mainly focused on the approval of vendors and facilities. In this section Duke states that Framatome ANP has responsibility for the entire fuel fabrication process in France for the test fuel. It further states:
As fuel assembly designer, Framatome ANP ultimately has the responsibility for certification of the finished fuel assemblies to Duke Power, through DCS.
This section of the application does not state that there will be quality certification of the test fuel pellets, nor the rods in addition to the assemblies. Since the Cadarache plant was closed by regulatory authorities in July, 2003, it is not clear that the equipment at this site will be able to meet quality control standard for Duke use. The recent report, “U.S. MOX “Lead Test Assembly” Controversy: Fabrication at Cadarache, France (If Too Dangerous for European Fuel, Why Just Right for US Weapons Plutonium?)” states:
ATPu was built in a regulatory context when only
limited nuclear safety rules were defined, a formal licensing procedure was
lacking and operators could build nuclear installations on the basis of a
voluntary declaration. In particular, no specific seismic rules existed at that
time for the design of such facilities.
In the early 1990s the safety authority reevaluated
the seismic resistance of the facility and discovered that the ATPu design was
not at all adapted to the seismic risk level of the geographical area (see part
4.1). In 1995, the French safety authority planned to require the shut down of
ATPu around year 2000. But only in January 2003, Anne Lauvergeon, chair of
COGEMA/AREVA, finally announced that ATPu would stop commercial operation as of
31
July 2003.
This report goes on to detail six separate technical concerns about whether this facility will deliver quality fuel pellets using the MIMAS process. We are not here challenging that process. We are suggesting that its product should be thoroughly documented prior to irradiation in Duke reactors.
Further, Cadarache does not have the capacity to assemble fuel rods into assemblies, which opens the question as to where this assembly step will occur and under what authority. France’s MELOX facility, as noted above is not cleared to handle weapons-grade plutonium.
There have been a number of quality control related events since 1996 when the Department of Energy announced its intention to pursue the use of weapons-grade plutonium as a reactor fuel, the most prominent of which was the supply of unvalidated reactor-grade MOX fuel to Japan by BNFL. There are many parameters of possible concern pointed out in the investigation of this matter, just cited including multiple avenues of fuel rod failure due to inconsistent fuel pellet diameter, like the BNFL fuel supplied to Japan was found to have.
Another quality issue cited in the NRC Staff White Paper on page 3:
Inhomogeneities (plutonium clusters) in MOX fuel may affect fuel behavior during reactivity accidents, especially at high burnups. This could necessitate modification of fuel damange criteria in Regulatory Guide 1.77 (Assumptions for Evaluating a Control Rod Ejection Accident in PWRs).
Since there is little experience with producing fuel pellets
from weapons-grade plutonium, the parameters associated with these first
assemblies are particularly important.
In order for LTA testing at Catawba to provide a credible
basis for future batch use of MOX, fuel pellet and fuel rod characteristics,
prior to irradiation, must be documented. Given difficulties in validating MOX
products in the recent past, it might be in the interest of this program to
seek independent certification. The current proposal as written appears to give
Framatome ANP, makers of the fuel sole authority in this matter.
- Provisions for Irradiated MOX Test
Assemblies
Irradiated MOX fuel has a higher thermal power, decaying
more slowly than irradiated LEU fuel, and irradiated MOX waste will also bear
more fissile plutonium than LEU waste.
Duke’s application states that the irradiated assemblies will be stored in the
fuel pool. Given uncertainties about the impact of burnup on the fuel rods, the
greater thermal power of this waste as well as any complications from inhomogeneities
and possible residues from other nuclear bomb ingredients, the cladding of this
test fuel may, or may not, be durable. A plan is needed for the ongoing
assessment of this waste while Duke Energy waits for eventual disposition of
high-level waste. Additionally, there is no mention made of the need to provide
for lower density packaging for transport in the event that a repository
becomes available.
