May 27, 2015

Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia
1333 H Street, N.W. Suite 200
West Tower
Washington, DC 20005
Submitted via Email

Re: Formal Case No. 1119 – Public Comment.

Please accept the comments of Nuclear Information & Resource Service (NIRS) on the above-referenced case, the proposed acquisition of Pepco Holdings (Pepco, or PHI) by Exelon Corp. (Exelon). NIRS is a nonprofit environmental organization, headquartered in Takoma Park, Maryland. The preparer of these comments, Executive Timothy Judson, has sixteen years experience monitoring the energy and utility sectors, with a particular focus on merchant nuclear power generation and utility restructuring. Exelon emerged as the largest player in both sectors more than a decade ago, and NIRS has monitored the corporation’s activities very closely with respect to the Pepco acquisition and a number of other current issues.

NIRS opposes Exelon’s proposed acquisition of PHI, for several reasons:

• It provides no material benefit to District of Columbia residents and ratepayers and does not meet the public interest standard for approval.
• It exposes Pepco ratepayers to the risk of steep commodity price and/or utility rate escalation in DC, and throughout PHI’s service territories.
• It has the potential to undermine other environmental and public policy priorities, including greenhouse gas reductions and sustainable energy goals.
• For the first time, it would tie Pepco ratepayers into a company that relies primarily on the generation of electricity from nuclear power plants and the production of radioactive waste, and increases the risk that DC residents could bear the cost of subsidizing their operation and/or decommissioning.

In short, DC deserves a better utility than Pepco, but Exelon would actually be worse. This is both because Exelon’s business model and policy objectives run counter to those that are in DC residents’ interests, and because Exelon is pursuing the Pepco takeover for the primary purpose of offloading risks from its struggling nuclear power business. As a result, the takeover is inimical to the public interest and poses multiple risks to Pepco ratepayers.

The proposed acquisition of Pepco presents unique and unprecedented risks of monopoly control and market domination that cannot be mitigated adequately by merely placing conditions on the transaction. Unlike Pepco, Exelon is a vertically integrated generation and utility company, with both regulated transmission and distribution businesses and the largest merchant power
generation business in the country. Already the second-largest distribution utility in the U.S., Exelon would become the largest if the Pepco acquisition is approved. What is more, all of Exelon’s distribution utilities and the majority of its merchant generation portfolio are concentrated within the same regional energy market, the PJM Interconnection (PJM). This would constitute an unprecedented and previously uncontemplated level of market domination and control, which state regulators lack sufficient capacity and authority to mitigate and federal regulators lack the authority to prevent, particularly since the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Companies Act (PUHCA) in 2005.

The conditions the Maryland Public Service Condition based its decision upon are not sufficient to rehabilitate the problems inherent in the proposed takeover. The complex set of arrangements and requirements they would institute would be very difficult to oversee and enforce. They are, in fact, testimony to the enormous risks the transaction would impose on Pepco customers, and, at best, they represent an attempt to mitigate those risks to the point of making the transaction public interest neutral. There is nothing in the conditions that enables or requires Exelon to do anything that Pepco is not already doing, committed to doing, or can be required to do, without any of the inherent conflicts of interest and anti-trust problems Exelon’s acquisition of Pepco would create. In effect, the Maryland conditions attempt unsuccessfully regulate increased risk resulting from the transaction without providing any material benefits to Pepco customers or the public interest.

In some ways, the approval actually would exacerbate those concerns. For instance, Condition 30 proposes a number of supposed ring-fencing requirements related to the corporate ownership and governance structure of PHI and the subsidiary utilities, including requiring the CEOs of Exelon’s distribution utilities to meet with the parent company CEO on a monthly basis, but the decision still allows Exelon CEO Chris Crane to serve as CEO of PHI, as proposed in the application. Such a condition provides only the appearance of protection, and would be as effective as trying to ring-fence someone who is simultaneously standing on both sides of the fence. But the vast array of measures necessary to create that appearance of protection only succeeds at obfuscating the significant and inherent risks that are easily avoided by not allowing Exelon to assume ownership of Pepco in the first place.

