CRS Report for Congress
Nuclear Weapons:
Disposal Options for Surplus
Weapons-Usable Plutonium
May 22, 1997
Craig M. Johnson
Research Assistant
Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division
Zachary S. Davis
International Nuclear Policy Specialist
Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division
Congressional Research Service *The Library of Congress* Document
# 97-564 ENR
SUMMARY
With the end of the Cold War, the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaties (START), and other agreements, the United States and
Russia have dramatically reduced their arsenals of nuclear
weapons. As a result, each side has accumulated large stockpiles
of plutonium, one of the principal materials used in nuclear
warheads. The United States recently declared a holding of
approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium excess
to military needs. Even greater levels are believed to exist in
Russia.
Ensuring the plutonium's safe and secure disposal is a priority
of the Clinton Administration, nonproliferation advocates, and
others. As the National Academy of Sciences declared, "The
existence of this surplus material constitutes a clear and
present danger to national and international security.' 'l The
principal concern is that Russian plutonium, if not securely
disposed of, could be diverted to terrorist groups or to states
aspiring to build nuclear weapons. Some experts believe that
Russia will not reduce its stockpile unless the United States
engages Moscow in a cooperative, simultaneous plutonium disposal
program.
On January 14, 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) released a
Record of Decision for disposing of U.S. surplus weapons-usable
plutonium. It recommended converting an unspecified quantity
into mixed oxide fuel (MOX), which would be "burned" in domestic
commercial reactors, and immobilizing at least eight tons in
glass (vitrification) or a ceramic compound. The purpose of the
plan is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to irreversible nuclear
disarmament and ensure that Russia begins disposing of its
excess plutonium as well. DOE is requesting $80 million in
FY1998 for the plutonium disposal program.
The two-track plan has since become the center of much debate
within Congress and the nuclear community. Some argue that the
decision to burn MOX fuel threatens to reverse a 20-year U.S.
policy against using plutonium fuel in civilian reactors. This
has led many to conclude that the United States should pursue
only immobilization. Others believe that if the MOX option,
which is Russia's preferred choice, is rejected, the United
States will be less able to influence Russia's plutonium
disposition policies.
There is also some concern that a near-term decision on
permanent disposal may be premature. Many intermediary steps
must occur between weapons dismantlement and geological disposal
that are still hindered by political, economic, technical, and
international uncertainties. Until these factors are settled,
long-term storage may be the de facto outcome.
CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Issues for Congress 3
Costs and Funding 4
Nuclear Nonproliferation 4
Russian Reciprocity 4
Location of Major Facilities 5
Utility Concerns 5
U.S. and Russian Plutonium Stockpiles 6
U.S. Inventories and Storage Sites 6
Estimates of Russian Stockpile 7
Implementation of Two-Track Plutonium Disposition 8
Immobilization 9
Mixed Oxide Fuel 10
Canadian Reactors 11
Plutonium Conversion 12
Spent Fuel Standard 13
Disposal Cost Estimates 14
Nonproliferation 16
Russian Disposition Issues 18
Gaining Russian Cooperation 18
U.S.-Russian Agreements 19
For Additional Reading 20
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have
dramatically reduced their nuclear arsenals and are dismantling
hundreds of nuclear warheads each year. As a result, both
nations possess growing stockpiles of excess plutonium, a key
nuclear weapons material. Although the U.S. government is
confident about the security of its own plutonium stockpile, the
Russian stockpile could pose significant risks until it is
disposed of.
The United States and Russia currently are attempting to agree
on one or more disposal methods. Major options that have been
considered include:
*"Burning" as nuclear reactor fuel. Plutonium from nuclear
weapons can be blended with uranium to make "mixed oxide" (MOX)
fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Most of the original
plutonium nuclei would be irreversibly fragmented (fissioned)
over the course of several years in a nuclear reactor, although
a small amount of new plutonium would be created at the same
time. After removal from a reactor, the spent fuel containing
radioactive fission products that make it difficult to use its
plutonium in weapons could be sent to a deep underground
repository for permanent disposal.
* Mixing with radioactive waste. Plutonium could be diluted
with highly radioactive waste, solidified in glass or ceramic
material, and emplaced in a repository. Although the
weapons-grade plutonium would not be destroyed in the process,
retrieval would require considerable time, effort, and special
facilities.
* Destruction in accelerators or advanced reactors. Nearly
complete fissioning of weapons plutonium might be achieved with
powerful particle accelerators, advanced types of nuclear
reactors, or a combination of technologies. However, such
advanced technologies would require more development work than
other options.
* Direct disposal in deep boreholes. Boreholes drilled as deep
as 2.5 miles into stable geologic formations might be used for
permanent disposal of sealed packages of surplus plutonium.
Plutonium would be emplaced in the bottom half of the borehole,
while the top half would be filled with sealant. The plutonium
would be much deeper
CRS-2
than in currently planned geologic repositories, which are no
more than 2,150 feet under the surface.
* Subseabed or space disposal. Plutonium placed deeply
underneath the ocean floor or launched into space would be
virtually irretrievable, but concerns about safety, ocean
contamination, and cost have limited the consideration of these
options.
* Indefinite secure storage. Secure storage of weapons
plutonium could minimize the risk of theft or diversion,
although the likelihood of establishing secure long-term storage
in Russia is uncertain. Moreover, the continued existence of
plutonium stockpiles would make it easier for the United States
and Russia to rebuild their nuclear arsenals.