- Duke’s License Amendment
Underscores Regulatory Gap Between NRC and DOE: Duke’s License Amendment Precedes The
Department of Energy’s Fulfillment of It’s Responsibility Under the
National Environmental Policy Act.
Duke Energy makes
clear in the application for license amendment that some aspects of the Lead
Test Assembly program, notably the transport of US
weapons-grade plutonium to France
for fuel fabrication is outside the scope of this proceeding. Nonetheless, the
irradiation of this fabricated fuel in the Catawba ice condenser reactors
depend upon the shipment of the weapons-grade plutonium to France.
There is also currently an application
before the NRC from the Department of Energy for an export license from NRC to
accomplish this plutonium transfer.
There has been, to date, no supplemental environmental review or
environmental impact statement (in the public record) by the Department of
Energy, under which auspice Duke indicates this part of the program will be
conducted. The proposed action to transport 300 pounds – enough plutonium for
dozens of nuclear weapons – by land and water is not a trivial action.
Clearly this regulatory gap, and its potential for
independent litigation should be addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
as part of resolving the decision about this license amendment.
- Only the No Action Alternative is
Consistent with the Overall Goal for Plutonium
Duke’s license amendment application includes the No Action
Alternative which is stated as “…to deny the license amendment.”
Page 2 of Mr. Tuckman’ s cover letter to the license
amendment application sums up the stated overall goal of this program:
This license amendment request is being made as part of
the ongoing United States
– Russian Federation
plutonium disposition program. The goal of this nuclear nonproliferation
program is to dispose of surplus plutonium from nuclear weapons by converting
the material into MOX fuel and using that fuel in nuclear reactors.
Most commentaries on the non-proliferation aspects of the
program focus on Russian plutonium. It must be stated however that many
observers of this program agree with Nuclear Information and Resource Service
and our members that commercializing weapons-grade plutonium and inserting it
into civilian commerce will not increase its security. This is particularly the
case since the bomb plutonium remains relatively easy to recover for nuclear
weapons use, until after irradiation. It
is a cause for immediate concern that Russia intends to sell the
weapons-grade MOX fuel produced in this program beyond its borders. A recent
report in Arms Control Today
states:
The decision to provide MOX technology to Russia is controversial, however,
because of proliferation risks. Plutonium could be diverted during transport to
a MOX site or during the MOX fuel cycle. It is also possible to separate MOX
fuel for its components, which could be used to develop nuclear weapons, so the
possibility that Russia might sell its MOX to other
countries is a concern.
When Russia’s nuclear power client nations
are reviewed, this “concern” becomes somewhat alarming from the perspective of
current United States foreign policy. Russian nuclear
projects
are “stopped” in Libya and North Korea, while a project in Cuba is “under review” and work on a
reactor in Iran continues. The proposition that unirradiated weapons
plutonium MOX fuel, available in the nuclear market to client nations such as Iran, is more secure and less likely
to be the cause of nuclear proliferation deserves careful attention from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NRC shares with the Department of Energy
responsibility, not only for public health and safety, but also the “common
defense” under the Atomic Energy Act.
Another voice calling this alarm is from former NRC
Commissioner, Victor Gilinsky who’s views on the US weapons MOX plutonium fuel
program are posted on the American Enterprise Institute website:
There
really are not any easy answers to the questions surrounding excess
weapons-grade plutonium. At the same time, however, the idea of recycling the
plutonium in civilian reactors is a particularly bad answer for several
reasons.
First,
the disposal of the weapons-grade plutonium will take a long time. Because
there are few reactors in Russia
that can process the material, it will take twenty to thirty years to get
through all of it. In order to speed this process up, the United
States would have to rely on
reactors outside Russia
or, alternatively, subsidize the construction of additional reactors in Russia.
Furthermore, there is a significant risk of theft and the subsequent hostile
use of this material as it is taken out of storage, transported, and processed.
It is not credible to support the weapons MOX program as a
means of non-proliferation. Some policy analysts are going so far as to suggest
that an international entity should “lease” MOX fuel made from weapons
materials on the open market to nuclear utilities.
