THE UNSOUND SCIENCE OF YUCCA MOUNTAIN

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President George Bush promised Nevada he would not approve the Yucca Mountain Project unless it was supported by “sound science.”

Congress’ Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board:

· January 1999 - Yucca Mountain “looks like an engineered repository, not like a geological repository . . . if you can’t even come close with the mountain . . . then you are relying almost entirely on an engineered barrier and not on the mountain.”

· January 2000 – “The present concept relies I would say completely on the adequate performance of the metallic barriers. Without those we would have release rates that would be just totally unacceptable.”

· July 17, 2001 – “The technical basis for projecting the long-term performance of the Project’s base case repository design has critical weaknesses.”

· October 27, 2001 – “DOE has not presented a clear and persuasive rationale for going forward with a site recommendation.”

· January 24, 2002 – “The technical basis for the DOE’s repository performance estimates is weak to moderate at this time.”

· January 24, 2002 – “The Board has limited confidence in current performance estimates generated [by DOE].”

· January 29, 2002 – DOE’s assessment of the corrosion of the waste container is “barely beginning to scratch the surface” of that issue.

· January 30, 2002 – “Many of the DOE’s assumptions regarding Yucca Mountain are extreme and unrealistic.”

NRC’s Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste:

· August 2000 – “The technical basis for DOE’s long-term projections of repository performance has critical weaknesses.”

· September 2001 – DOE’s performance assessment “reflects the input and results of models and assumptions that are not founded on a realistic assessment of the evidence.”

· September 2001 – “The masking of realism in the [performance assessment] precludes providing a clear basis to estimate the margins of safety, or making an objective regulatory decision that is in the best public interest.”

· September 2001 – NRC staff identified 293 unresolved and specific technical issues in 19 key areas, of which some 90% remain unresolved.

· January 30, 2002 – “DOE fails to define potential risks to people and the environment should a repository at Yucca Mountain be built.”

General Accounting Office (December 2001):

· “We question the prudence and practicality of making [a site] recommendation at this time given the . . . magnificent amount of work remaining to be done.”

· “Bechtel’s detailed reassessment of the work required to submit a license application . . . concluded that DOE would be in a position to submit a license application only in 2006.”

· “DOE is currently analyzing . . . how water would flow through the repository area to the underlying groundwater, and the durability of waste containers to last for thousands of years.”

· “DOE is currently not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC within the statutory limits that would take effect if the President recommended the site to the Congress within the next several years.”

· “Unresolved issues relate to uncertainties about the aspects of the long-term performance of the proposed repository: (1) the expected lifetime of engineered barriers, particularly the waste containers; (2) the physical properties of the Yucca Mountain site; and (3) the supporting information for the mathematical models used to evaluate the performance of the planned repository.”

Latest Admission from DOE:

· February 4, 2002 – “The Energy Department has discovered levels of fluoride in water and rock at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository that could cause early corrosion of containers and titanium shields designed to protect buried nuclear waste.” (Las Vegas Sun)

· February 4, 2002 – “DOE scientists said they need to find the source of the fluoride, because corrosion in pits and nicks on the metal surfaces could cause the burial containers to fail in much less time than the 10,000-year life of the repository.” (Las Vegas Sun)