The Russian government, which considers plutonium to be a
valuable national energy resource, has expressed interest
primarily in reactor-based disposal options, such as use as MOX
fuel. Within the United States there have been some reservations
about this form of disposal, primarily because of concern that
widespread use of plutonium fuel could create increase
opportunities for diversion of fissile material for nuclear
weapons programs. In September 1996, a joint U.S.-Russian task
force concluded that using weapons-grade plutonium to fuel
commercial nuclear reactors was the most technically mature
option, followed by the option of blending the plutonium with
highly radioactive waste. 2
Mindful of the above study, as well as reports from the Office
of Technology Assessment, the National Academy of Sciences, and
the President's 1993 Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy
(see below), the Department of Energy (DOE) on January 14, 1997,
released a Record of Decision for a "two-track" plan for
disposal of U.S. weapons-usable plutonium. The recommended
strategy is to simultaneously:
* immobilize at least eight tons of U.S. surplus plutonium in
glass or ceramic material, and
* "burn" an as-yet-undetermined quantity as mixed oxide fuel in
existing, domestic, commercial light water reactors, or in
Canadian commercial reactors.
The exact amounts for either option in the two tracks will not
be determined until additional technological development and
testing takes place. 3
CRS-3
The stated goal of the dual-track plan is to support U.S.
nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy by reducing global
stockpiles of excess fissile materials so that they may never
again be used in weapons. The program is designed to demonstrate
the United States' commitment to its nonproliferation goals, as
specified in the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control
Policy of 1993, and to stimulate similar action by other nations
such as Russia, where stockpiles of surplus weapons-usable
fissile materials may be less secure from potential theft or
diversion than those in the United States. 4
The United States is not planning to dispose of its surplus
plutonium unilaterally. Before disposal operations begin,
reciprocal action is expected by Russia, which could be pursuant
to a plutonium disposal treaty or other formal agreements.
Russia's continued production of weapons-usable plutonium could
complicate the matter. Russia also may require financing of the
necessary facilities to implement its plutonium disposal
program. Given these obstacles, it may be a number of years
before final disposal plans are fully developed.
Issues for Congress
Before the United States commits itself to plutonium
disposition, numerous issues that may involve legislative action
or oversight must be resolved. The range of disposal options
noted above, the location of new processing, storage, and
disposal facilities, the impact on U.S. nuclear weapons
nonproliferation policy, and Russia's disposal commitments are
among the major factors that Congress is likely to consider.
Three committees in the Senate and one in the House have
grappled with plutonium disposal issues since the breakup of the
Soviet Union. 5
Congressional action will be needed to provide funding for the
plutonium disposition program, authorization of new facilities,
and approval of any treaties that may be negotiated.
Authorization of new DOE facilities for fuel fabrication,
plutonium processing, and other plutonium disposal activities
may include the selection of specific sites, as well as the
designation of a nuclear safety regulator, such as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
CRS-4
Costs and Funding
DOE estimates that disposing of surplus U.S. plutonium utilizing
the two-track approach will be around $2.3 billion. Given
various technological uncertainties, however, the program could
cost upwards of $4.8 billion over 20 years, according to DOE. 6
Major potential costs include fabrication of MOX fuel, blending
plutonium in a glass or ceramic mixture, and payments to nuclear
utilities for burning MOX fuel. Subsidies for Russia's plutonium
processing and disposal facilities may also be an issue.
Funding for DOE's fissile materials disposition program rose
from $36 million in FY1996 to $68 million in FY1997, and the
Clinton Administration has requested $84 million for FY1998.
(All but about $4 million per year is for plutonium disposition
efforts.) Major activities of the program include analysis and
design of facilities, laboratory tests of plutonium mixtures,
preparations for the MOX fuel option, and joint tests and
demonstrations with Russia. 7
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Concerns have been raised that converting U.S. weapons plutonium
to commercial reactor fuel could undermine U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation policy, which discourages the civil use of
plutonium throughout the world. Plutonium is created in all of
today's commercial reactors and can be chemically separated from
other elements of spent fuel to make new fuel or weapons.
Opponents of the MOX option contend that widespread commercial
use of plutonium for fuel would increase the risk of plutonium
diversion for weapons.
However, DOE contends that the MOX fuel option would not
contradict U.S. nonproliferation policy, because plutonium
loaded into U.S. reactors would be from the existing surplus
stockpile. No additional plutonium would be separated to make
the fuel, and all MOX fuel fabrication facilities would be
permanently closed after the surplus weapons plutonium was used
up.
Russian Reciprocity
Whether it would be in the United States' interest to help
implement the reactor option in Russia is a contentious issue.
It is unclear, for example, whether Russia would commit to
restricting facilities for MOX fabrication solely to the
disposal of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons as the
U.S. intends or if Moscow might also introduce plutonium
separated from civilian spent fuel.
CRS-5
If Russia uses plutonium separated from commercial reactors, it
is questionable whether U.S. objectives of decreasing Russian
stockpiles and discouraging the use of separated plutonium in
reactors can be met. Russia may also wish to use a MOX fuel
fabrication plant to sell plutonium-based fuel on the global
market. Given Russian support for reprocessing spent fuel to
separate plutonium and uranium, construction of such a plant may
actually lead to increased quantities of separated plutonium in
Russia.
It is also undetermined whether Russia would dispose of spent
fuel from MOX in a geologic repository after a once-through fuel
cycle, as is the stated plan of the United States. If Russia
instead reprocesses its MOX fuel, it could recover unfissioned
weapons plutonium along with newly created plutonium. As a
result, the Russian plutonium stockpile could grow while the
U.S. stockpile was diminishing. A further complication is that
Russia has not yet declared the size of its existing stockpile
of weapons-grade plutonium, making it difficult to estimate
comparable reductions for both sides
Such concerns will probably have to be addressed before U.S.
plutonium disposal facilities are authorized by Congress.
Verifiable plutonium disposition agreements between the United
States and Russia might take the form of an official treaty
requiring Senate ratification.