Those risks are enhanced by Exelon’s track record and business strategy, which run counter to the needs, policies, and interests of the District of Columbia. In short, to know what life is going to be like with Exelon going forward, DC need only look to what the company is doing in Illinois and other states, like New York. In the past year in Illinois, Exelon defeated a bill to fix the state’s renewable portfolio standard by threatening to close three of its uncompetitive nuclear plants if the state did not agree to subsidize their continued operation, and has since held necessary reforms to the renewable portfolio standard law hostage to a demand for subsidies for its nuclear power stations.1 After initially blocking the RPS bill in 2014, Exelon pushed through a resolution promoting a national policy agenda that would result in steep electricity price

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increases and block competition from new energy technologies. This year, Exelon has again held up consideration of the RPS reforms by pushing its own legislation to create a “Low-Carbon Portfolio Standard,” which would direct $300 million/year in subsidies to its nuclear reactors – 50% more than the RPS would cost – while failing to address the obstacles to renewables.

In total, Exelon appears to be seeking over $1 billion per year in subsidies, incentives, and market reforms in Illinois, which would raise the price of electricity by 38% statewide. In September 2014, Exelon proposed $580 million per year in state-based subsidies, based on a misinterpretation of the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan. In addition, Exelon stands to benefit from capacity market reforms proposed by PJM (at Exelon’s behest), which would increase revenues for its Illinois reactors by an estimated $568 million per year, resulting in a 19% increase in electricity prices statewide and an 11% increase in the total delivered cost of electricity. When questioned at a state agency hearing in December, Exelon stated it would not forego its request for state-level subsidies in light of its capacity market windfall, and it continued advocating for the state to subsidize nuclear. In addition to the “Low-Carbon (High-Radiation)” Portfolio Standard, Exelon is proposing that states implement the Environmental Protection Agency’s carbon emissions regulation by implementing a kind of carbon market through which electricity customers (not fossil fuel generators) would pay emissions taxes to nuclear as a subsidy. While the costs of such a program have not been formally estimated yet, they could easily fall into the range of hundreds of millions per year. In total, Exelon’s proposals could result in raising the cost of electricity by well over $1 billion per year, averaging on the order of $100 million for each of the eleven nuclear reactors Exelon operates in Illinois, and raising the total cost of electricity to customers by over 22%.

At the same time, Exelon is trying to obtain a similar subsidy for one of its nuclear reactors in New York, which suggests another way Exelon could harm Maryland ratepayers. The Ginna Nuclear Power Plant near Rochester is one of the oldest, smallest, and most economically challenged in the country. Exelon is seeking New York PSC (NYPSC) approval of a contract with Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) to subsidize Ginna’s continued operation, on the basis of a reliability study indicating possible system reliability problems if Ginna were to close. The proposed contract was submitted to NYPSC on February 13, 2015, and would appear to result in a ratepayer subsidy of approximately $50 million per year, for a reactor roughly half the size of

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5 Ibid.
its reactors in Illinois. However, the contract involves a complicated pricing scheme, which has yet to be analyzed in detail and raises further questions about the veracity of Exelon’s filings with the NYPSC, RG&E and the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO).

Exelon’s original petition indicated that the reactor’s basic operating costs were substantially higher than the level reflected in the contract, and maintained that Exelon would recommend closure of Ginna unless it were awarded a contract that met its operating costs. Exelon later issued statements affirming the operating cost estimates derived from its NYPSC petition, citing an operating cost of $56-$64 per megawatt-hour (MWh), substantially higher than the estimate of $50/MWh in the proposed contract. If its statements were accurate, Exelon is now committing to operate Ginna for nearly four years at a price that would entail losses totaling nearly $100 million. It is not clear why Exelon is willing to continue operating the reactors under such conditions, and raises concerns about whether the company has manipulated reliability concerns to extract a subsidy.

Exelon’s proposed “ring-fencing” provisions would not protect Maryland ratepayers from such a scenario, but its likelihood is increased if Exelon were to own not only a power plant, but the local transmission and distribution utility into which it is connected. That precise situation would result from the takeover of Pepco, with Exelon’s Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant located within Pepco’s transmission system. Exelon’s Ginna proposal has benefited from RG&E’s record of poor system planning and investment, as documented in a 2012 audit commissioned by NYPSC. RG&E was found to suffer from systemic problems in those areas, and has struggled to undertake a set of transmission upgrades to address system vulnerabilities related, in part, to unplanned outages at Ginna. The “Rochester Area Reliability Project” was initially scheduled to be completed by 2014, but has since been delayed until at least October 2018.

