ALERT!
December 2, 2003

For more info, contact:
Paul Gunter, NIRS 301-270-6477 18

Your comments to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are urgently needed to stop a non-compliant and non-cooperating nuclear power industry from steamrolling federal fire protection law (Chapter 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2) passed in the aftermath of the near catastrophic fire in 1975 at the Browns Ferry nuclear power station. 

NRC is proposing to relax enforcement on industry-wide fire code violations at nuclear power stations until the agency can finalize a rule change on requirements currently mandating that control room-operated electrical circuits used for the automated shut down of the reactor be maintained free from fire damage in the event of a serious fire. NRC instead would allow utilities to work around longstanding violations involving bogus fire barriers and other structural fire protection deficiencies by sending plant workers into the reactor building during a fire to "manually operate" reactor shutdown equipment.

The proposed actions would allow station operators to sacrifice automated electrical circuits to a fire rather than restore functionality to required fire protection features for reactor safe shutdown circuitry. [2] While the stated intent of the NRC retreat is to reduce costs associated with the "regulatory burden" of bringing the nuclear industry into compliance, the resulting giant step backwards is certain to increase the risk to public safety and the environment in the event of the next serious fire at a nuclear power station. 

BACKGROUND

Current federal law mandates that nuclear power station operators physically protect emergency backup electrical systems (power, control and instrumentation cables) used to remotely shut down the reactor from the control room. [3] The affected provision requires the physical fire protection of electrical cabling with independently tested and rated fire barriers. Qualified fire protection systems are to be designed, installed and maintained to resist the passage of flame and protect encased electrical cables from excessive temperature for a minimum of 3-hours or; one-hour in conjunction with sprinkler and smoke detector equipment or; alternately, physical separate redundant cables with a minimum of 20-feet with sprinklers and detectors in the same area. 

The prescriptive fire code was put in place for U.S. nuclear power stations following the fire at Alabama's Browns Ferry nuclear power station on March 22, 1975 to provide the best assurance that no single fire can destroy a control room's ability to safely shutdown the reactor. The Browns Ferry fire was started by an employee using a candle flame to check for air leaks along electrical cable trays under the reactor control room, initially igniting polyurethane foam insulating material. The fire quickly spread from the cable spreading room into the reactor building. The fire burned out of control for seven and half hours destroying over 1600 electrical cables including 628 safety-related cable systems. The Browns Ferry fire demonstrated that a high number of circuit failures can occur in a relatively short period of time, in this case within 15 minutes from the ignition of the foam material. [4] It further demonstrated that the federal government's non-regulation of fire protection requirements at nuclear power stations was a principle contributing factor to the seriousness of the fire. Station nuclear engineers privately confided a catastrophic release of radiation was avoided only by "sheer luck." [5] NRC issued stricter fire protection guidance shortly after the Browns Ferry fire and over the next several years in a highly contested rulemaking codified detailed fire protection requirements in1981. The new rule required fire protection equipment to limit damage done to structures and equipment "so that capability to shut down the plant safely is ensured." [6] The prescriptive fire code required the reactor shutdown circuitry to be protected by qualified fire barriers or cable separation.

In 1992, the majority of the U.S. nuclear power industry was caught using "inoperable" Thermo-Lag 330 fire barriers credited for protecting these reactor safe shutdown systems from fire damage. [7] Other nuclear power station operators were found in violation of the alternate requirement for 20 feet of separation between backup safe shutdown wiring. By 1998, NRC began issuing a series of confirmatory orders requiring licensees to replace bogus fire barriers and restore fire barrier operability at nuclear power stations. Through a set of confirmatory orders licensees responded that they would come into compliance with the law by restoring operability to the fire barriers.

Between 2000 and 2003, renewed NRC fire inspections discovered that a significantly large number of these nuclear power station operators never fulfilled their obligations to restore fire barrier operability. Instead, industry quietly opted to sacrifice these electrical systems in the event of fire. In the event that the safe shutdown electrical wiring burned away due to nonfunctional fire barriers and inadequate separation, operators would simply send someone from the control room throughout the station to manually operate the once automated equipment by throwing a switch, pulling a circuit breaker, or turning a valve to shutdown the reactor. In many cases, the tasks involved numerous and complex manual actions. While a few NRC inspectors had randomly, on a case-by-case basis, provided approval for a small number of simple operator manual actions through the regulatory exemption process, the industry adopted a wholesale application of manual actions that never sought to get NRC approval or complete adequate safety reviews. In case after case, inspectors found that licensees were unable to validate that the manual actions could be accomplished with confidence. Employees were designated to enter station areas that were potentially fully involved in a fire to manually operate reactor shutdown equipment. One station operator was discovered with over 100 unapproved and illegal manual actions. NRC identified that licensees had taken manual actions to the "extreme interpretation" resulting in a significant increase in risk of reactor core damage in the event of fire. "This condition is similar to the condition Browns Ferry was in prior to the 1975 fire." [8] NRC discovered that the violations were so numerous throughout the industry that an enforcement effort "creates a prospect of significant resource expenditure without clear safety benefits. Licensees faced with enforcement actions might flood NRC with exemption or deviation requests, which would divert NRC resources from more significant safety issues and may not result in any net safety improvement if the operator manual actions are determined to be acceptable." [9]