Location of Major Facilities
Major new facilities will be required to implement either of
DOE's selected plutonium disposition options. The immobilization
route calls for construction of glassification (vitrification)
or ceramic-based processing facilities, while a MOX fuel
fabrication plant would be needed to implement the reactor fuel
option. For both methods, a facility would be required to
convert plutonium metal warhead components to non-secret oxide
forms. Possible locations for such facilities include the
Hanford Site in Washington, the Savannah River Site in South
Carolina, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory, and the Pantex Plant in Texas. 9
Utility Concerns
Given the capital modifications utilities would need to
undertake to prepare their reactors for handling MOX, they would
undoubtedly want solid assurances that the government will stay
the course once disposition begins. Similarly, considering the
expenses associated with fabricating MOX, the federal government
probably will want guarantees that utilities will not withdraw
from burning MOX until the excess stockpile is destroyed.
Ensuring against both of
CRS-6
those possibilities may require legislation aimed at locking in
long-term commitments to the mission. Substantial subsidies to
nuclear power plant owners might also prove necessary.
Any DOE negotiations with utilities on this matter may be
complicated by the restructuring of the electric power industry
now occurring. As a result of increased competition in the
generation sector of the industry, the economics of continuing
to operate some existing nuclear stations has been called into
question. As a result, utilities might be reluctant to accept
long-term contracts to use MOX fuel, which would commit them to
keep operating a reactor they might otherwise shut down. The
amount of any needed subsidy or other contractual arrangements,
might be affected by this uncertainty. 10
U.S. and Russian Plutonium Stockpiles
Plutonium (Pu) is one of the two fissile materials used in
nuclear weapons. The other is the uranium isotope U-235. Unlike
U-236, which makes up a small fraction of natural uranium,
plutonium is produced in nuclear reactors, including commercial
reactors. This occurs when U-238, the dominant isotope in
natural uranium, is bombarded with neutrons released during a
nuclear chain reaction. The uranium captures neutrons and decays
into Pu-239. The plutonium can then be extracted for use in
nuclear warheads.
Plutonium is considered weapons-grade if it contains at least 93
percent Pu-239. Fuel-grade plutonium contains from seven to less
than 19 percent Pu-240, and power reactor-grade plutonium
contains levels of 19 percent and greater Pu-240.1'
Distinguishing plutonium by its grade, however, obscures the
fact that all grades are weapons usable. Less than six kilograms
of plutonium, about the size of a baseball, is needed to make a
bomb.l2
U.S. Inventories and Storage Sites
The United States possesses 99.5 tons of plutonium either in DOE
inventories or in nuclear weapons controlled by the Department
of Defense. l3
CRS-7
In 1988 the United States ceased producing plutonium for
weapons. This halt became official policy on July 13, 1992, with
President Bush's announcement that the United States would no
longer produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
On March 1, 1995, on advice from the Nuclear Weapons Council,
President Clinton declared more than 52 tons of plutonium
surplus to national security requirements.'4 That declaration
placed a ceiling on U.S. nuclear forces, because the excess
plutonium is not authorized for use in nuclear weapons. The
stockpile of plutonium that continues to be held in reserve,
however, has been deemed adequate for maintaining projected
military needs.
The United States currently stores surplus weapons-grade
plutonium at six sites:
* Hanford Site (Washington), 1.7 metric tons;
* Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, 0.4
metric tons;
* Los Alamos National Laboratory (New Mexico), 1.5 metric tons;
* Pantex Plant (Texas), 21.3 metric tons (including plutonium
from planned weapon dismantlements);
* Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Colorado), 11.9
metric tons; and
* Savannah River Site (South Carolina), 1.3 metric tons.
The United States also holds an excess stockpile of 13.2 tons of
fuel-grade plutonium and 1.2 tons of reactor-grade plutonium.
The listed quantities do not include nonsurplus inventories,
such as strategic reserves, programmatic materials, and
non-weapons-usable materials.l5
Estimates of Russian Stockpile
Unlike the United States, Russia has not made a specific
declaration of excess plutonium. Unclassified sources estimate
Russian holdings of approximately 200 tons, with 30 tons
separated for civilian purposes and never
CRS-8
designated for weapons use.l6 To achieve equal levels of
military plutonium stockpiles, a goal the United States and
Russia share, Russia will need to declare more than 100 tons of
weapons plutonium surplus as well as the 30 tons of civilian
material, according to DOE.l7
Russia currently stores plutonium at a number of sites, many
with inadequate security systems. A Russian military prosecutor
who investigated the theft of fuel rods from a Russian naval
facility observed that "even potatoes are sometimes better
protected nowadays than radioactive materials....' 18 There is
concern that if security at these facilities is not improved,
fissile materials may be diverted to unauthorized states or
terrorist organizations.l9
To decrease the likelihood of theft, the United States is paying
half the cost of constructing a safe and secure storage facility
for excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium at the Mayak
site near Chelyabinsk. Completion of the facility's first phase
is expected in early 1999, with the final phase a year later.
Only excess material from dismantled nuclear weapons is to be
stored there. Other fissile materials will continue to be housed
at a variety of military and civilian facilities. U.S.
assistance for the facility, part of the Pentagon's Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program, is expected to total at least $200
million.
Implementation of Two-Track Plutonium Disposition
DOE's selection of the two-track plutonium disposition plan
calls for plutonium to be either burned in a reactor or
immobilized with highly radioactive waste for direct disposal.
However, numerous major decisions must be made before the
two-track plan can be implemented. The location of facilities,
the type of solidification to be conducted, and the specific
reactors that would burn MOX fuel must all be determined. All
those decisions must support the ultimate goal, to make the
surplus plutonium at least as secure as the plutonium in
unseparated commercial reactor fuel.
DOE has determined that at least eight metric tons of U.S.
surplus plutonium is unsuitable for use as MOX fuel without
extensive purification. A minimum of eight tons, therefore, will
be immobilized, but the total quantity has yet to be determined.
Former Secretary of Energy O'Leary contended that
CRS-9
maintaining both reactor and immobilization options was
necessary to ensure against possible difficulties with
implementation of either one.