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12 Calculated based on the pricing formula in the above-referenced Reliability Support Services Agreement, and themarket price and generation projections used in the above-referenced Azulay-Judson report.  
In December, RG&E announced it had identified an alternative substation upgrade that would eliminate the need for Ginna and substantially shorten the length of time for which the reactor would be needed. However, RG&E has not indicated how soon it could implement the substation expansion, and the three-and-a-half year term of the proposed Ginna contract suggests little hope that it would be implemented soon. For a net subsidy of $175 million, NY regulators and RG&E customers are essentially being held hostage to steep electricity price increases by a combination of Exelon’s uneconomical nuclear power plant and incompetence or negligence by the utility. The potential for such circumstances could more easily be replicated by the kind of integrated but partially unregulated monopoly that would be created by Exelon’s proposed acquisition of Pepco.

Exelon is pursuing the acquisition of Pepco precisely in order to offload risks facing its merchant nuclear business onto an expanded utility customer base, and to leverage the resulting increased monopoly power to inflate revenues for nuclear generation. This basic intent to raise electricity prices is evident from the structure of the deal, which will itself necessitate substantial rate increases for Pepco customers:

- Exelon would purchase Pepco for $1.3 billion more than its stock market value.\(^{16}\)
- Exelon is funding only about $1 billion of the transaction (less than 15%) through unencumbered cash from sales of assets.
- The purchase would be financed almost entirely with debt that Pepco customers, ultimately, would be the ones to repay.

The debt financing package includes $3.5 billion in loans and over $2 billion in future equity issuances, risky financial instruments that are more commonly used in private equity transactions.\(^ {17}\) Thus, Exelon will need to derive enough revenue from Pepco customers to pay off over $5.5 billion in debt, equivalent to nearly $3,000 for each of Pepco’s approximately two million ratepayers. As a result, Exelon is entering into this acquisition with a structural obligation to derive nearly sixty times more in earnings from the average Pepco ratepayer than the original offer of $50 credits toward their bills. Exelon says that proposed rebate program would ostensibly be financed through projected “efficiencies” achieved by joining Pepco to Exelon’s larger utility operations. Even if Exelon is to be believed that it can achieve such efficiencies without compromising service quality, it begs the question how it plans to pay off nearly $6 billion in new debt without substantial rate increases.

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In addition, Exelon has stated that, by acquiring Pepco, it will be able to guarantee that all of its annual shareholder dividends will be paid out of revenues from its utility business.\(^\text{18}\) That means Exelon’s regulated utility customers would be responsible for 100% of shareholder dividends, even though they would only represent 60-65% of the corporation’s business\(^\text{19}\) – that is, Pepco customers would be responsible for paying a 50% greater share of dividends than Exelon’s utility business represents. This speaks to both the heavy financial risks Exelon faces in its merchant generation business, and the company’s strategy to transfer that risk to its utility customers. In light of these factors, Exelon’s proposed three-year rate freeze provides little reassurance against steep rate hikes in years four, five, and beyond.

Unfortunately, though, Pepco customers likely would not need to wait that long to see their bills rise. Exelon cannot guarantee shareholders any profits from operating nuclear power plants, so it must do so on the backs of captive customers. While that business strategy might be enough to shore up investor confidence for the moment, it will not last long if Exelon does not restore its generation business to profitability by substantially increasing the price of electricity, in particular for its fleet of twenty-three aging nuclear reactors. About one-quarter of them are unprofitable, as a result of rising operational costs in excess of market electricity prices. Exelon is not able to divest its nuclear plants because of this fundamental problem:

- No other company would buy them for the same reason Exelon would sell them, that their operating costs are too high for them to operate profitably in the merchant energy markets.
- A previous effort by one of Exelon’s major competitors to spin off merchant nuclear plants failed to receive approval, as a transparent effort to offload environmental liabilities into an over-leveraged business doomed to fail.\(^\text{20}\)
- And retiring reactors early could entail over $1 billion in unfunded liabilities for decommissioning.\(^\text{21}\)