Faced with widespread and stubborn industry non-compliance, NRC is now poised to suspend its regulatory enforcement of this section of the fire code nullifying industry long held commitments to restore fire barrier operability and cable separation requirements. Instead, NRC proposes to provide licensees with an option to voluntarily abandon physical fire protection requirements through an alternate loose set of criteria that would bring "feasible" manual actions into interim "compliance." Then through subsequent rulemaking, NRC proposes to codify the interim criteria into law deeming manual actions not only legal but providing the equivalent level of safety as qualified fire barriers, sprinkler and smoke detection systems and the physical separation for reactor electrical cables. Interestingly enough, NRC staff did note that this is not only a significant policy shift to substitute manual actions for fire barriers, but "There appears to have been a Commission expectation that Thermo-Lag [fire barriers], !QW! found deficient was to be resolved by replacement or upgrade rather than through the use of operator manual actions." [10] Commissioner Ivan Selin made the commitment before Congress in March 1993 to restore the mandated fire barrier operability for the protection of reactor safe shutdown equipment and the public health and safety in the event of fire. [11] NRC now proposes to abandon its commitment to Congress and the public's confidence.

The NRC interim criteria for relaxing enforcement of federal fire code at nuclear power stations raises a number of additional concerns including:

1. Operator Manual Actions Increase the Risk of Core Damage from a Reactor Fire

Sending someone down a potentially burning, smoke filled corridor to manually operate safe shutdown equipment after required control room automated functions are burned away is not a reasonable or acceptable substitute for "upgrading" currently inoperable fire protection features. Such actions do not provide the equivalent level of safety as restoring qualified fire barriers used in conjunction with sprinklers and smoke detectors and physical separation of redundant electrical cables used to shutdown the reactor.

Manual operator actions, while made "compliant" by permitting the sacrifice of control room operated shutdown functions will possibly send licensed and non-licensed operators into harms way making reactor safety dubiously reliant upon heroic, at best, and potentially suicidal actions in an effort to head off a catastrophic nuclear accident.

2. Reliance on "Feasible" Manual Actions Sets an Unreasonably Low and Unacceptable Standard for Fire Protection at U.S. Nuclear Power Stations

As stated, the affected fire code (Chapter 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation Part 50 Section III.G.2) mandates that reactor shutdown electrical systems be protected by three hour rated fire barriers, one-hour rated fire barriers with sprinklers and smoke detectors that are qualified through independent laboratory testing and inspections. Cable separation requirements are required to be maintained through design controls and inspections. Under the proposed interim criteria the licensee need only deem the replacement manual actions "feasible," clearly a lower and nebulous standard. NRC staff has publicly expressed its own misgivings over the choice of a "feasible" standard. [12] Moreover, NRC staff identified that the substitution of manual actions for Appendix R III.G.2 requirements "will make Appendix R virtually uninspectable [sic]." [13] Further more, NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Subcommittee (ACRS) on Fire Protection had numerous problems with the use of "feasible" manual actions. ACRS identified that "feasibility" does not provide reasonable assurance that any given action is "reliable." The "feasible" standard is not effectively enforceable by NRC. As one ACRS member repeatedly interrupted both industry and NRC presenters, "I'll make a plea again for not using the word 'feasibility." "Don't use the word," he emphatically stated. [14]

By ignoring the comments of public interest groups, its own staff and its advisory committee to inappropriately qualify manual actions as merely "feasible," NRC's proposed interim criteria for relaxation of enforcement for illegal operator manual actions is establishing an inadequate and inappropriate standard for inspection and enforcement which will significantly jeopardizes public health and safety. It is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious to lower public safety standards to unduly accommodate the nuclear industry with "compliance." 

3. "Environmental Considerations" During a Fire Cannot Be Reliably Predicted To Assure Manual Actions Will Provide the Equivalent Safety of Control Room Automated Actions Protected by Barriers, Suppression, Detection and Separation

NRC states that the full effects of a fire (flame, temperature, smoke, toxic gases and possibly radiation) can be accurately predicted so as to provide confidence that licensed operators or employees will arrive at destinations within the station to successfully complete the manual actions required to shutdown the reactor before the radioactive core is damaged. To the contrary, on March 07, 1997 a main transformer fault resulted in the previously unanalyzed spill of 4,300 gallons of combustible lubricating oil into the Pilgrim nuclear power station turbine building spreading out over 2,200 square feet on the ground floor potentially affecting both division of safety-related switchgear leading to station blackout and core damage. [15] The environmental conditions of this potential fire were unpredictable.

4. The Interim Criteria for Proposed Operator Manual Actions Only Requires a "Demonstration" Without Validation by Simulation and Graded Exercises

The agency's proposed criteria state that the licensee shall demonstrate and document its capability to successfully accomplish operator manual actions within the allowable time using the designated procedures and equipment. However, the September 09, 2003 ACRS Fire Protection Subcommittee raised serious questions regarding the qualitative difference between "demonstration" and validation of the manual actions. "Is there any hope? It's not like you can set up a simulator and test an operator action," queried a subcommittee member. [16] "How do you simulate smoke, light, fire, ringing bells, fire engines, crazy people running around." [17] A mere demonstration does not simulate potential environmental conditions and challenge human behavior to adequately evaluate whether the manual actions can be accomplished with any level of confidence. A demonstration does not qualify manual actions nor provides an equivalence in confidence of performance as do the currently required standardized fire tests to qualify fire barriers.