Immobilization
In this form of disposition, plutonium would be converted into
an oxide form and embedded in glass or a ceramic. High level
radioactive waste or other fission products would be mixed with
the plutonium to create an intense radiation field and serve as
a proliferation deterrent. Immobilization could be used for
either pure or impure forms of plutonium.
Immobilization could occur in glass, a process known as
vitrification, or in a ceramic compound. In a variation called
"can-in-canister," plutonium would be suspended in a glass
matrix inside a can, which in turn would be placed within a
larger canister and surrounded by glass containing high levels
of radioactive waste or other intense fission products. With
each of these methods, the plutonium would be buried in a
geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
The Department of Energy estimates that between eight and 17
tons of the surplus plutonium will be immobilized, about one
third of the total declared surplus. This amount, however, has
not been finalized, and DOE reserves the option of immobilizing
the entire surplus.
Vitrification of high-level waste is currently conducted by
several countries, including the United States. Adding
substantial quantities of plutonium to the process, however, has
not been demonstrated on an industrial scale. All immobilization
options will require additional research and development prior
to implementation.
DOE has determined that its existing melters would not be
suitable for vitrification, nor is there a suitable facility for
ceramic immobilization. The Energy Department is contemplating
either constructing an "adjunct" melter to the existing
vitrification plant at the Savannah River Site's Defense Waste
Processing Facility or building a new facility at Hanford. 20
The concentration of plutonium in glass or ceramic has raised
certain safety concerns. High levels of dissolved plutonium risk
criticality accidents, i.e., unplanned nuclear chain reactions.
Depending on the technology utilized, studies indicate that
immobilization can handle between 5 and 12 percent plutonium by
weight. 21
Depending on the type of technology and whether new or existing
facilities are used, immobilization could begin within 7 to 13
years, according to DOE.
CRS-10
The overall mission duration, including research and
development, construction, and operation, is expected to be
about 18 to 24 years.22
Mixed Oxide Fuel
The second preferred option is to convert surplus plutonium into
mixed oxide fuel (MOX). MOX is a blend of uranium dioxide (UO2)
and plutonium dioxide (PuO2) that produces a fuel suitable for
use in nuclear reactors. This fuel would be used in existing
commercial, domestic light water reactors on a once-through fuel
cycle, in which the spent fuel would be disposed of without
reprocessing.
It is technically straightforward to substitute MOX fuel for
about one-third of the uranium fuel used in conventional light
water reactors operating in the United States. 23 MOX fabricated
from commercial spent fuel is considered technologically mature
in Europe, but fabrication and use of MOX fuel has never been
tested on a large scale with weapons-grade plutonium. There are
no reactors in the United States currently using or licensed to
burn MOX fuel. 24
The United States does not have an operational MOX fuel
fabrication plant. Two MOX fabrication facilities were
constructed at Hanford to supply the canceled Clinch River
Breeder Reactor, but they were never operated and it is unlikely
they could be reopened to comply with modern safety and
environmental standards. 26 A dedicated MOX facility is being
considered for either the Savannah River Site, Hanford, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, or Pantex.
About 70 percent, or 35 tons, of the plutonium declared surplus
appears to be suitable for MOX fuel, which would contain from
three to seven percent plutonium. After a once-through fuel
cycle, the spent fuel would still contain a substantial amount
of unburned plutonium, plus newly produced reactor-grade
plutonium. 26
The quantity of plutonium destroyed in a reactor depends on the
percentage of MOX used in the reactor core. With a one-third MOX
fuel core containing four percent plutonium, for example, there
would be a net gain of plutonium in the spent fuel in the entire
core. 27 This increase in plutonium
CRS-11
is caused by the dominant presence in the original fuel of
U-238, about one percent of which is converted to plutonium
during the reactor operation. On the other hand, in a
reactor-core with 100 percent MOX fuel, more plutonium would be
destroyed than created. (As noted previously, plutonium would
also be created if the same reactor were operating entirely on
conventional uranium fuel.)
The plutonium within the spent MOX fuel undergoes a shift in
isotopic composition from weapons-grade to reactor-grade. This
shift has been cited as one of the advantages of reactor based
options. Reactor-grade plutonium, however, can still be used in
a nuclear explosion. Yet, according to the National Academy of
Sciences, which conducted an in depth study of plutonium
disposition:
The main goal. . . is not so much to destroy the plutonium_by
fissioning the plutonium atoms or transmuting them into other
elements as to contaminate it with highly radioactive
fission products, requiring difficult processing before it
could be used in weapons.28
The Record of Decision states that selected nuclear power plants
could begin accepting MOX fuel in seven to 13 years. Depending
on the number of participating reactors, the percentage of MOX
used in the fuel cores, and other factors, the time to complete
the mission varies from 24 to 31 years. 29
The DOE would use existing commercial light water reactors to
burn the MOX fuel. The operational lifespan of the reactors
would be taken into consideration during the selection process.
If partially completed reactors were to be completed by other
parties, they would be considered for possible use in disposing
of plutonium.30 It is believed, however, that current reactors
are capable of fulfilling the mission.
Canadian Reactors
DOE retains the potential option of burning MOX in Canadian
deuterium-uranium (CANDU) reactors as well. This option would
dispose of U.S. and Russian plutonium in a parallel program, if
agreements could be reached among the three countries. For the
United States, MOX would be manufactured domestically at a DOE
site and transported to Canada. Similarly, Russia would
transport prefabricated MOX fuel to Canada. After a single
cycle, the spent fuel would remain in Canada for disposal in
accordance with Canadian waste polices. Canada has expressed an
interest in hosting this program of plutonium disposition. 31
CRS-12
Use of MOX fuel in CANDU reactors has never been demonstrated on
an industrial scale. It is thought that these reactors can
handle 100 percent MOX fuel cores with plutonium loadings
between 0.5 and 3.0 percent.32 An agreement was reached between
the U.S. and Canada to test MOX fuel in CANDU reactors. The
plan, however, was blocked in 1996 by domestic advocacy groups
charging the shipment of MOX fuel could not occur until
requisite environmental impact statements were completed.