These suggestions make about as much sense for securing weapons usable
plutonium as allowing Eron’s Kenneth Lay to define US government energy policy, which
is supposedly for the public’s interest.
While NRC may not be
in the position to reverse decisions made by other federal agencies, it does
have the authority and the responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act to engage
US nuclear policy matters and should work to end this fatally flawed and
dangerous program. The first step in that process will be to select the No
Action Alternative, and deny this license amendment.
- An Environmental Impact Statement
is Needed to Inform This Decision
The current decision on this license amendment application
is part and parcel of a larger action plan, detailed in the license application, that Duke and the Nuclear Regulatory commission
have been involved with for some time. The overall decision to use
weapons-grade plutonium fuel from nuclear weapons sources is a major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the Human environment. Under 10CFR51.20(a)(1) the NRC regulations direct NRC staff to
prepare a full environmental impact statement.
Since taking the No Action Alternative of denying the
license amendment will either redirect, or end the federal plutonium
disposition program, this alone demonstrates that the NRC’s decision on Duke’s
license amendment to test weapons MOX plutonium fuel is a major federal action
and that it cannot be separated from the intention to use “batch” quantities of
weapons-grade MOX plutonium fuel in US Light Water Reactors. Indeed, NRC has
been engaged in this process for some time, and is the agency responsible for
already institutionalizing plutonium fuel instead of upholding the Department
of Energy’s characterization of this as a limited, “one time” processing of a
specific quantity of plutonium. With the revision of Part 70 to include
plutonium and a Standard Review Plan for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility
that applies to any MOX factory, anywhere. It is reasonable therefore to assert
that the NRC licensing actions at Duke must be viewed as the precedent that
they would serve for any other future licensing proposals at other reactors. It
is not credible, given NRC’s generic approach and use of precedent and case law
to style this license amendment as a unique event.
That this decision is a major federal action is without
dispute.
Every other federal decision step in the US MOX program has been treated as such.
The step of considering the impact of the potential use of the fuel in light
water power reactors and deciding whether this is an acceptable in terms of the
potential impacts to the human environment and the level of risk that this
program carries should be fully informed before a decision is made. It is
important to underscore that according to the rules, this decision has not yet
been made. The potential to impact the human environment in the event of a
severe reactor accident with weapons-grade MOX plutonium fuel in the core may
in fact exceed all other potential impacts associated with this program.
The question of when and how a full environmental impact
statement process would be undertake by NRC on weapons MOX use were the subject
of considerable discussion during the NIRS intervention on the license renewal
proceeding for McGuire 1 & 2 and Catawba 1 & 2. Of particular note in that discussion was the
difference between an environmental assessment that is not an EIS and a full
environmental impact statement. Of greatest concern to NIRS is that the
assessment does not afford NIRS members or the general public to engage in a
scoping process with NRC staff, and does not allow for meetings in the affected
community where questions can be answered and concerns heard. The process of
intervention is by its nature insular, self-referring and not geared to
communicating with the greater affected public.
Duke has repeatedly argued
that other environmental reviews have been done; however all of these have been
preparatory in nature with respect to reactor use of weapons-grade plutonium
MOX fuel. The Department of Energy’s Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Environmental Impact Statement was accomplished without including the local
impacted communities’ direct participation.
Nuclear Information and Resource Service and allied organizations repeatedly
asked that affected reactor communities be included in the scoping and public
hearing processes conducted under the National Environmental Policy Act for the
preparation of that document. While our letters were never answered, in public
session a spokesman for the Department of Energy stated that the study was only
preliminary on the impact of reactor use of the fuel, and that it would be ‘the
job of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’ to conduct a more thorough
environmental impact statement on reactor use.
To its credit, the NRC has included Charlotte in the EIS process for the MOX
Fuel Fabrication Facility,
proposed by DCS to be built and operated on the Savannah River (Nuclear) Site, near the Savannah River and Augusta, GA. The product of this process is
forth coming, but the decision by NRC staff was to focus most their analysis on
the impact of the factory, not the use of its product. The reactor portions of
the NRC DEIS on MFFF are generic, not specific.
