Jane R. Summerson, EIS Document Manager
Yucca Mt Office, U.S. Dept of Energy
PO Box 30307, M/S 010
Las Vegas NV 89036-0307
June 25, 2001
Comments on Supplement to Draft EIS for Proposed Yucca Mountain
Repository
It seems clear to us from the Supplement to the Draft Enivonmental
Impact Statement for the Proposed Yucca Mountain High-Level Nuclear
Waste Repository that the DOE is attempting to be responsive to some of
the more stringent scientific criticisms of the site design in that
original document. We are grateful for that attention to public and
professional concerns. However, there are still many issues that are
dealt with inadequately in the Supplement, or not dealt with at all.
Legal Process
1. The Supplement is little more than an outline, and the public EIS
comment process is completely premature. If the repository design is
still ‘evolving" before the ink is dry on the last version, why are we
being asked to review it, and why is the EIS process moving forward?
This 125-page document outlines in very sketchy format enormous changes
to both the design and the entire operation of the proposed repository
for many years to come. Entirely new facilities and waste handling
processes are barely described, with little mention of relevant studies
on environmental impacts. We do not believe that this premature and
incomplete approach to the EIS/NEPA process is legal, let alone ethical
or responsible to U.S. taxpayers or residents of this region. Is
exposing our region to this incomplete plan merely being done to avoid
litigation from nuclear utility companies? Future generations and the
planet itself deserve far better than that.
2. The Supplement does not follow the National Environmental Policy Act,
which requires clear plans for the Proposed Action, and clear
alternatives for comparison. DOE does not provide clear definitions of a
proposed design for either the geologic repository or the surface
facilities. Rather, it lays out a number of design variables and
operational parameters which could be combined in different ways, all
still in an exploratory stage. The Supplement is a very interesting
Working Paper, but the NEPA legal process requires clear alternatives
for the public to evaluate.
3. The DOE must have a final design choice to recommend the site to the
president and congress, as well as to apply for a license to the NRC.
What is it? The Final EIS is supposed to reflect whatever design the
Energy Secretary describes as a comprehensive basis for Site
Recommendation. We understand that the DOE has opened a public "Site
Recommendation" comment period on May 4th. What are we being asked to
comment on?
4. Even current use of the Yucca Mountain site is in violation of the
Western Shoshone Treaty of Ruby Valley (ratified in 1863). The United
States has repeatedly failed to show legal title to this and other lands
within this treaty boundary, in U.S. and international courts (the
Organization of American States). Section 3.1.1 describes how the DOE
would obtain "permanent control" of the land surrounding the repository
site, but makes no mention of legal title. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission requires DOE to prove ownership of the lands it plans to use,
yet the DOE does not have ownership, only control.
5. Contamination of water will not be licensed by the state of Nevada.
The filtered waste water from the fuel pools, and from washing down the
transportation casks, would then go to evaporation pools (Section
2.3.2.4.2). This proposed use of water was specifically opposed by the
Nevada State Engineer when he denied the water-use permit for the
project. (The current permit expires in the spring, 2002.)
6. The DOE can’t use water that it doesn’t have. The Supplement should
not assume (Water Supply, 2.3.4.5, pages 2-19 and 3-6) that the
repository water supply will be appropriated from the State of Nevada.
DOE’s application was denied because a repository is not in the public
interest. Water will not be available unless the Nevada State Engineer
is overturned on appeal. The Supplement should look at alternative
water sources and evaluate the impacts of these alternatives.
7. By only holding public hearings in the immediate vicinity of Yucca
Mountain, the DOE is shirking its responsibility to all U.S. taxpayers
who are footing the bill, and who will be greatly affected by proposed
transportation of highly irradiated fuel rods to the site. All people
should have the right to a full presentation, and to review and comment
on these broad changes to a huge national policy.
Design Specifics
1. The North Portal Operations Area (2.3.2.1) lends a mere five
paragraphs to the entirely new concept of fuel blending, mixing and
repackaging waste, etc.. Potentially deadly problems that have happened
at nuclear reactor sites already, such as cranes getting jammed while
lifting rods out of pools, lids being dropped or gases threatening
explosion, would be greatly magnified by sheer volume. Given the precise
nature of the record-keeping that would be required for such a dangerous
operation, and the failed history of both the DOE and commercial
reactors in this regard (one of whom can’t even find all their used rods
right now) this concept needs a great deal more planning and
opportunities for public discussion.
2. Nuclear fuel blending inventory pools which would store up to 12,000
fuel assemblies are just glimpsed in a diagram (Figure 2-5) and barely
mentioned. There is no detail on the design, water source, water
circulation and treatment, or safety features. One sentence in the
Wastewater section (2.3.4.2) mentions the 10% increase in evaporation
pools from this source. Yucca Mt. is in the third most active earthquake
zone in the U.S. We could find no mention of these pools and the fuel
rods stored in them in any accident or earthquake scenarios (3.1.8).
Only dry storage components were mentioned. There is no mention of any
study on ground or surface water impacts in the event of an accident or
earthquake.
3. A 200 acre above ground storage facility that would store 4,500 dry
storage casks of spent commercial fuel on a cement pad for up to 50
years (page 2-8; 3-7; Figure 2-4) is mentioned in a few sentences. To
our knowledge, this site has not even been studied yet for suitability.