The CANDU option could potentially begin 10 years after a
decision to proceed were made. Estimates indicate it would take
another 15 years for Canada to dispose of 50 tons of plutonium.33
Plutonium Conversion
Plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads is initially in the
form of "pits," which are the fissile cores made of plutonium.34
For reasons of security the plutonium metal pits must be
transformed into an oxide form before either disposal option can
proceed. The United States does not currently have a pit
disassembly and conversion facility capable of operating on an
industrial scale. The preferred alternative is to construct such
a facility at either Hanford, Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory, Pantex, or the Savannah River Site.
Plutonium must be in a relatively pure form for use as MOX
fuel.35 This requires separating plutonium from alloying
materials found in the pits. Residual levels of the alloying
element gallium in separated plutonium may complicate its use in
MOX fuel. Gallium chemically attacks the metal zirconium, a
major material in the metal tubes containing nuclear reactor
fuel. A study by experts at Los Alamos National Laboratory found
that "the presence of excessive gallium in spent MOX fuel could.
. . cause [fuel tube] deterioration and hence possibly cause
waste management problems."36
The only fully developed technology for plutonium separation is
an aqueous process that results in large quantities of liquid
radioactive wastes. A dry method, the Advanced Recovery and
Integrated Extraction System (ARIES), is being developed at Los
Alamos National Laboratory. ARIES is expected to
CRS-13
significantly reduce the amount of radioactive waste in the
separation process. ARIES is also expected to lower the quantity
of gallium, which comprises about 1% of the plutonium pit, to
approximately 200 parts per million. If the MOX fuel contained
about 5% plutonium, the gallium concentration would average
about 10 parts per million. This is thought to be an acceptable
level, but it has not been conclusively determined.37
Spent Fuel Standard
Both of DOE's preferred disposal options_burning in reactors and
immobilization for direct disposal_are intended to meet the
"spent fuel standard." That is, to render surplus plutonium as
inaccessible for weapons use as the much larger and growing
quantity of unseparated reactor-grade plutonium existing in
spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.38
Reactor-grade plutonium is viewed as inefficient by weapon
designers, although explosive devices can be made with it.
Plutonium is produced in varying quantities in virtually all
operating nuclear reactors. Spent fuel from most commercial
reactors consists of about 1% plutonium of various isotopes.
Unlike weapons plutonium, however, plutonium in spent fuel is
mixed with highly radioactive fission products that make it very
dangerous to handle. Extracting the plutonium for use in nuclear
explosives is still possible; the United States, Russia, and
many other states have the technology to do so.
The spent fuel standard was initially advanced by the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) and adopted by the Department of
Energy. NAS reasoned:
Options that left the weapons plutonium more accessible would
mean that this material would continue to pose a unique
safeguards problem indefinitely.
Conversely, the costs, complexities, risks, and delays of going
beyond the spent fuel standard. . . would not offer
substantial additional security benefits unless society were
prepared to take the same approach with the global stock of civilian plutonium" (emphasis original) 39
The United States has no plans to exceed the spent fuel standard
for plutonium disposal. Current U.S. policy considers the direct
disposal of spent nuclear fuel to be the most
proliferation-resistant option for plutonium produced by
commercial reactors.
CRS-14
Disposal Cost Estimates
DOE's estimates for plutonium disposition using the two-track
approach over a 20-year period indicate a total program cost of
approximately $2.3 billion. This assumes that 35 tons of
plutonium will be burned as MOX fuel, and the remaining 17 tons
will be immobilized for direct disposal. The $2.3 billion cost,
it should be noted, could change significantly. Various
uncertainties provided by the DOE's Technical Summary Report
indicate that costs could raise the total to $4.8 billion (see
Table 1).
I
Table 1. DOE Cost Estimates for Two-Track Plutonium Disposition
Using Three Commercial Reactors and Can-in-Canister
Immobilization (millions of 1996 dollars)
Facility, Investment Costs, Operating Costs, Fuel Credits,
Possible Cost Increases 40, Net Life Cycle Cost
Pu Conversion, 360, 970, 0, 200, 1,330-1,530
MOX Fabrication, 360, 820(4l), -930, 600, 250-850
Reactor Operations, 200, 90, 0 , 600, 290-890
Immobilization, 220, 60, 0, 860, 280-1,140
Repository, 0, 230, 0, 200, 230-430
Total, 1,140, 2,170, -930, 2,460, 2,380-4,840 (42)
Source: DOE Technical Summary Report.
The Net Life Cycle Cost is calculated by adding the total
investment and operating costs and subtracting estimated "fuel
displacement credits." These credits consist of potential cost
recoveries from participating utilities' reduction of
conventional uranium fuel purchases.
CRS-15
The investment category refers to the near-term government
funding requirements such as pre-operational, capital, and
operating costs. Pre-operational and operating costs are
generally incurred within the first 10 years and would require
congressional funding. Capital costs are represented as "line
items" which also would require congressional appropriation.
Operating costs include staffing, maintenance, consumables,
waste management, decontamination and decommissioning costs for
performing the disposition mission.43
With plutonium conversion, DOE estimates that adverse variants
in the separation process, such as gallium removal, could add an
additional $200 million. Uncertainties with MOX fabrication that
could affect program costs include modification, licensing and
construction costs, use of European fuel fabrication
capabilities, and fluctuations in the price of low-enriched
uranium fuel (which could affect the anticipated "fuel
displacement credits").