NIRS comes now with this contention in part because of our
early and ongoing participation in the US plutonium disposition program,
precisely because of our concerns about the impact of weapons-grade plutonium on
reactor safety and on our environment. The very day that the dual track
plutonium disposition program was announced, Mary Olson, now Director of the
Southeast Office of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, attended the
Secretary of Energy’s press conference. The Energy Secretary took only a
handful of questions. Ms. Olson asked a question about the potential impact of
MOX fuel use on so-called low-level waste disposal, emphasizing the potential
for a dramatic increase in plutonium and other actinide in so-called
“low-level” disposal sites. Ms. O’Leary’s response
indicated that there would be many environmental impact statements done to
answer questions like mine “before the final decision to go forward is made.”
None of the environmental impact statements to date cover
the question of the increased levels of plutonium and other actinides in
so-called low-level waste.
Another example of
the analysis that has not been done on a site specific basis are issues of the
different impact and potential risk for the host community from storing LEU
generated high-level waste versus weapons MOX plutonium fuel generated
high-level waste. The host community may be facing extended on-site storage of
this material, even if a repository is made available, since it is not yet part
of the existing waste queue of material waiting to be sent to a repository (assuming
that one becomes available). If
transferred to dry storage it is likely that this irradiated fuel will require
more containers due to the issues of thermal loading and criticality discussed
above. These are simply examples of the types of issues that the local host
community, under the National Environmental Policy act should be able to
exercise its rights in informing a major federal action. To date, the Duke host
communities have not had these opportunities.
It is important to
emphasize that this analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act must
focus not only on the use of plutonium fuel, but on the use of weapons-grade
plutonium fuel. Throughout Duke’s application there are stipulations about the
fact that many parameters of plutonium fuel are different than LEU fuel (for
instance: source term, neutronics, fuel rod behavior, thermal conductivity,
decay heat generation, contact dose…). There are few references to the fact
that there are differences between weapons-grade plutonium and reactor-grade plutonium, however already in this proceeding we have
encountered a very real one pertaining to the level of information access that
is available and which individuals are or are not qualified to access it. This
must be considered as well. The Catawba ice condenser reactor sites may, if NRC
decides to proceed with this major federal action by approving Dukes license
amendment, be effectively converted from commercial power generation sites into
a national security zone. The people of this community deserve to know this,
and give comment on it. There are additional concerns about the differences
between weapons-grade MOX and reactor-grade MOX that could be beneficially
explored in a full EIS process, and now is not too soon. It would, in fact serve
the overall program schedule to embark on this process now, rather than later.
Additionally, there is the work of Dr. Edwin Lyman
on the significantly elevated consequences to local populations from a severe
reactor accident, and his assessment that the use of MOX, particularly in ice
condenser reactors may contribute to some of these accident scenarios. The ice
condenser design has been noted by a number of authorities to have a
containment that is less robust that other pressurized water reactors, thus
placing the populations in this region at even greater risk in the event of a
severe accident.
This alone should be the reason that the NRC decides to reject the use of
weapons plutonium MOX fuel in LWRs. This major federal decision should, of
course, be informed and supported by a full environmental impact statement
process, which includes the North and South Carolinian people of the Charlotte region who will be impacted by
this decision, not simply their “dose receptor” status in computer codes and written
reports.
Nuclear Information and Resource Service respectfully urges
the NRC staff and Duke to specifically consider children. When a “dose
receptor” is modeled, why not use a child? While the Standard Man
is used in most calculations of potential accident consequences, we would like
to remind all parties that Real Men are not capable of self-reproduction.
Protecting the children of the Carolinas should be the number one priority of all parties in this
proceeding, and all calculations and decisions, based on those calculations,
should therefore be based on our children.
Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Olson
Director of the
Southeast Office
Nuclear Information
and Resource Service
P.O.
Box 7586
Asheville, North Carolina 28802