Government studies indicate that replacing automated functions with human actions can contribute to the likelihood that a variety of failed and erroneous human actions will significantly increase the risks for safely shutting down the reactor during an operational event such as fire. "This includes operating with known deficiencies, permitting 'workarounds' (i.e. requires alternate operator actions usually manual actions to operate the system) or documenting problems and solutions but failing to take action in time to prevent an equipment or system failure." [18]

Demand NRC enforce its current fire protection laws established as the result of a real fire and near catastrophic accident at Browns Ferry nuclear power station.

Demand NRC uphold its commitments to Congress to restore fire protection operability with qualified fire barrier systems at U.S. nuclear power stations.

PLEASE submit your written comments to NRC by January 26, 2004 and email or post a copy to NIRS or simply submit the sample comment attached below to:

Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail < nrcrep@nrc.gov >

RE: PUBLIC COMMENT ON DRAFT CRITERIA ON MANUAL ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN

To Whom It May Concern:

As a result of the near catastrophic fire at Browns Ferry nuclear power station in 1975, NRC is mandated by federal law to require electrical systems used for the automated shutdown of the reactor from the control room be maintained free from fire damage in the event of a serious fire. I am opposed to the proposed relaxation of enforcement of current fire code that would allow non-compliant reactor operators to sacrifice automated reactor shutdown electrical systems and instead substitute non-validated manual actions that increase unacceptable and undue risks to public health and safety and the environment in the event of a reactor fire.

Name: ___________________________________________

Address: ___________________________________________

Date: ___________________________________________

Additional Available Resource Materials:

"Nuclear Agency Changes Its Stance on a Fire Safety Proposal," Matt Wald, New York Times, November 26, 2003.

Visit NRC website Fire Protection Issues on Manual Operator Actions for agency documents < http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/fire-protection/technical-issues.html#manual >

You can also contact NIRS for additional materials.

Paul Gunter, Director Reactor Watchdog Project Nuclear Information and Resource Service 1424 16th Street NW Suite 404 Washington, DC 20036 tel. 202 328 0002 Email < pgunter@nirs.org >

[1] Federal Register: December 15, 2003 (Volume 68 Number 240) "Draft Criteria for Determining Feasibility of Manual Actions To Achieve Post-Fire Safe Shutdown: Extension of Public Comment Period," [Page 69730]

[2] Federal Register: November 26, 2003 (Volume 68 Number 228) "Draft Criteria for Determining Feasibility of Manual Actions To Achieve Post-Fire Safe Shutdown," [Page 66501-66503]

[3] Chapter 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2.

[4] "Post Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis: History, Safety Significance and Expectations,"

NRC/Industry Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis Workshop, Patrick Madden, U.S. NRC, July 28, 1998.

[5] "Browns Ferry: The Regulatory Failure," Union of Concerned Scientists, June 10, 1976

[6] Chapter 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 50.48(2)(iii) "Fire Protection".

[7] Bulletin No. 92-01, "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier Systems To Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free From Fire Damage," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 24, 1992.

[8] "White Paper For Manual Actions," John Hannon, Chief PSB/DSSA/NRR, US NRC, Letter to Alex Marion, Nuclear Energy Institute, November 29, 2001, Enclosure, FOIA 2003-0358 Appendix D22, p.1.

[9] "Rulemaking Plan On Post-Fire Operator Manual Actions," SECY-03-0100, U.S. NRC, June 17, 2003, [Page 4].

[10] Ibid, SECY-03-0100, [Page 5].

[11] "Fire Safety At Nuclear Power Stations," Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Oversight and Investigations of the Committee On Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, March 3, 1993.

[12] Official Transcript, "Interim Feasibility Criteria for Fire Protection Manual Actions: Public Meeting," November 12, 2003, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Comments of Richard Dudley, NRC, [Page 20 Lines 15-22]

[13] Email, Robert Daley, Region III, US NRC, To Phil Qualls, Fire Protection Engineer, US NRC, September 09, 2002, FOIA 2003-0358 Appendix N11.

[14] Dr. Graham Wallis, Official Transcript, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Fire Protection Subcommittee, Operator Manual Actions, September 09, 2003 , [Page 354 Line 11]

[15] Information Notice 97-21: "Availability of Alternate AC Power Source Designated for Station Blackout Event," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 18, 1997.

[16] Dr. Dana Powers, Official Transcript of Proceedings, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Fire Protection Subcommittee, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 09, 2003, [Page 310 Line 25-Page 311 Line 1-2]

[17] Ibid, ACRS Transcript, [Page 312 Line 14-16]

[18] "Summary of INEEL (Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory) Findings on Human Performance During Operating Events," Report No. CCN 00-005421, Transmitted by letter, February 29, 2000.

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