Reactor operations pose significant costs as well. The Record of
Decision asserts, "The combined investment and net operating
costs for MOX fuel are higher than for commercial uranium fuel;
thus, the cost of MOX fuel cannot compete economically with
low-enriched uranium fuel for LWR or natural uranium fuel for
CANDU reactors."44 Given the greater expense of using MOX fuel
and potential public opposition to utilities' handling plutonium
in civilian reactors, companies that have expressed interest in
burning MOX have done so on the assumption that the government
would provide substantial subsidies. DOE estimates that total
allocations to utilities could reach $500 million, which is
counted as an uncertainty in the reactor category 45 DOE also
budgeted an additional $100 million for delays in reactor
modifications to accommodate MOX fuel.
Factors contributing to increases in immobilization include
requirements for additional analyses and experiments and
modifications to facility construction designs. Moreover, if it
is determined that plutonium loadings in glass or ceramic are
too high, the concentration of plutonium to be immobilized in
each matrix will have to be reduced. This will require
increasing plant capacity, which would raise the program's total
cost.
Overall, the Record of Decision projected that burning MOX fuel
would be more expensive than disposing of plutonium immobilized
with high-level waste, and that "can-in-canister approaches are
the most attractive variants for immobilization based on cost
considerations."46 Similarly, Berkhout et al., concluded that,
"blending plutonium into HLW [high-level waste] glass at
CRS-16
existing or planned facilities is probably the least costly
especially in the U.S., which has no established infrastructure
for plutonium recycle...."47 Congress, however, may consider
other factors associated with disposition than simply projected
costs.
Besides domestic expenditures, the United States may decide to
help finance disposition options in Russia. Like the United
States, Russia does not have industrial-scale facilities capable
of transforming plutonium into forms suitable for disposition or
conversion into MOX fuel. Howard Canter, acting director of the
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition at DOE, has asserted
that Russia's disposition decision "will be driven by who is
going to pay for it."48 Before any moves toward implementing
disposition options are made, further agreements will need to be
reached concerning Russian plutonium disposition policy.
Nonproliferation
The United States has sought to discourage other states from
reprocessing their spent fuel, out of concern that separated
plutonium could be diverted to weapons use. This policy was
established by President Ford and codified in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242). In 1993, President
Clinton released his Nonproliferation and Arms Export Control
Policy, which stated that "the United States does not encourage
the civil use of plutonium, and accordingly does not itself
engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or
nuclear explosive purposes."
The reasoning behind the policy was emphasized by President
Clinton in a letter to Representative Stark: "The United States
does not encourage the civil use of plutonium. Its continued
production is not justified on either economic or national
security grounds, and its accumulation creates serious
proliferation and security dangers."49
To head off criticism that the two-track option would lead to
widespread reprocessing of spent fuel, the Record of Decision
asserts, "The MOX fuel fabrication facility will serve only the
limited mission of fabricating MOX fuel from plutonium declared
surplus to U.S. defense needs, with shut-down and
decontamination and decommissioning of the facility upon
completion of this mission."50
Many arms control and environmental groups are concerned that
use of MOX will be seen as encouragement for other states to
continue reprocessing
CRS-17
spent fuel. A memorandum from the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency to former Secretary of Energy O'Leary stated:
A U.S. decision to support the hybrid option would. . .
undermine our efforts to discourage proliferation-prone closed
fuel cycles [i.e., spent fuel reprocessing] not only in Russia
but also in countries such as South Korea. If the hybrid option
is chosen, these countries would hear only one message for the
next 25 years: that plutonium use for generating commercial
power is now being blessed by the United States. 5l
Various European firms experienced in MOX fuel fabrication have
indicated an interest in providing their technology to the
United States. Incorporation of European equipment would enable
the U.S. to begin burning MOX fuel sooner than if only
indigenous equipment is utilized. 52 Contracting with European
firms, however, may be viewed by some as violating U.S.
nonproliferation policy. Considering that those firms are state
controlled enterprises that promote plutonium fuel cycles,
contracting with them may be counter to the U.S. policy of not
encouraging the use of plutonium in civilian reactors.
Similar concerns may be raised with an agreement to burn MOX in
Canada. A DOE report asserts that "the CANDU alternative would
mean encouraging the use of plutonium fuel in a foreign. . .
state which is not currently using plutonium fuels."53 There may
be public objection that this constitutes a reversal of U.S.
nonproliferation policy.
A counter-argument is that U.S. rejection of plutonium fuel has
diminished its nuclear nonproliferation influence throughout the
world. Gregg Renkes, majority staff director of the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, believes that the
U.S. policy not to reprocess is anachronistic and detrimental to
American interests. In a panel discussion before the American
Nuclear Society he argued:
U.S. non-proliferation policy is not having an impact on
nuclear programs in other nations.... The rest of the world will
not turn away from plutonium as an energy source. Reprocessing
is an international fact; the U.S. policy has simply not worked.
What is worse is that reduced involvement in the technology
reduces the impact the U.S. can have on international control
regimes and non-proliferation technology development. 54
CRS-18
Russian Disposition Issues
Disposal of U.S. and Russian weapons-usable plutonium is
expected to take place simultaneously. Both sides, however, have
reached tentative agreements that the options pursued need not
be identical. The Joint Plutonium Disposition Study concluded
that "given the very different economic circumstances, nuclear
infrastructures, and fuel cycle polices in the two countries, it
is likely that the best approaches will be different in the two
countries."55
Gaining Russian Cooperation
Despite the tentative Russian agreement to accept differing
plutonium disposal programs, concerns have been raised that
Russia would reject any U.S. plan to immobilize all its surplus
plutonium without destruction, because the plutonium would still
be retrievable in weapons-grade form. The U.S. delegation to the
Joint Study, for example, argued in a letter to President
Clinton:
There is much reason to think that the Russians will not
eliminate their plutonium stockpiles at all if the United States
implements only immobilization, leaving all U.S . plutonium
weapons-grade_the Russians might then merely store their
stockpile of weapons indefinitely, which is what we should most
wish to avoid. 56
The letter also asserted that without the MOX option, the United
States would:
lose any leverage we might have had over the conditions and
safeguards accompanying the use of Russian plutonium in their
reactors. It is critically important for the United States to
play a leadership role in an international effort to implement
the reactor option in Russia, and this will be extremely
difficult to do if we reject the reactor option for our own
plutonium."57
Secretary O'Leary stressed that the two-track approach to
plutonium disposal would provide the needed flexibility and
leverage to ensure Russia begins reducing its stockpile of
excess weapons plutonium.68 Ensuring Russian cooperation,
however, remains troublesome. To date, Russia has been reluctant
to accommodate U.S. preferences in the handling and storage of
plutonium. This has much to do with the different perspective
each country has for the material. Unlike the United States,
which regards plutonium as a liability,
CRS-19
Russia sees its stockpile as a national asset to be exploited
for financial and energy benefits.