The best option for Exelon is to raise the prices it is paid for electricity from its nuclear power plants. However, that is the worst option for Pepco ratepayers. It is also the basis for Exelon’s opposition to renewable energy, efficiency, and distributed generation. The electricity system cannot rely solely on inflexible, unresponsive nuclear and coal plants, and Exelon depends on the volatile market prices created by natural gas generation to ensure the profitability of its generation portfolio. But the growth of wind, solar, and energy efficiency – which are rapidly

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Sum of decommissioning trust fund shortfalls for Exelon reactors known to be at risk of closure (Byron 1 and 2, Clinton, and Ginna) equaled $1,112,545,716 in 2013.

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being the lowest cost energy resources, with efficiency and wind now less expensive than natural gas—will likely result in much more stable electricity prices in the long term, at lower rates than most nuclear power plants can operate at profitably.  

In this proceeding, Exelon has stated that it is a supporter of renewable energy and that it operates a substantial amount of wind and solar generation, but such claims are unsupported by the record. In 2014, the clean energy organization CERES ranked the nation’s thirty-two largest utilities on energy efficiency and renewable energy. Exelon rated in the bottom of both categories:

- It is 21st out of 32 utilities in efficiency, at just 2.69% of electricity sales.
- And it is 22nd in renewables, at just 2.97% of sales.

Pepco already rates higher in renewable energy, by comparison, at 3.40%. What renewable generation Exelon provides is merely a boutique portion of its portfolio, mostly required by state renewable portfolio standards.

In point of fact, Exelon is one of the leading opponents of renewable energy in the United States. It gained notoriety for its position in 2012, when the American Wind Energy Association terminated the company’s membership and removed Exelon from its board of directors, because of its vociferous opposition to the Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit. Due in part to Exelon’s advocacy, the PTC has repeatedly failed to be renewed over the last four years, leading to an unpredictable environment for one of our most promising and cost-effective energy sources. In addition, Exelon announced in 2014 that it intends to oppose renewal of the Investment Tax Credit that benefits residential distributed energy, most popularly for rooftop solar.

It is not clear that Exelon even knows what clean energy is. The company’s comments on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan list five different versions of failed or unproven nuclear, coal, and natural gas generation as emissions-reducing technologies, all ahead of proven sustainable energy solutions, such as solar and demand management; inexplicably, Exelon’s comments leave out wind entirely. Exelon’s effort to promote its preferred energy source, nuclear, as a “clean” energy source is possible only by ignoring the vast quantities of long-lived radioactive

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and hazardous wastes and environmental justice impacts it produces, from the mining and processing of uranium all the way to the production of irradiated nuclear fuel and decommissioning of contaminated reactor facilities, never mind the risk of catastrophic nuclear accidents like Fukushima and Chernobyl.

The company’s advocacy serves only one purpose: to convince policymakers to provide subsidies and incentives to restore uncompetitive nuclear plants to economic viability, ultimately by trying to position nuclear as the only viable energy option, no matter how much ratepayers and taxpayers must pay for it. Exelon is simply attempting to slow or stop the deployment of renewable energy sources, and the responsive and resilient infrastructure that will integrate them, in order to avoid the consequences of its previous business decisions.

The Pepco takeover would be instrumental in empowering Exelon to advance that agenda, by accumulating an unprecedented level of monopoly control and political influence. It would become the largest utility in the country, with 10 million ratepayers, all within a single electricity market, the PJM Interconnection. Pepco’s independent voice within PJM would be lost, and Exelon would have the single largest share of both the distribution utility and wholesale markets within the country’s single largest regional energy market. This would significantly increase Exelon’s ability to manipulate market prices to its advantage, well beyond the jurisdiction of the DC PSC to regulate. In addition, by becoming the local power company for the nation’s capital Exelon could leverage the symbolic value of its presence here to advance a national policy agenda that is also contrary to the expressed will and interests of DC residents and businesses.

For the above reasons, the proposed acquisition of Pepco by Exelon would be counter to the public interest standards governing approval of utility merger requests. Therefore, the Public Service Commission must deny the Pepco and Exelon’s application. Thank you for the opportunity to share our views.