Nuclear Information and Resource Service

1424 16th Street NW, #404, Washington DC 20036

202-328-0002; fax: 202-462-2183; e-mail: nirsnet@igc.apc.org web: www.nirs.org

July 23, 1996

KEY VOTE, THURSDAY, JULY 25! CALL, FAX, E-MAIL YOUR SENATORS!

S. 1936 (formerly S. 1271), the "Mobile Chernobyl Act," is still on the Senate floor. A key "cloture" vote is scheduled for Thursday, July 25. A "cloture" vote is used to try to end a filibuster. Although Nevada Senators Reid and Bryan have allowed the Senate to conduct other business over the past week, they have maintained their filibuster over S. 1936, preventing it from coming to a vote.

It takes 60 votes to reach "cloture," i.e. to break the filibuster. We lost the first cloture vote last week 65-34. Thus, we only need to swing a few votes to win this one! Please call, fax & e-mail your Senators today. If they voted against cloture last week, thank them and ask them to do so again. If they voted for cloture last week, ask them to change their votes this time. You might point out that the 34 votes Reid/Bryan received last week are enough to sustain a presidential veto, and President Clinton last week reaffirmed his intention to veto S. 1936. Thus, continuing consideration of this bill will result in more wasted time for the Senate (indeed, it is possible that if we just gain 3 or 4 Senators, the bill will be withdrawn, unless its sponsors actually want a presidential veto). All no-shows are counted in our favor.

If you don't know how your Senators voted last week, please check the NIRS web site (www.nirs.org) and read S. 1936, update #1, or call NIRS at 202-328-0002.

Grassroots activity is essential now! The nuclear industry has spent at least $100,000 on ads in Washington papers over the past 10 days. You can bet they're sending a bevy of lobbyists up to Senate offices too. We don't have ad money and we don't have a bunch of lobbyists either. What we have is you--and your action can make the difference. WE CAN WIN THIS BATTLE!

CAPITOL SWITCHBOARD: 202-224-3121

Here is some background material on the Price-Anderson Act and nuclear waste transport. Perhaps the most significant issue is that TAXPAYERS will pay for any accident damages, not the nuclear industry which generated the waste, nor the carrier transporting the waste. You may want to bring up this issue with your Senator, few realize the extent of taxpayer liability.

If S 1936 passes, more than 50 million people in the U.S. will be at risk of a high-level nuclear waste transport accident. The Department of Energy intends to privatize the transport, while also indemnifying the carriers. In the event of a significant accident, the tax payers will have to foot the bill. Involuntary risk coupled with financial liability for the hazard is a bad deal for the people of the U.S.

The Department of Energy projects that more than 50 million people live within 2 miles of the rail routes that would carry high-level nuclear waste to a waste site in Nevada. This does not include those who live along the projected truck corridors.

The rates of accidents for the transport industry indicate that one can expect 15 accidents a year at a minimum. Department of Energy staff acknowledge that they project 2--5 accidents with significant release of radioactivity during the span of the program.

S. 1936 states that the Department of Energy takes title and ownership of the irradiated fuel when the fuel is accepted at the reactor sites, thus the shipments will be DOE shipments.

July 9, 1996, the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management met with prospective bidders for contracts to operate the OCRWM's transport system (either to a congressionally mandated interim storage site, or to a repository). Attendees were informed that the contractors would be indemnified for all transportation accidents involving the release of radioactive materials and liability associated with some emergency evacuations.

Indemnification would be pursuant to the Price-Anderson Act, which provides up to $ 8.96 billion. Since the liability would pertain to a DOE shipment, the fund which would pay these costs resulting from this indemnification would be the U.S. Treasury General Fund--in other words, taxpayer dollars.

This differs from the Price Anderson coverage available in the case of a reactor commercial reactor accident, where the payments come from the utility's insurance, to the limit of coverage, and then from a pool that all the nuclear utilities pay into.

OCRWM also informed prospective bidders that they must be self insured or provide suitable liability insurance for all operating situations not covered by the Price-Anderson Act.

The user-funded Nuclear Waste Fund, is intended to pay the cost of the government operated commercial nuclear fuel management and disposal program. However, under the Price-Anderson Act, since the transportation contractor will accept title on behalf of the Department of Energy, at the commercial reactor sites, financial liability for incidents involving radiation release and Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved evacuations will then shift to the federal government's General Fund, rather than being underwritten by the Nuclear Waste Fund.

Given the magnitude and expected 30 to 40 year duration of the planned shipping campaign, even OCRWM predicts that there could be a few accidents where radiation would be released. The potentially enormous liability for each such incident would fall on the taxpayers of the nation rather than the ratepayers originally benefited from the nuclear power. Nuclear ratepayers were intended to bear all the costs of the waste generated and the management and disposal system.

Privatizing the nuclear waste transport system, while at the same time removing any liability for accidents places the incentives in the wrong place. The U.S. population should not have to pay for disastrous consequences from a risky activity that affects them without their consent. If title remains with the generator during transport to the point of destination, then there is more incentive to insure that the transport will be done as carefully as possible. This is the ultimate in privatization of nuclear waste handling.

Mary Olson

Nuclear Information & Resource Service (202)328-0002

7/11/96

Note: OCRWM has removed any expectation that there will be any preference for rail shipments. Previous projections of the distribution of truck vs. rail transport of high-level waste assumed that rail would be used wherever possible. (Some reactors do not have the physical capacity to lead a larger rail cask, so truck cask would have to be used.)

A rail cask holds about 5 times more fuel assemblies than a truck cask. If OCRWM transportation service contractors instead selected truck for any reason, this will increase the number of shipments and also impact the projections on which areas will be most heavily affected by shipments. For instance, in Indiana, there could be an even greater impact on Indianapolis, over and above the 1080 casks already projected to pass through the I-70 corridor.