U.S.-Russian Agreements
Before any disposition agreement can take place, the United
States will likely require additional assurances from Russia
that weapons-grade plutonium is no longer being separated, and
that verifiable safeguards protecting against diversion are in
place. Howard Canter, acting director of DOE's Office of Fissile
Material Disposition, has commented that unless a solid
agreement with Russia is reached, "I don't think we'll do
anything with our plutonium other than store it. . . because
we'll never be able to sell up on the Hill spending a lot of
money to do something with ours unilaterally."59 Russian
officials are expected to insist on comparable verifiability
arrangements at U.S. facilities as well.
A complicating factor is Russia's continued production of
weapons-grade plutonium. Three reactors in Russia, two at
Seversk (Tomsk-7) and one at Zeleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26),
which generate electricity and heat for neighboring communities
in Siberia, also produce weapons-grade plutonium.60 To prevent
corrosion of the spent nuclear fuel discharged from those
reactors, it must be reprocessed to separate the plutonium,
uranium, and other elements. The separated plutonium is
increasing Russia's stockpile of unsafeguarded, weapons-grade
plutonium by about 1.5 tons each year.61 Vice President Gore and
Prime Minister Chernomydrin signed an agreement June 23, 1994,
requiring the shutdown of these reactors by 2000.
In January 1996 Secretary of Energy O'Leary and Russian Minister
of Atomic Energy (Minatom) Mikhailov signed an agreement to
convert the cores of the Russian plutonium production reactors
rather than permanently shut them down. Conversion would allow
use of fuel that produces only 1%-10% of the plutonium currently
generated. The range reflects different fuel types and designs,
e.g., use of highly enriched uranium versus low enriched uranium
in the reactor. Moreover, the spent fuel would have higher
concentrations of Pu-240, downgrading it to reactor grade.
Finally, the spent fuel would not have to be reprocessed. 62
Progress toward implementing the agreement, however, has been
slow.
The Department of Defense is requesting $41 million for FY1998
to assist in core conversion of these Russian reactors.
Converting the reactor fuel cores
CRS-20
would be considerably cheaper than replacing them with nuclear
or fossil fuel power plants.63
Other U.S.-Russian agreements have been reached as well, but
their efficacy remains uncertain. At the May 10, 1995, Moscow
Summit, the two countries released a Joint Statement on the
Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing
Nuclear Weapons. Among the agreed provisions were declarations
not to use excess fissile material from dismantled nuclear
weapons to fabricate components for new weapons; not to use
newly produced fissile material in nuclear weapons; and to
negotiate further agreements for reciprocal monitoring of stored
excess fissile materials from dismantled nuclear warheads, which
would allow each nation to send inspectors to the other's
weapons facilities.
A U.S.-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition could include
verifiable step-by-step measures to ensure that Russian disposal
is taking place as agreed. A first step, for example, could be
the verification of surplus stored plutonium noted above. A
plutonium agreement could take the form of a treaty, or a global
convention such as the proposed treaty to end production of
nuclear weapons materials.64 Without such an agreement, each
side would appear unlikely to move beyond the unverified
indefinite storage currently taking place.
For Additional Reading
Berkhout, Frans et al. "Disposition of Separated Plutonium."
Science & Global Security 3, 1992: 1-53.
Holdren, John et al. "Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to Reduce a
Clear and Present Danger." Arms Control Today 26, 1997: 3-9.
Makhijani, Arjun and Annie Makhijani. Fissile Materials in a
Glass, Darkly. Technical and Policy Aspects of the Disposition of Plutonium and
Highly Enriched Uranium. Takoma Park, MD: IEER Press, 1995.
National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security
and Arms Control. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994.
National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security
and Arms Control. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium: Reactor Related Options. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 1995.
63 Ibid., l.
64 See Carl E. Behrens and Warren H. Donnelly, International
Agreement to Cut Off Production of Nuclear Weapons Material, CRS
Report for Congress, 96-602 ENR, July 8, 1996.
CRS-21
U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment. Dismantling the
Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials, OTA-0-572. Washington,
DC: GPO, 1993.
U.S. Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation. Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment
of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium
Alternatives. Washington, DC: GPO, 1997.
U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fissile Material
Disposition. Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 1-4.
Washington, DC: GPO, 1996.
U.S.-Russian Steering Committee. Joint United States/Russian
Plutonium Disposition Study. Washington, DC: Department of
Energy Office of Fissile Material Disposition, 1996.
Footnotes
l National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of
Excess Weapons Plutonium, (Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1994), 1.
2 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition, Joint United States/Russian Plutonium Disposition
Study. Executive Summary, September 1996, 1.
3 U.S. Department of Energy, Record of Decision for the Storage
and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials. Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, January 14, 1997, l.
4 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 22.
5 See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on
European Affairs Hearing, Loose Nukes, Nuclear Smuggling, and
the Fissile-Material Problem in Russia and the NIS (Sen. Hrg.