Based on seismic activity in the aea, it seems extremely unlikely that
it could meet NRC criteria for "Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility
Installations" as a stand-alone facility (10 CFR Part 72). There is no
mention of this facility in the Accidents section (3.1.8 and S-6). There
is no mention of any ground or surface water studies on how this
facility could impact our water in the event of storm runoff, which
occurs every few years in that region. Cannisters arriving at the WIPP
facility have already proven to have surface contamination from their
source sites. Irradiated nuclear fuel is vastly more dangerous.
4. Disturbing Native American Cultural Resource sites (Section 3.1.5) is
unacceptable. The Supplement notes that additional facilities it
proposes, such as the above ground storage facility, and the solar
generating array, could impact highly significant archaeolofical sites.
It notes that over 25,000 artifacts were already disturbed in one area
alone. The Yucca Mountain area is not a long abandonned series of
archaeological sites, but a place where Western Shoshone continue to
gather for active spiritual ceremony.
5. Neither the Draft EIS nor the Supplement takes into account the
severe flooding that regularly occurs in our area. Most people do not
understand that although rainfall is infrequent here, there is little
vegetation to hold it back, once it comes. The Amargosa Opera House has
a high water mark of three feet inside. All transportation has been cut
off for days at a time in the last thirty years by flooding of the
Amargosa River, sometimes necessitating airlifts of critical supplies.
Debris from the interior of the Nevada Test Site still lines the south
side of Highway 95 in Nevada from the 1995 flood of Forty Mile Wash. A
recent study by the US Geological Survey about moderate to severe storm
drainage in our area states that the already radioactive effluent from
the Nevada Test Site, and potentially contaminated effluent from the
Yucca Mountain area, runs directly into our Amargosa River. This impacts
the California communities of Death Valley Junction, Shoshone, Tecopa,
Baker, the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, the 1.4 million visitors each year
to Death Valley National Park. Above ground nuclear storage and handling
facilities would directly impact surface water, unlike the deep
repository component. It is vital that the DOE take this new USGS study
into account.
6. Store the waste before transporting it, not after. Above-ground
storage to cool high-level nuclear waste should take place as close to
the site of origin as possible to eliminate transportation dangers to
the public and residents of this area. We agree that above-ground
storage is the safest method currently available, but dispute the plan
to transport it to an additional location. On-site storage would also
relieve the pressure that fosters this rushed and poorlydeveloped
approach, and give the DOE adequate time to research a truly safe and
responsible solution. This would be a realistic modification for the
No-Action Alternative in the Yucca Mountain DEIS.
7. There’s a lot we still don’t know, and neither does the DOE. Waste
Package and Drip Shield design (2.3.4.1) depends largley on a metal,
Alloy-22, that has only been in use for 20 years. This Supplement does
not acknowledge the orders of magnitude of uncertainty that the DOE
waste package peer review is now questioning about Alloy 22,
uncertainties about the titanium drip shields, and uncertainties in
subsurface performance of both these metals. (The Alloy-22 initial peer
review report is not due until September, with the final report in
February 2002.)
8. The Supplement does not take into account a number of serious
discrepancies in the original DEIS document affecting socioeconomics and
radiation dose calculations that have been pointed out about this
region, such as huge discrepancies in population and employment figures
in Nye county. Therefore, how can the socioeconomic or radiation dose
calculations be accurate?
9. We commend the DOE’s proposed use of solar power to operate a nuclear
facility. In fact, we hope the DOE expands this encouraging precedent
into a sound national policy of locally appropriate renewable energy
facilities, thus phasing out deadly nuclear reactors entirely.
General Comments
1. Many of the thousands of comments submitted on the Draft EIS to the
DOE specifically asked for a Supplemental document on Transportation.
However, this critical concern is not mentioned in the Supplement. We
note that in the "Total System Life Cycle Cost of the Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management Program" DOE document, also released in
May, 2001, the DOE states that "Transportation will be carried out using
commercially available equipment…DOE will rely on the private sector to
provide the necessary services to accept and transport HLW and DOE SNF
(except naval SN) to the potential repository." The fifty million
Americans who reside within a half mile of proposed transportation
routes are expecting a great deal more detail and opportunity to comment
than that.
2. The Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository is a very poor use of taxpayer
funds- for the money already spent, irradiated fuel rods could already
be contained. According to the "Total System Life Cycle Cost of the
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program" DOE document, suitable
contaners for on-site storage can be fabricated for $100,000 per metric
ton of irradiated fuel. When calculated for the 77,000 tons of
irradiated fuel estimated for disposal in the next thirty years, the
cost would be 7.7 billion dollars. Assuming that mass production would
reduce the cost further, the $6.7 billion already spent on Yucca
Mountain could have provided safe containers on site already.
3. This document confirms that it is completely impossible for the
proposed repository to meet its original mission, "to isolate high-level
nuclear waste from the biosphere". Page S-7 states that the mean annual
radiation dose will continue to rise for thousands of years after the
arbitrary 10,000 year licensing period, that the peak dosage could be up
to 17 times higher than current permissable levels for future
generations under the best of conditions. Has any other federal project,
let alone one that is currently estimated to cost $58 billion dollars,
ever guaranteed its own failure, right from the start?
We appreciate your consideration of our comments, and the opportunity to
participate in this important process.
Sincerely,
Jennifer Olaranna Viereck, Director
-- Jennifer Olaranna Viereck, Director
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