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The Department of Energy’s
(DOE) decision to mix 33 or more metric tons of plutonium from
nuclear weapons with depleted uranium into a mixed-oxide fuel for
use in commercial nuclear reactors is a direct reversal of
decades-old U.S. policy aimed toward non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons materials. A plutonium fuel program will increase the
risks of nuclear terrorism and the international proliferation of
plutonium.
A decision on the part of the U.S.
government to engage in a large scale civilian plutonium program
would encourage the continuation of the messy and dangerous
reprocessing programs in Europe and Japan. A plutonium fuel
program would destroy any leverage the U.S. might have to
influence non-weapons states from creating their own civilian
reprocessing programs.
PLUTONIUM ECONOMY
The U.S. plutonium fuel program
would create facilities and financial interests based exclusively
upon the use and spread of plutonium. The corporation most
involved in a potential U.S. plutonium fuel program is the French
reprocessing company Cogema. This company has teamed up with Duke
Power and Virigina Power to create a new consortium, and would be
responsible for the storage, safeguarding, and some processing of
weapons-grade plutonium.
This industry structure builds an
economy upon the false and dangerous notion that plutonium is an
asset. The involvement of these corporations places the
responsibility of these deadly materials in the hands of
corporate entities whose single goal is the generation of
profits.
REPROCESSING
Reprocessing is the chemical
process of separating plutonium and uranium from other fission
products in the irradiated fuel from a nuclear reactor. The
separated materials can then be made into a mixed-oxide fuel
(MOX) which is reused in a reactor. Since the 1970s, the U.S. has
had a policy of not allowing reprocessing, and instead treating
the nuclear fission products as the high-level atomic waste it
is. This policy is based primarily on non-proliferation grounds,
and is met to discourage countries from engaging in the
separation of plutonium and uranium—since these
substances—once separated—can also be used to build
nuclear weapons.
Even now, the Department of Energy
says that its proposed MOX program will only be a
"once-through" program, meaning that once the plutonium
from nuclear weapons has been processed into MOX and used in
civilian reactors, no further reprocessing would be allowed. But
the industries involved in the plutonium fuel program will have a
vested interest in the possibility of a U.S. commercial
reprocessing industry as part of waste management policy. And the
necessary infrastructure—including construction of all the
need facilities—would be in place.
THEFT AND DIVERSION
In recent years the US has seen a
surge in devastating terrorist activities on its own soil. The
knowledge necessary to create a nuclear weapon is available to
the public. The best policy toward the prevention of nuclear
terrorism is to ensure that the materials necessary to make a
nuclear bomb cannot be obtained. The US plutonium fuel program
would increase the risks of theft of weapons grade plutonium. The
process of fabricating plutonium fuel involves the handling of
bulk amounts of plutonium. This process makes accurate accounting
of plutonium extremely difficult, which leaves measuring
disparities that could be an open invitation for diversion of the
plutonium for weapons purposes. In some cases it may be
impossible to know whether plutonium has been stolen or is simply
left in residues at processing facilities without an expensive
clean-out. Once the plutonium fuel has been made, it would then
have to be transported to commercial reactors where safeguarding
of that plutonium will be the responsibility of the utility. This
also makes the plutonium vulnerable to theft or diversion.
Irradiating weapons plutonium in a
reactor does not make the plutonium unusable for weapons
purposes. The U.S. government proved with a nuclear test in 1962
that so-called "reactor grade" plutonium can be used in
nuclear bombs. Using weapons plutonium in reactors does not
effectively safeguard plutonium, and it undermines disarmament
efforts.
PROLIFERATION WORLDWIDE
A U.S. plutonium fuel program would
send a clear signal to other countries: the U.S. government
approves of separated plutonium fuel programs. This would
undercut the government's ability to discourage reprocessing in
other countries and may encourage other countries to pursue
plutonium programs. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director
John Holum explained the situation clearly in a memorandum to
former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary:
"U.S. decisions on plutonium
disposition are inextricably linked with U.S. efforts to reduce
stockpiles as well as limit the use of plutonium worldwide. The
multi-decade institutionalization of plutonium use in US
commercial reactors would set a very damaging precedent for US
non-proliferation policy."
The alternative, to encase the
plutonium in ceramics or glass (immobilization), will not affect
the government's non-proliferation goals, nor encourage civilian
reprocessing in the U.S. or elsewhere. Immobilizing plutonium
will send the proper signal that plutonium is a dangerous waste
and needs to be treated as such.
For more information, contact:
Nuclear Information and Resource
Service
1424 16th Street NW,
#404
Washington, DC 20036
202.328.0002; fax: 202.462.2183
nirsnet@nirs.org www.nirs.org
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