104-253), August 22 and 23, 1995; House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security and Human
Rights, Stemming the Plutonium Tide: Limiting the Accumulation
of Excess Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials, March 23, 1994; and
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing, Disposing of
Plutonium in Russia (Sen. Hrg. 103-135), March 9, 1993.
6 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition, Technical Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable
Plutonium Disposition, DOE/MD-0003 Rev. 1, October 31, 1996,
4-14.
7 U.S. Department of Energy, FY1998 Congressional Budget
Request, DOE/CR-0041, Vol. 1, February 1997, 532.
8 National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of
Excess Weapons Plutonium, 12.
9 The Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Laboratory were rejected as
possible sites because DOE does not want to introduce plutonium to areas were
it is not already stored. Rocky Flats was rejected because the preferred option is to
remove all plutonium from Rocky Flats for storage at either Pantex or the Savannah River
Site.
10 For details on restructuring proposals see Larry Parker,
Electricity Restructuring: Comparison of S. 237, N.R. 656, H.R.
1230 and S. 722, CRS Report to Congress, 97-504 ENR Revised, May
20, 1997.
1l U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition, Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Materials. Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,
DOE/EIS-0229 Vol. 1, December 1996, 1-2.
12 U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies
Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115, December
1993, 173.
13 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment
of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium
Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007, January 1997, 18.
14 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition, Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Materials. Final Programmatic Environmental Statement. Summary,
DOE/EIS-0229 Summary, December 1996, S-3. The Nuclear Weapons
Council includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Deputy Secretary
of Energy.
15 Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
Storage and Disposition, 1-3.
16 Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, 22.
17 Ibid., 22.
18 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Fuel Rods Theft
Blamed on Lax Naval Security," Izvestiya, May 12, 1995, 31,
cited in The Nuclear Black Market, Global Organized Crime
Project (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 1996), 12.
19 See Graham Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy:
Containing the Threat of Loose Russia Nuclear Weapons and
Fissile Material, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 12,
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996).
20 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 20.
21 Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition, Technical Summary Report, 2-16.
22 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 12.
23 U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Dismantling
the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials, OTA-0-572, 1993, 89.
24 Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, 82
25 Office of Technology Assessment, Dismantling the Bomb, nl9,
89.
26 National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of
Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options, (Washington,
DC: National Academy Press, 1995), 35.
27 National Academy of Sciences, Reactor-Related Options, Table
6-1, 252.
28 National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition,
154.
29 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 12
30 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 20.
31 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 8.
32 National Academy of Sciences, Reactor-Related Options, 145.
33 Department of Energy, Arms Control Assessment, 100.
34 Modern thermonuclear warheads contain a "primary" and
"secondary" stage in their detonation. Plutonium is present in
the fissile pit of the primary. See Berkhout, et. al,
"Disposition of Separated Plutonium," Science & Global Security
Vol. 3, 1992, 4.
35 Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
"Plutonium Conversion and Extraction," Briefing Slide, FY 1998
Budget Request: Investing for a Better Future, February 6, 1997.
36 James W. Toevs and Carl A. Beard, "Gallium in Weapons-Grade
Plutonium and MOX Fuel Fabrication," Los Alamos National
Laboratory document LA-UR-96-4764, reprinted in Science For
Democratic Action 5:4 (February 1997), 10.
37 Josef Hebert, HLANL Warns About Element in Weapons Plutonium
for Use in Reactors," Associated Press, January 29, 1997.
38 Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
Storage and Disposition, 1-5.
39 National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition, 34.
40 Cost uncertainties are illustrative of increases from
stand-alone approaches to plutonium disposition, i.e.,
immobilizing or burning as MOX fuel the entire stockpile of
surplus plutonium. The amounts listed assume maximum cost
increases. DOE asserts that because each option in the two-track
approach would process a lower amount of material than its stand
alone counterpart, the magnitude of the cost uncertainties will
be proportionally reduced.
41 Includes $140 million for fuel fabricated in Europe.
42 The high end assumes that all potential cost increases are
realized to their maximum extent.
43 Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
Technical Summary Report, 4-1.
44 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 12.
45 Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
Technical Summary Report, Table 6-1, 6-3.
46 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 12.
47 Berkhout et al., 28.
48 "Plutonium Disposition Plans Unlikely to Proceed Without
Agreement Between U.S., Russia," Spent Fuel, 3:141 (February 3,
1997), 3.
49 Letter from President Clinton to Representative Fortney Pete
Stark, October 20, 1993.
50 Department of Energy, Record of Decision, 21.
51 Memorandum signed by ACDA Director John D. Holum to Secretary
of Energy Hazel R. O'Leary, November 1, 1996.
52 Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
Technical Summary Report, 6-3.
53 Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, 106.
54 Gregg D. Renkes, "U.S. High Level Waste Management: Policy
and the Reprocessing Option," Panel discussion at the American
Nuclear Society, November 12, 1996.
55 Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
Joint U.S./Russian Plutonium Disposition Study Executive
Summary, September 1996, 2.
56 Letter to President Clinton from the United States Delegation
of the U.S./Russian Independent Scientific Commission on
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, December 3, 1996.
57 Ibid.
58 DOE Announces Decision on the Storage and Disposition of
Surplus Nuclear Weapons Materials," Department of Energy Press
Release, January 14, 1997.
59 "U.S. Plutonium Use Plan Hinges on Russia," Reuters, January
27, 1997.
60 John P. Holdren et al., "Excess Weapons Plutonium: How to
Reduce a Clear and Present Danger," Arms Control Today 26:9
(November/December 1996), 8.
61 Todd Perry, "Ending Russian Plutonium Production: Cooperative
Efforts to Convert Military Reactors," The Nonproliferation
Review 4:2 (Winter 1997), 1.
62 Ibid., 1.